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The Broken Body and the Fragmented Self: 
Theological Anthropology after Girard 
Paul Andrew Fletcher 
Recent French post-structuralist thought, through its radical decentering of the self, 
has challenged the legitimacy of essentialist interpretations of human nature, 
whatever their theological or philosophical origin. My thesis is an exploration of the 
theological implications of this fracturing of the narratives in which human self- 
understanding is formed and transmitted. I begin this exploration with a two-fold 
critical engagement. First, I consider the `resituation' of the self in the recent thought 
of Derrida and Marion. Second, I examine the wide-ranging projects of Jürgen 
Habermas and his theological followers in which the self is `reconstituted' in the 
context of communicative action. In response to the inadequacy of these discourses 
for the reconfiguration of theological anthropology, I then turn to the work of Rene 
Girard. 
Rene Girard argues that mimetic desire governs all human social interaction and 
mimetic behaviour inevitably generates conflicts which threaten the very possibility 
of communal existence. By taking seriously the violence of intersubjectivity and in 
searching for a peaceable alternative, I argue, Girard offers us an opportunity to 
transcend the violent fragmentation of the human subject celebrated by the theorists 
of post-modernity and neglected by their critical-theoretical partners. His detailed 
attention to the constitution of selves through others' desire offers a significant 
resource for the revisioning of theological anthropology. 
Girard's project, however, is not uncritically embraced. I argue that his work has to 
be supplemented theologically and in relation to the `visceral register' of human 
existence. Consequently, I bring Girard's work into conversation with Maurice 
Blondel and Ignatius of Loyola. Through the work of the latter I construct - in 
conclusion - three `exercises' in which the viscerality of the self is central and 
through which an ethically responsible theological anthropology might be revisioned. 
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Introduction 
In his 1987 film, Der Himmel Ober Berlin, Wim Wenders portrays the trials and 
tribulations - the fragmentation - of modern urban life from a very peculiar, though illuminating, 
perspective. ' Wenders presents `a quasi-documentary of Berlin, a way of seeing the (at the time) 
divided city as a pastiche of individual lives, whose murmurs and acts of despair constitute a 
painful vision' of contemporary metropolitan existence. 2 This pastiche is offered in the context of 
the restless drifting of two angels, Danuel and Cassiel. The angels move effortlessly around (and 
literally through) the city providing a supra-mundane vantage point from which to observe the 
dissipated and detached lives of individual human beings. The endless angelic vocation, as 
Damiel concedes, is simply to `look, assemble, testify, observe. ' In the process of observing the 
pain and joy of people's lives and testifying to their actions and omissions, Damiel falls in love 
with a circus performer, Marion. This love affair is characterised by two things: distance, because 
Marion is unaware of the angel's presence (only children have that privileged awareness) and 
melancholy, as Damiel yearns for a self-realisation that only materiality and sensuality can 
facilitate. The medium of this endless melancholy, particularly for Damiel, is the angels' 
I Der Himmel über Berlin, Wim Wenders, 1987. The film was renamed Wings of Desire for an English- 
speaking audience. 
Robert Phillip Kolker & Peter Beicken, The Films of Wim Wenders: Cinema as Vision and Desire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 138. 
existence in timelessness and infinite space. This constitutes the `angelic condition', a state in 
which stability and the need to be available are constants but within which Damiel feels 
incomplete. This is demonstrated in a lament at one point in the film when Damiel confesses that 
he would love to be able to say `Here' and `Now' rather than `Forever' and `Always'. He desires 
to participate fully in the ebb and flow of life rather than continue with an angelic pretence. Thus 
the angel falls to earth - enters the human condition - and the complexity and carnality of life are 
embraced, a fact attested to in Wenders' switch from the black and white of eternity to the full 
colour of contingency. This fall from black and white disengagement to the immersion within 
technicolor, however, is a descent into self-actualization rather than sin -a compelling inversion of 
the myth of Lucifer's fall. 
This celluloid juxtaposition of the angelic and the human provides a powerful 
commentary on the state and status of subjectivity in a postmodern context. This celluloid 
elucidation of the human condition is, however, equivocal in its determinant elements. In the first 
place the film presents the spectator with a postmodern anti-narrative: 
One is confronted not with a unified text, much less by the presence of a distinct 
personality and sensibility, but by a discontinuous terrain of heterogeneous 
discourses uttered by anonymous, unplaceable tongues, a chaos different from 
that of the classic texts of high modernism precisely insofar as it is not 
recontained or recuperated within an overarching mythic framework. 3 
Only from an angelic point of view can any coherence and meaning be insinuated but within this 
(spiritual) world existence is monochromatic and devoid of any real delight. 
3 F. Pfeil, `Postmodernism as a "structure of feeling" ' Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (eds) C. 
Nelson & L. Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988), 384. 
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The sense of fragmentation, of the death or at least decomposition of unifying meta- 
narratives, is embodied in the figure of Homer the muse. This old and frail figure holds history 
and identity together but his time is limited and in his own wanderings through the city he exhibits 
a sense of loss and a heavy burden of mourning for those who have literally lost the plot. Homer, 
nevertheless, has one last desire: to write and recount an epic of peace that can be realised in flesh 
and blood. Yet while the film presents this noble desire it is set within the realm of doubt and 
impossibility because everything that surrounds Homer - isolation, the violence of history and the 
division symbolised by the Berlin wall - militates against his vision. 
Nevertheless, in its endorsement of the supremacy and incomparability of a sensible and 
tangible environment, Wings of Desire is also a celebration of the colour of human life. This is 
reinforced by Damiel's encounter with Peter Falk who, as a former angel himself, is able to 
appreciate the significance of the former's fall: `How good it is to be here, just to touch something 
To smoke, have coffee and if you do it together it's fantastic. ' In these sensuous terms the film 
is an attempt to resolve the fragmentation, brokenness and division of social existence in the wake 
of Homer and the diremption of the city and its inhabitants. Damiel lacks any history and his 
lover-to-be, Marion, is an exile whose desire to be an angel -a trapeze artist with wings - is foiled 
by the economic failure of the circus. The coming together of their desire and their bodies, 
however, symbolises an immanent resurrection and a return to paradise. `We are on our way' 
claims Marion as the camera ushers us towards the heavens at the close of the film. 
This denouement, however, is the moment of contradiction. Wenders attempts a 
resolution of the crisis of subjectivity by reinstating, indeed resuscitating, a subject to whom the 
film seemed a last testimony or eulogy. A Romantic unity with colour, sense and sensibility 
sublates deficient histories and deterritorialization and `autonomy, identity. liberty, choice and 
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fulfilment'4 arise from the release of the spiritual into the material in the miracle of an inverse 
resurrection. Subjectivity and identity, topics that are portrayed by Wenders as problematic for so 
much of the film, are suddenly reconstituted in the arms of another. 
It is this contradiction in Wenders' cinematic exploration that serves as a sign of the times. 
This is true not only for art house cinema but for theological considerations of the self. There has 
arisen in the last few decades a major threat to the very possibility of a theological anthropology. 
This challenge relates to the destruction or deconstruction of the very subject matter of that sub- 
discipline - namely, the self. 
The modem self was constituted on the basis of consciousness, ultimately understood as 
self-consciousness, and unity and identity were deemed to be secure even in the midst of the 
change and flux of life. 
Subject (or `suppositum') is the name given to a be-ing whose identity is 
sufficiently stable for it to bear, in every sense of the word (sustain, serve as a 
foundation for, withstand), change or modification. The subject remains the 
same, while accidental qualities are altered. Since Descartes, the most subjective 
of all subjects is the one which is certain of its identity, the ego of ego cogito. 
The quality of subjectivity is thus confined to consciousness. 
Attacking both `phenomenological consciousness and the logic of identity', 6 recent philosophical 
and critical-theoretical assessments of subjectivity have forcibly removed the foundations of this 
4 Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 1. 
5 Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy trans. L. Scott-Fox & J. M. Harding (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), 76. 
6 Ibid. 
theoretical edifice and replaced it with a confusing `series of diverse zones, subject to differing, 
constraints, frequently of an irreconcilable sort. '7 Consequently, according to Gianni Vattimo, 
Far from being able to be summed up and centred in consciousness, or in the 
knowledge each of us has of himself and the responsibility each conceives for 
himself, the individual personality is an ensemble, perhaps not even a system, of 
different strata or `pulsations' as we might call them (Nietzsche calls them 
`passions') that are at odds with one another and give rise to equilibria that are 
never more than provisional. 8 
If Vattimo is correct, and he is only one of a myriad of thinkers to follow this line of thought, then 
the suggestion that the self is but an `ensemble of pulsations' provides a major challenge to 
theological appraisals of the state and status of subjectivity. Old certainties are threatened, if not 
irreparably damaged, and a theological response is essential. The demand for a response, 
however, is not simply the result of a need to provide a competent rejoinder to recent theoretical 
developments. The requirement to respond arises from the remarkable socio-political changes in 
the post-war west that have transformed the site and status of subjectivity. 
The crisis of subjectivity- that which Frank Farrell calls its disenchantment9 - is, according 
to Eric Alliez, a `crisis of habitat. ' 10 Fragmentation and the `suppression of distance' 1I between 
strangers who have no shared home are the conditions in which the contemporary urban self has to 
7 Wlad Godzich, `Foreword: The Further Possibility of Knowledge' in Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: 
Discourse on the Other (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), ix. 
8 Gianni Vattimo, `The Decline of the Subject and the Problem of Testimony' The Adventure of Difference: 
Philosophy after Heidegger and Nietzsche trans. C. Blamires & T. Harrison (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), 45. 
9 Frank B. Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism: The Recovery of the World in Recent 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
10 Eric Alliez, Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time trans. G. Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 228. 
11 Frederic Jameson, `Cognitive Mapping' Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (eds) C. Nelson & L. 
Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988), 351 
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forge a home and a habitat. 12 If Erasmus could suggest, in the late Renaissance period, that The 
city is a huge monastery' 13 then the postmodern urban landscape represents a move from the 
recreational and shared space of the Benedictine cloister to the rigidly separated life of the cell in a 
privatised version of the Strict Observance of the Trappists. Yet these 'cells' do not represent a 
stable and constant space for the practice of askesis and a vocational cultivation of the self. 
Rather, as Alliez contends 
In the city, there are no more places, only emplacements relative to 
displacements, with no instance more "profound" than the speed of circulation 
within a space empty of any ultimate and original dimension, a space that annuls 
itself in the explicating itself ouside of itself: in analysis, in the decomposition of 
motion into units of distance and time. The city is a cinematic entity. 1 
The rise of capitalism and the concomitant creation of a particularly modem conception 
of time and history (that Alliez exposes) transformed the telos towards and through which human 
beings moved. Time, objectified in the course of Enlightenment thought, ' 5 (literally) brought with 
it the mechanism through which `human beings made history'16 - for it was by means of the 
machine that they did so. In the context of late-capitalism, and the dissolution of any unifying 
telos, it is time that creates human beings: `For us, it is the time of the workday - and the 
subordination of work to time: the time of wages, the capitalistic (in the strict sense) time of 
products, of time that is stocked up, moved forward, negotiated in an abstract commerce that 
11 Indeed, Giorgio Agamben claims that the exilic `existence' of the refugee and the camp internee is the 
paradigm for contemporary political life in western democracies. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
13 Quoted by Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life trans. S. Rendall (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 93. 
14 Eric Alliez, Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, 228. Alliez's emphasis. 
15 The point being that with the turn to the subject objectification is a necessary consequence. As Heidegger 
puts it, `the essence of subjectivism is objectivism, insofar as everything becomes an object for the subject. ' 
Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics (ed. ) David 
Farrell Krell, trans. Joan Stamburgh et at. (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 221. 
16 Helga Nowotny, Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience trans. Neville Plaice (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994), 47. 
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introduces the consideration of its capitalization under the conditions of infinite duration. ' 17 What 
has occurred is the reversal of Enlightenment progress, or to be more precise, the deceleration of 
progressive time - the infinite duration of the `extended present'. 
18 It is not simply the case that, 
as the graffiti artist put it, `the future is no longer what it used to be' but that the future is 
increasingly overshadowed by the problems which are opening up in the present. 
The future no longer offers that projection space into which all desires, hopes and 
fears could be projected without many inhibitions because it seemed sufficiently 
remote to be able to absorb everything which had no place or was unwelcome in 
the present. 19 
Helga Nowotny sees the `future drawing closer to the present'20 in the techno-scientific quest to 
conquer time and its exigencies. She points to G. H. von Wright's conviction that `Time is man's 
flight from contradiction. '21 The pertinent question, then, is whence comes this contradiction 
from which human beings are attempting to flee in the postmodern context? 
The contradiction which is being fled from in this way arises, among other things, 
from the fact that the insatiable desire for technological and scientific innovations, 
and the rapid pace at which they are to be converted into economic growth, 
produce both the unforseeable element and the essence of the innovation, and in 
addition also seek to bring under control all the consequent effects of this very 
innovation. 22 
The name of the game is to control both innovation in order to produce desire (and guilt) and 
comprehend and command in advance the repercussions of such an innovative creed. 
Consequently, the future is chosen: `But this future which is to be created is already taking place 
17 Eric Alliez, Capital Times, 227. 
18 Cf. Helga Nowotny, Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience, 45-74. 19 Ibid., 50. 
`0 Ibid., 51. 
21 Ibid., 50. Cf. G. H. von Wright, Time, Chance and Contradiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968). 
22 Ibid., 51. 
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now, is being determined in the extended present. "3 It is the extended present that chooses the 
future and not vice versa. '24 The relation between present and future has undergone a massive 
shift, the outcome of which is that the future is put into operation - now! 
25 An image comes to 
mind of Walter Benjamin's angel of history who, rather than being irresistibly propelled into the 
future to which his back is turned', 26 is limping backwards, the stumbling due to the fetters around 
his legs that issue from the extended present. It is the managers - the manipulators - of techno- 
scientific innovation who direct the angel's course, not the storm blowing from paradise nor the 
gift of providence. 
This loss of possibility, and the `infinite duration' of the present that takes its place in the 
reign of determinism suggests that the present condition in which humans live, survive and 
prosper is marked by a series of spatio-temporal fractures that have resulted in a quite 
unprecedented crisis of identity. Moreover, any possibility or future is commodified and 
controlled and selves are subject to a status founded on `value' or price - the irreducible is reduced 
to the value given within a specific currency. In this study I will attempt a theological response to 
the fragmentation of the self that takes into account both recent theoretical reflection on the 
subject and the existential challenge that faces a theological enquiry. My hope in this study is 
modest. I wish to question contemporary solutions - both philosophical and theological - and add 
a somewhat different perspective that takes seriously the state and status of the self and the vitality 
of a tradition that is often ignored in constructive appraisals of theological anthropology. 
'`3 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 52. 
25 Cf. Ibid. 
26 Walter Benjamin, `Theses on the Philosophy of History', Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (London: 
Fontana Press, 1973), 249. 
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In pursuit of this goal I will, initially, utilise the contradiction portrayed in Wenders' 
speculation on the possibilities for human existence as a mise-en-scene within which to place this 
theological rejoinder. Practically, this entails an analysis in Part One of two prevalent solutions to 
the present crisis of subjectivity: namely, an acceptance of the fragmentary character of the self 
from which arises an attempt to radically resituate the self after, and in line with, its 
deconstruction and, alternatively, an undertaking to reconstitute subjectivity that arises as a 
reaction to -indeed against - the dissolution of a subjective ground for dialogue and community. 
This entails an analysis in Chapter One of the attempt by Jacques Derrida, in particular, to revision 
subjectivity on the basis of the negation of religion. In its wake, he proposes a `religion without 
religion' shorn of any theologico-metaphysical overlay or any commitment to dogma, doctrine or 
articles of faith. As a counterpoint to Derrida's nondogmatism, I consider the philosophical 
theology of Jean-Luc Marion. Marion reconfigures subjectivity in relation to an ecclesiastical 
hierarchy and, in contrast to Derrida, he locates the only authentically theological subject in the 
hands of the bishop and his concomitant ecclesial dogmatism. These alternatives, I will argue, are 
seriously deficient solutions. As two distinctive attempts to resituate the self, I argue that Derrida 
and Marion's dissolution of the self (negative anthropology) and its theological complement 
(negative theology) embody a tendency towards political and ecclesial quiescence. Neither figure 
provides the resources for an ethically and theologically responsible anthropology. In Chapter 
Two I move on to consider the attempt by Jürgen Habermas to reconstitute subjectivity on the 
basis of an rationality that is distinct from the instrumental and purposive rationality that has been 
dominant in the modern era. In order to complete rather than reject the project of modernity, 
Habermas proposes the delimitation of this type of rationality and its supplementation with 
another rationality based on human intersubjective discourse. Habermas, a leading scholar of the 
second generation of the Frankfurt school and intensely interested in the revival of the public 
nature of subjectivity, attempts through an analysis of communication to provide the grounds for 
non-coercive relations to others in the context of a broad understanding of the role and 
significance of reason. In line with Habermas's philosophical reflections, I then move to examine 
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the theological bed-fellow of this attempt to reconstitute the self -a theology of sociality where 
mutuality and understanding are central theoretical motifs. Both perspectives are charged «ith a 
tacit disregard for difference, contingency and contestation. This is particularly true of theological 
responses in which the (often) purely formal outline of this reconstitution of subjectivity is 
overlooked or its significance underestimated. Crucially, in the context of theological 
anthropology, this reconstitutive project ignores the bodily, visceral nature of subjectivity. 
As an alternative to these contemporary projects I turn, in Part Two of this study to the 
work of Rene Girard. Girard provides an alternative approach to the present crisis of subjectivity. 
While taking seriously the fragmentation of the self within western societies, Girard's analyses of 
culture, religion and identity offer, I argue, a way through and beyond these two prevalent 
alternatives. His analyses of violence, culture and religion offer significant resources for the 
interrogation of the human condition in which conflict and the problem of recognition are 
constants. Card's work is not, however, uncritically embraced and for the purpose of delineating 
a theological anthropology I critically evaluate and augment his hypothesis. 
The modification and, more importantly, the augmentation of Girard's work is executed 
in Part Three. There I examine the two major contributions to an understanding of the self that are 
explicitly theological in character - the existential analysis of the early Martin Heidegger and the 
phenomenological examination of action and practice carried out by Maurice Blondel. It is 
Blondel's work, I believe, that provides a theological supplement to the cultural criticism of 
Girard. Blondel's rapprochement with Girard is then situated within the rubric of the spiritual 
exercise, through which Girard's explication of desire is placed within the context of grace and 
nature and through which the motif of performance is given prominence. 
17 
Finally, as a conclusion to this study, I attempt to outline the possible configuration of the 
subject and the framework within which the self might be set in a theological anthropology after 
Girard. I attend, in particular, to some examples of desiring practice that are performed in relation 
to both scripture and tradition. These practices also take seriously the multifaceted nature of 
subjectivity and the various `registers' of the self are thoroughly integrated into a theoretical 
engagement with desire. Moreover, these performances attempt to reclaim the body in theological 
anthropology by means of attending to the movement of the bowels. To begin, however, I will 
now move to the first of Wenders' subjects - the resituating of the self. 
18 
Part One 
Chapter One: 
Resituating Subjectivity 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter (and the next) is to outline the present state of some major 
strands of philosophical and theological anthropology. The reason for undertaking such a task is 
not simply to portray possible responses to the kind of existential crises of space and time that I 
sketched in the introduction. There have been a number of attempts, particularly within 
continental philosophy over the last three decades or so, to dissolve the specifically modem self. 
The challenges that such projects pose for theology are huge. That is not to say that they are 
wrong-headed but that theologians have to engage with the varied implications of such ventures. 
Here I will briefly contextualize contemporary discussions with an overview of the relationship 
between the death of God and the demise of the subject. This will provide a backdrop to an 
encounter with one of the two strategies that I delineated with reference to Wenders' portrayal of 
subjectivity in Der Himmel über Berlin - the resituation of the subject. 
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This encounter will proceed in two movements. First, I will indicate the manner in which 
deconstruction, and Jacques Derrida in particular, understands how it is that the subject is 
dissolved and then resituated. This contemporary theoretical perspective is the most important 
and (in)famous example of the postmodern critique and reassessment of modern anthropological 
discourse and effectively demands a wholesale reappraisal of essentialist and existentialist 
interpretations of human nature. Second, I will outline the very different approach to the subject 
offered by Jean-Luc Marion. Marion's highly distinctive contribution to philosophical theology 
includes, I will demonstrate, a negative anthropology that is predicated on the primacy of the gift. 
This aspect of Marion's work is often disregarded as attention is more often given to his retrieval 
of negative theology. Nevertheless, I will argue that Marion's negative anthropology is just as 
important an ingredient in his construction of an ecclesiology and eucharist-centred theology as is 
his engagement with traditional apophaticism. In response to these dissimilar postmodern 
approaches to the question of the self, I will then critically evaluate the theological and socio- 
political implications of their work. Before doing so, however, I will first consider the fate of the 
subject who requires resituating. 
1.1: The Dissolution of the Subject 
The pivotal feature of the modern subject is disclosed in Montaigne's assertion in the 
Essays that `I have no other business but myself. I am eternally mediating upon myself, 
considering and tasting myself. ' 
1 Here the emphasis is clearly on the interior, private character of 
Montaigne's identity and it is the prominence of this inner life that results in the modern 
`thinning' out of the world. 
2 `Meaning, clarity, and truth, ' as Charles Winquist suggests, `all 
become the domain of the subject. A reversal into modernity occurred in this move. Inner reality 
I Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. D. M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1957), II, 17, p. 499. 
` Frank Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism: The Recovery of the World in Recent Philosophie 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2-3. 
2 
was valued over the external world. '3 From the perspective of the absolute self-presence and 
security that Montaigne perceives in the inner life - that non-negotiable, privatised realm of 
certainty - contemporary theory seems to have moved towards an anarchic celebration of a 
`fragmented diachronicity. '4 The postmodern context, in contrast to Montaigne's assured manner, 
is marked by a moment of ineluctable privation: 
Postmodernism opens with the sense of irrevocable loss and incurable fault. 
This wound is inflicted by the overwhelming awareness of death -a death that 
"begins" with the death of God and "ends" with the death of our selves. '' 
The `death of our selves' signals a crisis of identity that is the existential subject matter of 
Wenders' films and that is identified, theoretically at least, with the destruction of a `metaphysics 
of presence'. The latter is established on the basis of a self-presence secured through self- 
consciousness. To quote Hegel: 
The truth of consciousness is the self-consciousness and the latter is the ground of 
the former, such that in existence all consciousness of another object is self- 
consciousness. I know of an object that is mine (it is my representation); in doing 
so I know of myself. 6 
The world, interaction and others are little more than provisions that feed self-awareness and the 
building blocks that assist the advancement to consciousness. The displacement of consciousness 
as the foundation for the development of individual particularity and individual awareness of 
identity has occurred, not least, as a response to Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God. 
3 Charles Winquist, Desiring Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 10. 
4 Mark C. Taylor, `The Empty Mirror' Deconstructing Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 93. 
Ibid. 
6 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel 's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Philosophical Sciences trans. A. V. 
Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), § 424. 
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The relationship between the death of God and the death of the self is well documented. 
The first part of this relation consists in the death of God being a `combination of Luther's 
Reformation insistence on a personal relationship with God and Descartes' decisive turn to the 
subject, thereby implicating theology in anthropology, that culminates in a need for the death of 
God to liberate the humanistic subject. '7 God here is understood in terms of being, esse, and 
onto-theologically provides a ground or identity through which difference is held secure and 
ultimately returned to the one. The death of God is the violent interchange of one basic 
metaphysical support - God - to another - Man. According to the Nietzsche of The Gay Science, 
this interchange is contrived by way of murder. ` "Wither is God? ", he cried. "I will tell you. We 
have killed him - you and I. All of us are his murderers. " `8 The bold claim of the madman 
brings to light a new age that is full of both terrifying and enticing possibilities for human beings. 
The challenge to begin again is, in Nietzsche's terms, daunting but the prospects cannot be viewed 
as `all sad and dark but rather like a new, scarcely describable kind of light, happiness, relief, 
exhilaration, encouragement, dawn. '9 However, as long as `Man' takes the place of the dead God 
then the precarious relationship of dependence between the divine authority and the patricidal 
subject is concealed. Feuerbach's insistence that `the absolute to man is his own nature' 
10 
demonstrates the theological legitimacy of the subject even though this subject is now a creator in 
the context of atheistic humanism. This modern subject has imperial pretensions, is believed to 
possess an essence as impervious as his fallen predecessor and his murder of the divine is fulfilled 
in order to deify himself. As Charles Davis puts it, `Descartes' cogito to which we can trace the 
origin of the modem subject, transferred to man the function of God as the source of reality and 
intelligibility. ' 11 God's death is effected through the assertion of the subject and opens up the 
prospect of the human individual `determining the essence of certainty by himself in accordance 
with the essence of certainty in general (self-assurance), and thus of bringing humanity to 
' Charles Winquist, Desiring Theology, 114. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 181. 
9 Ibid, 182. 
10 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity trans. G. Eliot (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 5. 
1 Charles Davis, `Our Modern Identity: The Formation of the Self Modern Theology 6: 2 (1990), 165. 
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dominance within what is real. ' 12 Consequently, to quote James Bernauer, the subject becomes 
nothing less than `a substitute for the Absolute. ' 13 This thematic - of the self-assertion of the 
subject - is evident throughout the modern period from Hobbes to Hegel14 and is undermined by 
Nietzsche in that he accounts for the overcoming of God in terms of Man's frustration, resentment 
and desire for revenge. 
The claim of Nietzsche's French successors is that within the logic of the modem critique 
of metaphysics and the consequent rise of the subject lies the resources that ensure the demise of 
the latter. If `the modem form of the death of God comes to expression in humanistic atheism' 1 
then the death of the subject is the result of the same murderous disease: to kill the Other who is 
the `original ground of selfhood', 16 is to kill the one who assumes the divine identity. The 
dissolution of one ground of truth and certainty is negotiated on the basis of the establishment of 
another - Man. But atheistic humanism is deemed to fail in that it is founded on equally uncertain 
grounds. The subjectum that Man himself has become is the result of a scepticism with regard to 
a metaphysical foundation that was claimed to reside in the divine. Yet, this same scepticism, 
taken to its conclusion, undermines the human subject as the ultimate foundation upon which 
things are rendered intelligible. The inheritance of the masters of suspicion is a recognition, 
maintained although modified by deconstruction, that `identity is always constructed and situated 
in a field and amid a flow of contending cultural discourses. ' 17 A sure foundation upon which the 
subject is based is dissipated and if subjectivity remains it is an effect of, for instance, the 
dif j`erance of language (Derrida) or of economies of desire (Deleuze). However one chooses to 
12 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy trans. J. Stamburgh (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 20. 
13 James Bernauer, `The Prisons of Man: An Introduction to Foucault's Negative Theology' International 
Philosophical Quarterly 27: 4 (1987), 368. 
14 Cf. Anthony J. Cascardi, The Subject of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 31. 
15 Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 20. 
16 Ibid., 23. 
17 Craig Calhoun, `Social Theory and the Politics of Identity' Social Theory and the Politics of Identity (ed. ) 
C. Calhoun (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 12. 
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theorise the dissolution of the subject, one issue is central: `Henceforth, thinking begins not with 
the constituting conscious subject but with the material, historical, economic (both in the Marxist 
and Freudian senses of the word), discursive, or linguistic structures, practices, and drives that 
constitute subjectivity and of which the subject is an effect. ' 18 Rather than a self-grounded 
subject, the dissolved self is dependent on otherness - the heterogeneity of conditions that 
constitute its possibility - for any form of identity. 
1.2. - Resituating the Subject 
The thrust of deconstruction and its constant negativity is to resituate the subject. This is 
attempted in a double move: first, the critical gesture that reveals the illusory nostalgia of 
unimpaired formulation of subjectivity and then, second, an emphasis on the Other whom the 
sovereign subject objectified and excluded. This second movement is carried out through the 
interrogation of various common thematics such as responsibility and difference. Consequently, 
subjectivity is always mediated rather than fixed and suggests our dependence on, and 
accountability to, those others that are pre-given. 
The deprivation of grounds for certainty - whether divine or human - results in a void 
characterised by the dissolution of the absolute signified (God) and its privileged signifier (Man). 
Presence can no longer be guaranteed on the basis of divine or human self-presence and, 
consequently, negativity and loss are dominant motifs of the deconstructive turn. It is for this 
reason the `religious' or `theological' have become more than mere sub-texts or areas of 
misunderstanding as proponents of deconstruction have tackled religious questions explicitly. 19 A 
18 Simon Critchley, `Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity' Deconstructiv e Subjectivrtie. ti 
reds) S. Critchley & P. Dews (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 26. 
9 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, `Of Divine Places', The Inoperative ('ommunii r (ed. ) & trans. P. Connor 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), Jacques Derrida, `How to Avoid Speaking: Denials' 
25 
remarkable feature of the engagement with religious themes and problems is that in considering 
and banishing a particular subjectivity based on a metaphysics of presence, the advocates of the 
dissolution of the self - Derrida and Blanchot are exemplary here - constantly mourn the absent 
presence of alterity: 
self-relation welcomes or supposes the other within its being-itself as different 
from itself. And reciprocally: the relation to the other (in itself outside myself, 
outside myself in myself) will never be distinguishable from a bereaved 
apprehension. 20 
This bereavement is a constant motif within the work of Derrida and Blanchot. In Blanchot's The 
Writing of the Disaster21 and Derrida's essay `Post-Scriptum', 22 the annihilation of the subject, 
the death of Man, and an apophatic theology move hand in hand. Both theorists place in close and 
dependent relation an `impossible death' that eludes subjective experience and points to radical 
finitude and an `unknowable divine'. 23 Death, that which it is impossible to experience - it is the 
ultimate limit - and a God of which nothing positive can be said - unknown and ineffable as God 
is - are the absent protagonists in the incessant performance of grief. Just as death is the limit that 
acts as the heterogeneous other to self-consciousness and self-presence, questioning and 
destroying its claims, so the God of negative theology, before or beyond esse, deconstructs the 
pretensions of metaphysics in the demand for constant negation. More importantly, however, 
Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory (eds) S. Budick & 
W. Iser (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). I use the term `misunderstanding' here as early 
advocates of deconstruction were at pains to stress the distance between it and negative theology. Cf. 
Spivak's introduction to Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology trans. G. Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), lxxviii. 
20 Jacques Derrida, Aporias trans. T. Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 61. 
21 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster trans. A. Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1986). 
22 Jacques Derrida, `Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways, Voices' Derrida and Negative Theology (eds. ) H. 
Coward & T. Foshay (New York: SUNY Press, 1992), 283-323. 
-. Cf Thomas A. Carlson, `The Poverty and Poetry of Indiscretion: Negative theology and Negative 
Anthropology in Contemporary and Historical Perspective' Christianity and Literature 47: 2 (1998), 169 & 
Thomas A. Carlson, Indiscretion: Finitude and the Naming of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999). 
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negative theology is a seductive motif for deconstruction on the basis of its passi\ m. Rather than 
forcibly speaking for and in place of the Other and establishing an absolute, divine identity. the 
way of negation is responsible to those deprived of language and effectively silenced. The 
apophatic disrupts the closure of representation, concept and value while, in contrast, the danger 
of positive religion is its inherent violence. 
Because of its deconstructive potential, negative theology, as the bedfellow of negative 
anthropology, is 'hot'. 24 Negative theology reminds us that there is always some Other prior to 
and before us, our utterance and our domination: `Language has started without us, in us and 
before us. This is what theology calls God, and it is necessary, it will have been necessary, to 
speak. ' 25 Unlike positive, tradition bound religion - dogma, doctrine and articles of faith - 
negative theology in the hands of deconstruction emphasises the impossibility of absolute 
certainty or truth and the provisionality of any formulation with regard to the divine. Even if, as 
Derrida contends, the apophatic returns to the positive, it is always as promise to be fulfilled. 26 
Yet the promise is not located in any one place. It is always to be and is not yet. There is always 
then a disjunction between the divine promise insinuated in negative theology and the positive 
moment of the institution of the religious. The significance of this disjunction has been delineated 
in two major reconsiderations of theology that require exposition and comment. First, I will 
consider this disjunction in Derrida's work, its importance for an understanding of the state of 
theological motifs and its significance for theological anthropology in particular. Then, second, i 
will outline the way in which Jean-Luc Marion has transformed this disjunction into a conjunction 
in the bid to move beyond a theology predicated on a metaphysics of presence. 
24 Mark C. Taylor, 
25 Jacques Derrida, 
26 Ibid., 49. 
`nO nOt nO' Derrida and Negative Theology, 176. 
`How to Avoid Speaking: Denials', 29. 
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1.3: Religion Without Religion 
The problematic status of `the religious' constitutes the focus of Derrida's highly 
provocative and penetrating essay on faith and reason. 27 It is not the divine that is the concern of 
Derrida in this essay; how could it be when the parameters of the discussion rest on the Kantian 
subtitle la `religion' aux limites de la simple raison? It is undoubtedly strange that this motif, 
which resonates so clearly with the edification of the sovereign subject that dif erance has done so 
much to undermine, should inform Derrida's exploration of religion. The reason, however, is 
crystal clear. Religion, according to Derrida, has inevitable consequences, the effects of which 
can be observed everywhere but particularly in the Middle East, and even more particularly in 
Jerusalem. For Middle Eastern violence is nothing less than an `unleashing of messianic 
eschatologies'28, the inevitable result of the theological content of the political. 29 Derrida's 
political response to this violence - which is religio-politics - is to limit (within reason) the concept 
of religion, not to call for its evacuation but to reinscribe what it is that is religious. 
30 Again, this 
is the most Kantian of gestures. 
31 For here, rather than constructing an epistemological barrier 
that ensures (within reason) the separation of the natural and the supernatural, Derrida is inscribing 
a grammatological or, to be more exact, a geometrical barrier in which the figure of the religious 
is drawn within the political yet the boundaries are prevented from intersecting. Only in this way 
can the violent messianisms, so dependent on the fuel of religious and theological conviction, be 
evacuated from politics. 
27 Jacques Derrida, `Foi et Savoir: Les deux sources de la « religion » aux limites de la simple raison' La 
Religion: Seminaire de Capri sous la direction de Jacques Derrida et Gianni Vattimo (ed. ) Thierry 
Marchaisse (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996), 
28 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994), 59. 
29 Although things may be more complex than Derrida thinks. Cf David Martin, Does Christianity Cause 
War? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
30 Jacques Derrida, `Foi et Savoir', 16-17. 
31 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone trans. Theodore M. Green & Hoyt H. 
Hudson (New York: Harper, 1960). 
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Let us for a moment, however, examine what constitutes the possible religious response to 
violence in Derrida's religio-political schema. Derrida posits, in the face of the violence of 
religion, the possibility of a `religion without religion'. Taking up a long-standing reflection on 
the conjunction between justice and deconstruction, 32 Derrida's journey into the ternton of 
religion sees him at pains to warn of the consequences of the fundamentalisms that abound with 
the adherence to positive, dogma-bound religious traditions. In place of these phenomena that 
engender and sustain violence, Derrida suggests that what he is proposing, as the heir (or is it 
prodigal son? ) to a particular strain of western thought, is `a nondogmatic doublet of dogma, a 
philosophical and metaphysical doublet, in any case a thinking that "repeats" the possibility of 
religion without religion. " -3 And in the same place Derrida provides us with a clue as to the 
content of this (albeit contentless) religion: 
The Christian themes can be seen to revolve around the gift as gift of death, the 
fathomless gift of a type of death: infinite love (the Good as goodness that 
infinitely forgets itself), sin and salvation, repentance and sacrifice. What 
engenders all these meanings and links them, internally and necessarily, is a logic 
that at bottom (that is why it can still, up to a certain point, be called a "logic") 
has no need of the event of a revelation or the revelation of the event. It needs to 
think the possibility of such an event but not the event itself. This is a major point 
of difference, permitting such a discourse to be developed without reference to 
religion as institutional dogma, and proposing a genealogy of thinking concerning 
the possibility and essence of the religious that doesn't amount to an article of 
faith. 34 
This lengthy quote helps us to pinpoint the formless composition of a `religion without religion'. 
In order for the "logic" of infinite love in the face of the other, of justice, to be an impossible 
possibility, religion must be evacuated of its dogma, its articles of faith. Religion here is not that 
which exists as a particular example of a tradition but an unrevealed alterity, the ineluctable 
32 Cf. especially, Jacques Derrida, ` Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"' Deconstruction 
and the Possibility of. hustice (eds) Drucilla Cornell et al. (London: Routledge, 1992), 3-67. 33 Jacques Demda, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 49. 34 Ibid. 
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responsibility before the other: `Religion, it is the response. [La religion, c'esl la reponse. ]'3' 
This evacuation of theological content is a familiar Derridean move, reminiscent in so many ways 
of the young Heidegger's attempt to recover, through a `destruction' of the impurity of a 
Christianity overlaid with Neoplatonism, the authentic factical life experience of primordial 
Christianity. 36 In relation to the dangerous supplement of theological content, `the point would 
seem to be to liberate theology from what has been grafted on to it, to free it from its 
metaphysico-philosophical super-ego, so as to uncover an authenticity of the "gospel", of the 
evangelical message. ' 
37 
Derrida's engagement with religion in general and theology in particular emphasises an 
encounter with otherness that precedes a positive, exclusive proclamation of truth. He invalidates 
the drive for immediacy whether it is predicated on the basis of revelation or experience. Indeed, 
in stark contrast to the metaphysical or phenomenal security of dogma-bound religiosity, Derrida 
portrays Christianity as engendered by a love that is actualised at the limit - death. This `logic' of 
sacrificial giving and the refusal of a priority in truth characterises an authentic Christianity 
whereas institutional forms of religion, while contaminated by this `logic', conceal and expurgate 
its unspeakable challenge to violence and immediacy. However, this logic is also based on the 
negation of a God of metaphysics and the refusal of a subjectivity that is in some sense self- 
contained. Any notion of the self is, for Derrida, already inscribed with alterity and a rejection of 
this displacement is seen within deconstruction as an offensive illusion: `To speak nobly of the 
human in man, to conceive the humanity in man, is to quickly come to a discourse that is 
35 Jacques Derrida, `Foi et Savoir', 39. 
36 C£ especially, Martin Heidegger, Augustunis und der Neoplatonismus, Gesamtausgabe 11. Band 60, 
Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (Frankfurt, a. M.: Klostermann, 1995), 157-299. There is also 
something of a Nietzschean twist here. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
& R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), § 214, (Nov. 1887 - March 1888), 125. `They have 
mastered Christianity: Judaism (Paul); Platonism (Augustine); the mystery cult (doctrine of redemption, 
emblem of the "cross"); asceticism (- enmity toward "nature", "reason", "the senses" - the Orient - ). ' 37 James Creech, et al. , `Deconstruction 
in America: An Interview with Jacques Derrida' Critical Exchange 
17 (1985), 12. 
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untenable and undeniably more repugnant than all the nihilist vulgarities. ' 
38 The logic of 
humanism is that of violence and exploitation and deconstruction attempts, through the alliance of 
negations - theological and anthropological - to resituate both discourses. 
1.4: The Recuperation of Theology 
A quite different combination between a negative theology and a negative anthropology is 
evident in Jean-Luc Marion's philosophical theology. Marion's aim is to save the deity from the 
charge that "God" constitutes the Being who grounds beings and, as such, is the metaphysical 
problem per se. He attempts this by reversing the logic through which theological discourse is 
approached: `At issue here is not the possibility of God's attaining Being, but, quite the opposite, 
the possibility of Being's attaining to God. '39 Consequently, Marion `shoots' for God according 
to a name that is his most theological, 40 a name that is wholly otherwise than the one which 
provides the basis for the `onto-theo-logical' constitution of metaphysics. This name that is, 
according to Marion, above all other names, is charity. 
41 This rather imprecise name is 
deliberately contrasted with what Marion calls `the extremely precise characteristics' of onto-theo- 
logy. 42 I shall outline these characteristics in due course, but the process of Marion's attempt to 
foreclose a `postmodern questioning'43 of the deity in relation to metaphysics is two-fold. In the 
first place, he quite literally distances God from the field of metaphysics and retreats to sanctuary 
in negative theology. This move is duplicated with regard to anthropology where the human 
38 Maurice Blanchot, La Nouvelle Revue Fran ca/se 179 (1967), 820-21. Quoted in Emmanuel Levinas, `No 
Identity' Collected Philosophical Papers trans. A. Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 141-42. 
39 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors Texte trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), xix-xx. 
40 Ibid., xxi. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Jean-Luc Marion, `Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'onto-theo-logie' Revue thomiste 95: 1 (1995), 36. 
43Graham Ward, The Theological Project of Jean-Luc Marion' Post-Secular Philosophy: Between 
Philosophy and Theology (ed. ) Phillip Blond (London: Routledge, 1998), 229. 
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concept or thought of God is tied, by analogy, to the idol. A negative theology and a negative 
anthropology are intrinsically related. 
In Marion's terms, the God of onto-theo-logy is an idol, a false apprehension within 
which `representation, and hence knowledge, can seize hold of it. '44 It is central to Marion's 
thesis that `the icon and the idol determine two manners of being for beings, not two classes of 
beings. '45 With regard to the divine, the idolatrous gesture is accomplished in the reduction of the 
divine to the image of the onlooker. Conceptually, as well as aesthetically, this means that `the 
idol consigns the divine to the measure of a human gaze. '46 Thus metaphysics is the labour of 
idolatry: `When a philosophical thought expresses a concept of what it then names "God", this 
concept functions exactly as an idol. '47 This is true, Marion continues, of both theism and atheism 
because in both `the measure of the concept comes not from God but from the aim of the gaze. '48 
As a means to the re-positioning of God in relation to the concept, Marion attempts to 
define God as the One who is wholly dissimilar to the God of onto-theo-logy. He is keen, 
therefore, to outline in the most precise terms the constitutive characteristics of this metaphysical 
idol. There are three elements that belong to the designation onto-theo-logic: 
First, in onto-theology, God must be explicitly conceived as part of the subject 
matter of metaphysics, that is to say he is arrived at through an analysis of the 
particular historical determinations of the Being of beings and grasped through a 
univocal concept. Second, God must be the efficient causal foundation 
(Begründung) of beings as their sufficient reason. Third, God as ground must 
assume the function and eventually the name of causa sui, that is to say as the 
44 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 10. 
45 Ibid., 8. 
46 Ibid., 14. 
47 Ibid., 16. 
48 Ibid. 
32 
supreme ground of being, precisely through being the supreme ground of 
himself. 4 
This idolatrous God, however, is not, suggests Marion, the God of Christianity. Marion is here 
following a Heideggerian analysis of a metaphysics of presence founded on the God whose 
principle function and name is causa sui: `where everything that presences exhibits itself in the 
light of a cause-effect coherence, even God can, for representational thinking, lose all that is 
exalted and holy, the mysteriousness of his distance. ' 50 With regard to his attempt to save God 
from the idolatry of metaphysical theism (and atheism), Marion's solution also follows 
Heidegger's lead while attempting to go beyond Heidegger's obsession with the ontological 
difference. `Does not the search, ' asks Marion, `for the "more divine god" oblige one, more than 
to go beyond onto-theo-logy, to go beyond ontological difference as well, in short no longer to 
attempt to think God in view of a being, because one will have renounced, to begin with, thinking 
him on the basis of Being? '51 Marion's answer to this question is to provide `an appellation 
whose determination is to save God from Being, ensure that God is, as it were, absent from Being, 
absent as a source. '52 This appellation, echoing Heidegger is la distance. Distance is an apposite 
term because of its refusal to reduce the divine to the conceptual gaze of beings. 
By definition and decision, God, if he must be thought, can meet no theoretical 
space to his measure [mesure], because his measure exerts itself in our eyes as an 
excessiveness [demesure]. Ontological difference itself, and hence also Being, 
become too limited... to pretend to offer the dimension, still less the "divine 
abode", where God would become thinkable. 
53 
49 Jean-Luc Marion, `Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'onto-theo-logie', 36. Cf also, Brian Shanley, O. P., `St 
Thomas Aquinas, Onto-theology, and Marion' The Thomist 60: 4 (1996), 617-625. 
50 Martin Heidegger, `The Question Concerning Technology' The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 26. 
51 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 44. 
52 David Burrell, `Reflections on "Negative Theology" in the Light of a Recent Venture to Speak of "God 
Without Being"` Postmodernism and Christian Philosophy (ed. ) R. T. Ciapalo (Mishawaka, Indiana: 
American Maritain Association, 1997), 59. 
53 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 45. 
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In contrast to the measure of onto-theo-logy, God is gift, pure love. This love refuses to be fixed 
and frozen in the concept and frees God from metaphysics. 54 
In freeing God from metaphysics, Marion theological partner is Denys the Areopagite. 
After Denys, Marion privileges prayer - not philosophy - as that discourse which preserves 
distance between the divine and the human: `Denys tends to substitute for the saying of 
predicative language another verb, humnein, to praise. '55 Praise as a theological discourse does 
not reveal a positive `content' to the divine. Rather, it is a discourse which performs the distance 
between God and self in prayer. 56 For God is wholly otherwise than - and, therefore, not - that 
which is. This via negativa is also related to God's self: `The humble and unthinkable authority 
of the father remains first and foremost that which puts at a distance Being as the icon of distance 
itself' 57 
This strategy, of rejecting Being as the context within which to conceive of God, also 
carries with it, as is clear from my exposition, a negation of any humanistic position. The 
praiseful subject is privileged to receive the excessive gift of love. God so utterly exceeds human 
concepts and perception that a relationship to God is marked by unknowing. In this context, the 
self is subject to love, the gift, and all we can speak of, or consider, is the trace of the given. 
58 
Consequently, theological discourse is only possible within the ecclesia and as the result of a 
commission: 
54 Cf. Ibid., 48-49. 
55 Jean-Luc Marion L Idole et la distance (Paris: Grasset, 1977), 232. Cf. Thomas A. Carlson, 
In discretion, 197ff 
56 Thomas A. Carlson, indiscretion, 200. 
57 Jean-Luc Marion L Idole et la distance, 315. 
SR Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 105 
34 
The rectification of the theological discourse can only result from a restoration of 
the tie of delegation from the bishop to the teacher, who - learned person and 
hermeneut - constitutes only one particular case of charismas which are worth 
nothing unless related to charity and the edification of the community (1 Cor. 14). 
The theological teacher is not justified unless he serves charity. Otherwise, he 
brings death. But, the more the teacher inscribes himself in the eucharistic rite 
opened by the bishop, the more he can become a theologian. 59 
The theologian must arise from the authority of the bishop and must serve nothing and no one but 
the Word, charity. `The qualification, ' remarks Marion, `extrascientific but essential, that makes 
the theologian: The referent is not taught, since it is encountered by mystical Union. ' 60 There is 
nothing that one can do or impart as theologian. One somehow conveys or transmits, on the basis 
of a commission, the mystical union. The follower of this non-metaphysical God is a no one, a 
subject with no identity or character except that which is delegated. 
1.5: Critical Evaluation 
The undertakings of both Derrida and Marion - whose work is more expressly theological 
- are highly distinctive projects that weave together a negative theological movement with respect 
to content or metaphysics and a deliberate dissolution of the subject, a negative anthropology. As 
we have seen, both offer particular challenges to contemporary theological anthropology but it is 
my contention that both are deeply flawed. In this section, I will begin with an evaluation of 
Derrida's `religion without religion' before moving to an examination of Marion's radical reversal 
of theological subject matter. 
59 Ibid., 154. 
60Ibid., 154. 
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1.5.1: Derrida 's Nondogmatism 
Given the agenda from which Derrida is working, that of the violent consequences of the 
political messianisms which issue from the religious imperative, his conclusions with regard to the 
necessary deconstruction, even transformation, of actual religions and their theologico- 
metaphysical `overlay', is less than surprising. Rather than being a catalyst for change and for 
`infinite love', the `Abrahamic religions' or the `religions of the book'61 have carved a landscape 
of destruction and terror. Yet rather than work with any positive, actual aspect of religious life, 
Demda retreats to concepts that are impossible to realise - responsibility being the most obvious 
and important. Thus the situatedness of knowledge and identity that were hallmarks of early 
poststructuralism have given way to a rejection of site and situation. 62 More importantly, Deirida 
reinforces a religious logic that `has no need of the event of a revelation or the revelation of the 
event. ' 63 In doing so he takes religious life out of a public context where human beings might be 
engaged in an exchange of meanings which articulate the principles of action. Consequently, what 
counts as religious is at variance with an ecclesiology -a process of being with others - and there 
cannot but be a loss of a sense of our relations with others. The limit - the impossible - is now 
relocated to the centre of theological exploration and there is no other situation circumscribed, 
however provisional, for the practice and negotiation of religio. In casting the sacred to the vague 
and nebulous region that marks the perimeter of thought and experience, Derrida may well be 
inviting the cessation of violence predicated on religion. Nevertheless he is also reinscribing 
religion as a phenomenon that was formally exteriorised by Kant and which ultimately became the 
61 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, 59. 
62 It is in relation to the dissolution of the subject that we can see how his thinking has undergone something 
of a transformation over two decades or more. It was his contention in 1966 that `I don't destroy the 
subject. I situate it. ... 
It is a question of knowing where it comes from and how it functions. ' Derrida's 
remarks can be found in the `Discussion' of `Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences', The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: The Structuralist Controversy (eds) 
Richard Macksey & Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 270. In a much 
more recent interview, however, Demda avers that it is responsibility that is aimed at in the deconstruction 
of the subject. Cf. ` "Eating Well, " or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida', 
Who Comes after the Subject?, (eds) E. Cadava, P. Connor & J-L. Nancy, (London: Routledge, 1991), 100. 
63 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, 49. 
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captivating and seductive other to bourgeoise Victorian sensibility and was safely demarcated as 
the shocking 'outside'. 
64 
Yet there is another feature of the Derridean treatment of religion that is even more 
offensive than, although a concomitant of, the rejection of site and situation. This characteristic is, 
I believe, a major failing of deconstruction and relates to the politics of the postmodern. The best 
way to consider this issue is by asking: what is this thing called deconstruction? 
In order to (at least partially) answer this question, I would like to examine Walter 
Benjamin's fragment on `Capitalism as Religion', written in 1921 but unpublished in his 
lifetime. 65 Here, Benjamin offers an uncompromising analysis of the logic of capitalism, a 
phenomenon which `serves essentially to allay the same anxieties, torment, and disturbances to 
which the so-called religions offered answers. '66 Benjamin offers three distinctive characteristics 
intrinsic to this religiosity that `may be discerned in capitalism'67: the purely cultic nature of this 
religion, the permanence of this cult, and the pervasive nature of guilt engendered by the purely 
cultic form of capital. Capitalism as pure cult implies that `things only have a meaning in their 
relationship to the cult; capitalism has no specific dogma, no theology. '68 In other words, 
capitalism is the religion devoid of any content. Moreover, in relation to Benjamin's second 
point, capitalism `is the celebration of a cult sans reve et sans merci_[without dream or mercy]. '69 
It is the impalpable nature of capital, its status as unqualified system that yields both its success 
64 Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans. Daniel Heller Roazen 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 75-80. 
5 Walter Benjamin, `Capitalism as Religion', Selected Writings: Volume 1: 1913-1926 (eds) Marcus 
Bullock & Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996), 288-291. 
66 Ibid., 288. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
37 
and its consequence - guilt. This third distinguishing mark of capitalism as religion has, in its 
wake, even engulfed God: 
A vast sense of guilt that is unable to find relief seizes on the cult, not to atone for 
this guilt but to make it universal, to hammer it into the conscious mind, so as 
once and for all to include God in the system of guilt and thereby awaken in Him 
an interest in the process of atonement. This atonement cannot then be expected 
from the cult itself, or from the reformation of this religion (which would need to 
be able to have recourse to some stable element in it), or even from the complete 
renouncement of this religion. 70 
God is no longer transcendent, nor the possible point of reference for an authentic form of 
existence - God is inscribed and incarcerated within the immanent demands of guilt. `God's 
transcendence is at an end. But he is not dead; he has been incorporated into human existence. '7' 
Is this the narrative that subsumes and silences Derrida's `reponse? This contentless religion, 
because it is dogmatically barren and uninhabited by articles of faith, cannot be deconstructed. Of 
course, if capital is seen solely in terms of fiscal actuality and commensurability, the ultimate 
presence of the measure of value, then it is urgently in need of deconstruction because of its 
pretensions to divinity. In Georg Simmel's terms, 
The essence of the notion of God is that all diversities and contradictions in the 
world achieve a unity in him, that he is - according to a beautiful formulation of 
Nicholas de Cusa - the coincidentia oppositorum. Out of this idea, that in him all 
estrangements and all irreconcilables find their unity and equalization, there arises 
the peace, the security, the all-embracing wealth of feeling that reverberate with 
the notion of God which we hold. There is no doubt that, in their realm, the 
feelings that money excites possess a psychological similarity with this. In so far 
as money becomes the absolutely commensurate expression of all values, it rises 
to abstract heights way above the whole broad diversity of objects. 
72 
70 Ibid., 288-289. 
71 Ibid., 289. 
72 Georg Simmel The Philosophy of Money trans. Tom Bottomore & David Frisby (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978), 236. 
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What Benjamin proposes, however, is a religion in which measure [mesure] is not something that 
stands to be so thoroughly comprehended or grasped but is an excessiveness [demesure] in which 
the human being is located (in fact, dis-located) in the context of the `absolute loneliness of his 
trajectory. '73 
This leads us to a second important feature of `capital' religiosity. Benjamin suggests that 
while (following Weber) one can reiterate the fact that capitalism's development was parasitic 
upon Christianity, a point has been reached `where Christianity's history is essentially that of its 
parasite - that is to say, of capitalism. '74 The logic of infinite love is always indebted to the 
restrictive benevolence of Schuld - guilt and debt. 
75 The barometer of the possible is the level of 
anxiety that is inculcated by capitalist religiosity: "`Worries" are the index of the sense of guilt 
induced by a despair that is communal, not individual and material, in origin. '76 And then comes 
Benjamin's warning. `Capitalism is entirely without precedent, in that it is a religion which offers 
not the reform of existence but its complete destruction. '77 Despair is the fulfilment of religion as 
capital, its lelos which has no end, no goal: capitalism is the religion of nihilism, of mourning 
without end. 78 Desire can never be sated, only produced and reproduced in the empty promise of 
fulfilment. In other words, desire is a lack which is `created, planned and organized' by capital. 79 
73 Walter Benjamin, `Capitalism as Religion', 289. 
74 Ibid. Benjamin actually argues against Weber and Troeltsch in that he maintains what Howard Caygill 
calls `a more radical thesis': `The Christianity of the Reformation period did not favour the development of 
capitalism, but transformed itself into capitalism. ' `Capitalism as Religion', 290. Cf Howard Caygill, 
Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 1998), 56. 
75 Ibid. As the translator's note (on p. 291) suggests, Schuld denotes both guilt and debt. 
76 Ibid., 290. 
77 Ibid. 
79 Caygill calls Benjamin's study of the Baroque Trauerspiel, Origin of the German Mourning Play trans. J. 
Osborne (London: Verso, 1977), an analysis of `the culture of nascent capitalism. ' Howard Caygill, Walter 
Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, 57. 
79 Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia trans. R. Hurley et al 
(London: Athlone, 1983), 28. 
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How does one negotiate between the incommensurable narratives of love in the face of 
the other, that is, justice which cannot be deconstructed, and the religion of despair that cannot be 
deconstructed - because there is no content? The answer in short is that one cannot. There is no 
between, no possible site of negotiation; what Gillian Rose would call `the broken middle'. 80 
Indeed, Rose's reflection on Derrida's dismantling of Marxism is equally relevant to his 
discussion of religion. It is her contention that Marxism's `vital spirit, its anima, has been 
thoroughly etherialised and floats in a heaven of archi-original Messianic justice. ' This, 
moreover, is the character of a `religion without religion'. In the nineteen twenties Benjamin was 
already outlining the destruction that accompanies capitalism and its capacity for what Deleuze 
and Guattari were to call, some fifty years later, `deterritorialization' - the destruction of site and 
situation. Yet it must be said that Derrida did not always eschew situatedness. It is in relation to 
the dissolution of the subject that we can see how his thinking has undergone something of a 
transformation over two decades or more. It was his contention in 1966 that `I don't destroy the 
subject. I situate it. ... It is a question of knowing where 
it comes from and how it functions. '82 
In a much more recent interview, however, Derrida avers that it is responsibility that is aimed at in 
the deconstruction of the subject83 This transformation exhibits both Derrida's deterritorialization 
of the subject and his complicity with the non-dogma of capital in his flight from the world and 
the hard labour of love that is the focus of articles of faith. 
As a counterpoint to this (non)concept of religion, within the dogmatic content (always 
subject to deconstruction) of the Abrahamic religions there lies the centrality of the bodily 
80 Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of our Ancient Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 
81 Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 66. 
82 Cf. `Discussion' of `Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', The Languages of 
Criticism and the Sciences of Man, 270. Cf footnote 62 above. 
83 ` "Eating Well, " or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida', Who Comes after 
the Subject?, (eds) E. Cadava, P. Connor & J-L. Nancy, (London: Routledge, 1991), 100. 
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physicality of redemption, of resurrection84, a resurrection according to the law or the tradition 
that requires negotiation. This `content' is of course highly problematic but `if all human law is 
sheer violence, if there is no positive or symbolic law to be acknowledged ... then there can 
be no 
work, no exploring of the legacy of ambivalence. ' 85 The point is that if, as Derrida seems to be 
suggesting, one evacuates the content of religion, politics and law then there is no voyage of 
discovery even if, as is necessary, it is one of contestation and tension. 
All of this seems to be intensely foreboding and gloomy. However, if one considers 
Benjamin's reflection in a similar spirit to that of the ambivalence proposed by Rose then the 
possibility is that one's perspective changes. Take, for example, Benjamin's celebrated `Theses 
on the Philosophy of History', 86 where the seemingly pessimistic tenor might be construed as the 
inevitable result of the `unremitting gloom' of Benjamin's context. 87 If, however, the Theses are 
understood as coming from a perspective in which `All of history appears as wreckage from the 
standpoint of redemption. '88 then matters look significantly different. And it is the weight and 
consequence of this viewpoint that the articles of faith of the `religions of the book' attempt, all 
too poorly, to (re)read. That is why these (dogmatic) commentaries as well as narrations have 
never ceased. The attempt to comprehend such a significance is an enduring hermeneutical 
exercise comparable to the `inexhaustible' Abrahamic promise: it cannot be immediately realised 
but is always to come and as such `it opens up a history in which this promise can be repeated and 
89 reinterpreted over and over again. ' As a counterpoint to this physicality, the obsession with and 
84 Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 66. 
x' Ibid., 69. 
86 Walter Benjamin, `Theses on the Philosophy of History', Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (London: 
Fontana Press, 1973), 245-255. 
97 The Theses were completed in the Spring of 1940. 
RR Peter Osborne, `Small-scale Victories, Large-scale Defeats: Walter Benjamin's Politics of Time', Walter 
Benjamin s Philosophy: Destruction and Experience (eds) Andrew Benjamin & Peter Osborne (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 91. 
89 The quote comes from Paul Ricoeur. Cf. Richard Kearney, `Interview with Paul Ricoeur', Dialogues 
with ('ontemporarl Continental Thinkers (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 26 
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celebration of limits drives action - religious, political and legal - into an ethereal wasteland. 
`There can, ' as Gillian Rose correctly claims, `be no work, no exploring of the legacy of 
ambivalence, working through the contradictory emotions aroused by bereavement. '9' To act is 
delegitimated, and in this celebration of negative anthropology and negative theology politics, law 
and religion are but components in a `baroque melancholia immersed in the world of soulless and 
unredeemed bodies. '91 Such a melancholic stance is inevitable in the context of Demda's 
consideration of religion. He presents an insistent but unresolved dialectic between what Michael 
Dillon has called `Another Justice' 92 and an impotent resignation before contemporary religio- 
political reality. What is required by theological anthropology is an analysis of subjectivity that 
takes seriously the existential conditions within which a bodily religious, economic and juridico- 
political life is lived. Derrida's resituating of the subject, as I have demonstrated, fails on this 
count. With his rejection of the empirical form and status of positive religion, Demda's concern is 
with a negative, or more properly a negation, of theology. He is only concerned with delineating a 
religious life that stands at the limits of his (neo-Kantian) geometrical barrier. Jean-Luc Marion, 
in contrast, is primarily concerned with the distant side of this barrier where the deity resides 
unimpaired by, and disinterested in, creation. To his project I will now return. 
1.5.2: Marion's Dogmatism 
As I have pointed out elsewhere, 93 Marion's thesis is highly problematic. While his aim 
is thoroughly commendable - to save God from the clutches of onto-theo-logy - and his approach 
daring, Marion moves toward an `uncritical dogmatism'94 that has substantial, unsavoury 
implications for theological anthropology. Here I will concentrate on two areas in which his 
90 Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 70. 
91 Ibid., 69. 
92 Michael Dillon, `Another Justice' Political Theory 27: 2 (1999), 155-175. 
93 Paul Fletcher, `Writing off) Victims: hors texte' New Blackfriars Vol 78 No 916 (June 1997), 267-278. 
94 Graham Ward, `The Theological Project of Jean-Luc Marion', 229. 
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undertaking is fatally flawed: first, in relation to Marion's theoretical claims and, second, in 
relation to the practical repercussions of his ecclesiology. 
First, then, in his attempt to resituate theological discourse in the sphere of charity rather 
than that of metaphysics, Marion effectively destroys one part of the divine/human relationship. 
God is unknown and all that human beings can hope for is the trace of God's absent and distant 
gift. However, rather than secure the distinctive and exceptional character of God, Marion runs 
the risk, as Jean-Luc Nancy points out, of formulating a more radical anthropologization: 
far from being rediscovered, God disappears even more surely and definitely 
through bearing all the names of a generalized and multiplied difference. 
Monotheism dissolves into polyatheism, and it is no good asserting that this 
polyatheism is the true word and the true presence of God in his distance from the 
supreme Being of metaphysics. For the infinitely absent god, or the god infinitely 
distended by the infinite distance of god, should no longer be termed "God", nor 
be presented in any way as "God" or as divine. Try as it may, there is no 
theology that does not turn out here to be either ontological or anthropological - 
saying nothing about the god that cannot immediately be said about "event", 
about "love", about "poetry". 95 
Paradoxically, while it seems that God may well be saved from onto-theo-logy, he is in fact 
dissolved into mediocrity and - ironically - shares the status of any entity (being) that exceeds 
definition or that is characterised by an inability to provide an adequate explication. In terms of 
this inadequacy, the world, surely the only context from which the gift can in any way be 
understood and celebrated, is rendered inconsequential and the human pole of the divine/human 
relationship is made virtually redundant. As John Milbank puts it, Marion's loving God as `pure 
gesture, empty and disinterested' is in fact an offensive God: 
95 Jean-Luc Nancy, `Of Divine Places', 113. 
43 
just as Marion's gift is in this aspect a hypostasization of a modern, free, post- 
Cartesian, capitalist and `pure' gift, and thereby indifferent to content, so it is also 
(as a concomitant) relatively indifferent to counter-gift or to relation and 
96 reciprocity. 
The most human beings can hope for is that `what such a One does do, in freely calling forth all- 
that-is, is to inscribe in those who can recognize their existence for the gift it is, an impulse to 
return it. '97 Marion's concern, however, is entirely with the category of gift and he has no interest 
in, nor concern for, what it is that is given. As such, his theology rejects the materiality and 
carnality of the gift and the struggles and trials of responding to the gift. The absolute 
commitment to an apophaticism establishes theology in the realm of the ethereal where nothing 
positive or constructive can be uttered or performed in relation to the content and significance of 
the gift. 
The second issue that Marion's work raises concerns his ecclesiology. While his debt to 
Denys the Areopagite is often acknowledged, the more detailed and nuanced relationship between 
Denys's various works is not. When, for example, Marion expounds the unique and distinguished 
role of the bishop in his ecclesiology, he refrains from revealing the significance of the bishop in 
Denys's De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia. The Word, in Marion's terms, can only be disclosed on the 
basis of a `tie of delegation from, bishop to teacher. '98 This mirrors Denys's contention that 
96 John Milbank, `Can a Gift be Given?: Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic' Modern Theology 
11: 1 (1995), 134. 
97 David Burrell, `Reflections on "Negative Theology" in the Light of a Recent Venture to Speak of "God 
Without Being"`, 60. 
98 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 154. 
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the divine order of the hierarchs [i. e., the bishops] is the first of the orders which 
see God, but it is also the highest and last, for in it are perfected and fulfilled all 
the ordering of our hierarchy .... 
The power of the hierarch order pervades all the 
sacred totalities, and through all the sacred order effects the mysteries of its own 
hierarchy. 99 
There is no activity within the Church that stands apart from the bishop's office. The mediation of 
grace is effected through the intermediary who contains and manifests the higher orders. One 
cannot, in consequence, experience or encounter the gift of grace apart from this intermediary. In 
the terms of Denys's Neoplatonism this is wholly acceptable and, indeed, the Areopagite 
constructs an spectacular participative edifice. However, in a (post)modem context, the 
straightforward transposition of these hierarchies seems to be thoroughly anachronistic. There is a 
wholesale ignorance and rejection in Marion's work of two important facts. First, that the context 
within which Christians live at the end of the twentieth century demands an engagement with, if 
not an uncritical commitment to, the desiring economy of late-capitalism and the emancipatory 
discourses of modernity. The example of Henri de Lubac is notable here. It was important for de 
Lubac that `the Christian's watchword can no longer be "escape" but "collaboration". He must 
co-operate with God and men in God's work in the world and among humanity. ' 100 In contrast to 
Marion's obsession with securing the integrity and purity of the gift, de Lubac's understanding of 
grace was more nuanced: `All grace is gratia gratis data, that is, in the old meaning of the 
expression, given for the sake of others. ' 101 The content of the gift and the outward mission of the 
Church are just as momentous as the gift itself and its status. 
' Denys the Areopagite, De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia in Corpus Dionysiacum 11,5.1.5.107 (505AB) (ed. ) 
G. Heil & A. Martin Ritter (Berlin: 1991). Quoted in Eric Perl, `Hierarchy and Participation in Dionysius 
the Areopagite and Greek Neoplatonism' American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68: 1 (1994), 21-22. 
100 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: A Study of Dogma in Relation to the Corporate Destiny of Mankind trans. 
L. C. Sheppard (London: Burns & Oates, 1950), 120. 
101 Ibid. 
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There is, furthermore, a second major implication concealed within the logic of Marion's 
ecclesiastical hierarchy. Violent exclusion is the cost of a nostalgic return to an inflexible 
ecclesiology: 
If we start yearning nostalgically, especially these days, for a revitalised 
`symbolic order', we should have no illusions. Such an order once existed, but it 
was composed of ferocious hierarchies; the transparency of signs goes hand in 
hand with their cruelty. 102 
The cruel logic of this hierarchy also displaces and supplants the logic of la distance. There is an 
evacuation of the distance between God and Being - an overcoming of infinite space - in the 
figure of the bishop. As John Caputo argues, this singular location of the mediation of grace is 
marked by absolute power. 103 In the place of a theological anthropology, stripped of any 
significance in his negative anthropology, Marion has created a meta-subject, the Church whose 
subjectum is a faculty or figure known as the bishop. However, this meta-subject is even more 
sovereign and disengaged than the most self-certain subject of modem European philosophy. In 
the name of the pure gift, Marion has given birth to Frankenstein's monster. And this monster is 
dismissive of any experience and narration of grace that exceeds the bounds of his episcopal 
office. As Gerard Loughlin, in a different context, reminds us 
It is also important to remember that the founding stories of the Christian tradition 
are rendered narratable not only by doctrinal `schemas' or narratives, but also as 
contextual (e. g. liberationist) theologies remind us - by the lives (autobiographies) 
of the interpreters themselves, just as they are by the gospel stones, in a complex 104 
process of internarrativity. 
102 Jean Baudrillard, `Symbolic Exchange and Death' Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings (ed. ) Mark 
Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 136. 
103 John D. Caputo, `How to Avoid Speaking of God: the Violence of Natural Theology' Prospects for 
Natural Theology (ed. ) Eugene Long (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 
130. 
104 Gerard Loughlin, `Christianity at the End of the Story or the Return of the Master-Narrative' Moden, 
Theology 8: 4 (1992), 378. 
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This `complex process' is compressed under the authority of the solitary figure or censor who 
regulates the content and narration of the tradition as a figure of divinely-produced totality. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have approached the postmodern resituation of the subject from and 
through three directions. In the first place I considered the fate of the modern subject whose ruin 
has been intrinsically linked to the death of God. Here, one metaphysical foundation (the Divine) 
was conquered and displaced (so the narrative goes) by another (Man). Yet the sceptical disease 
that saw to the death of one foundational entity proved even too powerful for its new master. 
Consequently, the heterogeneous elements that were excluded within unified theories of identity 
are seen, in the wake of God and Man, to engender and constitute the self The Other, death, 
finitude and responsibility are inscribed in the flesh and spirit of any self in the fluid context that 
arises after the post-mortem of the divine. 
Second, I then moved to a reflection on two ways in which these contemporary thematics 
are embraced in postmodern thought. The point of departure for this section of the chapter was 
Jacques Derrida's `religion without religion'. Derrida repositions the self and religion in a 
surprisingly similar manner. Both are stripped of the metaphysical and theological overlay and 
are resituated as modes, examples and instantiations of response. They are moments of dynamic 
gift-giving that refuse termination and decision but are characterised as liminal generosity. Rather 
than generating exclusion and violence, this different self - and selves who are religious (without 
being religious) - welcomes rather than denies the human plurality that Derrida perceives as 
essential to a just being-in common. As a counterpoint to Derrida's evacuation of the theologico- 
metaphysical from the religious and the subject, I turned to Jean-Luc Marion's attempt to 
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revitalise philosophical theology through his reading of the non-metaphysical God of negative 
theology. Marion attempts to save God from the clutches of onto-theo-logy and thus to recover 
the integrity of God as God rather than as a conceptual idol who is implicated in Being. This 
quest of the non-metaphysical God leads Marion to revision the Church as a eucharistic 
community within which grace is mediated by the bishop who stands as the theologian par 
excellence. 
My third and fmal move in this chapter was to critically evaluate the work of both Dernda 
and Marion. Derrida's work, although challenging to theological reflection in that it questions the 
foundation and presuppositions of its discourse, was, I argued, ultimately deeply flawed. Because 
of the tendency for deconstruction to take over and reside at the theoretical boundaries, 
deconstruction tends to eschew the concrete and the rooted. Consequently, I suggested that while 
Derrida wants, quite rightly, to move beyond the modem obsession with secure foundations, his 
alternative does not respond in any meaningful way to the critique of modernity by Adorno and 
Horkheimer in which `reason itself has become the mere instrument of the all-inclusive economic 
apparatus. ' 105 It was my contention that what we might call the embrace of un-reason terminates 
in the victory of late-capital. Walter Benjamin's salient prophecy that summarised the status of 
capital as a perfect, cult-free religion was juxtaposed with Derrida's `religion without religion' to 
show the hazard of positing a non-negotiated, unadulterated religious life as a means through 
which human beings might move beyond the religio-politics - the violence - of positive religion. I 
then moved to Jean-Luc Marion's revisioning of negative theology and questioned the status of 
the God of whom nothing (but charity) can be said. After Nancy I claimed that the recourse to a 
nebulous understanding of a divine characterised by absolute distance terminates in a renewed 
anthropomorphization of God and also a refusal to take the gift of created being seriously. 
105 Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment trans. J. Cumming (London: Verso, 
1979), 30. 
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Furthermore, it is evident, I argued, that Marion's negative anthropology dissolves the modem 
subject but, in its places, asserts a meta-subject, the church, whose authority in terms of the 
mediation of grace creates an exclusivist agenda. 
In response to these projects that purport to resituate the self, there is, however, another 
strand of contemporary anthropological discourse that believes it transcends the problems and 
difficulties of the fragmentation of the self celebrated in deconstruction. This second attempt to 
manage the fracturing of the narratives through which human self-understanding is formed and 
transmitted corresponds with Wim Wenders' endeavour to reconstruct subjectivity through 
mutuality and communality - the reconstitution of the subject. This is the project I will delineate 
and discuss in Chapter Two. 
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Chapter Two: 
Reconstituting Subjectivity 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I outlined and scrutinised the two very different attempts to resituate the 
subject that are presented in the postmodern enterprises of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion. 
Their fragmentation, indeed dissolution, of the self was examined on the basis that it constituted 
one element of Wim Wenders' rather confused bid to resolve the problem of subjectivity in Der 
Himmel über Berlin. The second approach of Wenders, which I have termed the reconstitution of 
the self is also evident in contemporary theoretical reflection on the crisis of subjectivity. 
Although the terms of this conceptual engagement are dissimilar to Wenders' turn to the 
sentimentalism of Romanticism, the desire for an intersubjective foundation to the self is apparent 
in both these theoretical and cinematic explorations. As with the last chapter, I will expose the 
philosophical and theological reconstitution of the self in two movements. First, I will outline the 
critical theory of Jürgen Habermas and his important response to the fragmentation of the self. 
Second, as a counterpart to his project, I will also summarise the theological anthropology of 
Alistair McFadyen that is fundamentally dependent on the work of Habermas. In order to 
demonstrate that McFadyen is representative of a particular strand of theological approaches to the 
self, however, I will also refer to the theology of Colin Gunton, Anthony Thiselton and Wolfhart 
Pannenberg. Gunton and Thiselton, in particular, share a commitment to a conception of 
relationality that is outlined, although more rigorously pursued, by NlcFadyen. The particular 
significance of the work of the former, however, lies in the more explicit association of this 
relationality with a doctrine of the divine (intersubjective) life of the trinity. As this study is 
primarily concerned with theological anthropology, this conjunction cannot be ignored and, 
consequently, I will briefly considered the main tenets of this model of theological anthropology. 
I will then, finally, evaluate both these philosophical and theological movements in the light of the 
theoretical and empirical contexts within which subjectivity must be considered. Prior to the 
theological and critical elements of this chapter, however, I must turn to the reconstitution of the 
self in Habermas's critical-theoretical enterprise. 
2.1: Discourses of Modernity and Postmodernity 
As a major figure of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Jürgen Habermas has 
sought to formulate a response to the political and socio-economic circumstances of late- 
modernity that remains faithful to the previous generation of the school but which bears his own 
distinctive imprint. The continuing commitment to praxis - the bringing together of theory and 
practice in a neo-Marxist analysis of politics - is where Habermas can be seen to follow in the 
footsteps of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm and, although he 
was only loosely affiliated with the school (out of financial need as much as any theoretical 
alliance), Walter Benjamin. Like his predecessors, Habermas is concerned with delineating a 
critical theory of society in the context of the forms of life that pertain to `modernity'. The 
originality of Habermas's work is evident in his development of a theory of communicative 
rationality that is critical both of what I referred to in the last chapter as a modem self constituted 
on the basis of consciousness (and its inclination towards instrumental reason) and what he refers 
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to as the postmodern `irrational' self `To instrumental reason they juxtapose in Manichean 
fashion a principle only accessible through evocation, be it will to power or sovereignty, Being or 
the Dionysiac force of the poetical. In France this line leads from Georges Bataille via Michel 
Foucault to Jacques Derrida. ' 1 
Haberman is, then, is no advocate of the dissolution of the self Insofar as he understands 
the contemporary standing of mass communication in western societies to be baleful, however, he 
perceives the timeliness and the appeal of deconstruction. `Derrida and a capering 
deconstructivism', he argues, `give the only appropriate answer to the surrealism of "de- 
differentiated", "de-reified" mass culture. '2 The reason for this ambivalent stance on the 
modernity-postmodemity debate is that while Habennas is very much a champion of the 
Enlightenment, his work attempts to place the socialising, intersubjective elements of reason in the 
socio-political foreground and resituate the `instrumental' or `strategic' reason of Bacon and 
Hobbes (respectively) in the background of contemporary socio-political discourse. 
3 Not least, 
Habermas's attempt to chart an uneasy passage between these two philosophical Utes noires - the 
`irrationalism' of deconstruction and the `instrumental' reason of modernity - is due to his desire 
for political engagement. Consequently, his more constructive task is to establish normative 
evaluations by which individuals might be bound in the public sphere and through which non- 
coercive, rational dialogue might proceed. 4 
1 Jürgen Habermas, `Modernity - An Incomplete Project' Postmodern Culture (ed. ) H. Foster (London: 
Pluto Press, 1985), 14. 
2 Jürgen Habermas, `A philosophico-political profile' New Left Review 151 (1985), 97. 
3 Robert B. Pippin, `Hegel, Modernity, and Habermas' The Monist 74: 3 (1991), 343. 
4 Jürgen Habermas, 'Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests' Philosophy of Social Sciences 3 
(1973), 169. 
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In taking as his starting point the need for a proper and adequate theory of communicative 
reason, Habermas is already positioned as a critic of the modem subject of consciousness. As 
with the proponents of deconstruction, Habermas believes that a concept of reason 
unconditionally grounded in the consciousness of the individual subject leads to `a structurally 
overloaded subject (a finite subject transcending itself into the infinite). '5 The crisis of 
subjectivity is, for Habermas, a symptom of the modern inability to negotiate the distinct validity 
claims associated with differentiated and heteronomous life spheres. In other words, the 
monologic of modernity does not allow for, nor take account of, the different rationalities and 
validities operative in the realms of `purposive rationality' (science) and `communicative 
rationality' (discourse ethics). Yet Habermas contends that the reassessment of modernity, while 
requiring a rejection of `pure transcendentalism', ought not lead us to the rejection of normative 
notions and ideals in an orgy of `pure historicism'. 6 What is required is a completion of the 
unfinished project of modernity. 
Habermas sees modernity as a two-edged sword and, following Adorno and Horkheimer, 
acknowledges the sombre even hellish nature of the `dialectic of enlightenment'. Adorno and 
Horkheimer in an unremittingly gloomy assessment of modernity argued that `reason itself has 
become the mere instrument of the all-inclusive economic apparatus. '? This purposive-rational 
reason has flourished in the modern west to the point that its predominance is hegemonic. 
Notwithstanding the pessimism of his forebears in the Frankfurt school, and with a nod in 
Weber's direction, Habermas openly celebrates the progress that has been made through the 
development and utilisation of this dominant form of rationality: 
S Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures trans. F. Lawrence 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 261. 
Jürgen Habermas, `Questions and Counterquestions' Habermas and Modernity (ed. ) R. Bernstein 
cCambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 193. 
Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment trans. J. Cumming (London: Verso, 
1979), 30. 
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The list of original achievements of Western rationalism is long. Weber points 
first to modem natural science, which puts theoretical knowledge in mathematical 
form and tests it with the help of controlled experiments; he adds to this the 
systematic specialization of scientific activity in university settings. He mentions 
... the institutionalization of art... 
harmonious music ... scientific 
jurisprudence, 
institutions of formal law ... modem state administration... calculable 8 
commerce. 
These achievements have been procured by the success of calculative and purposive rationality. 
Nevertheless, Habermas, as I have shown, is equally aware of the cost of an over dependence on 
one type of rationality. Addressing the ambiguity of the enlightenment, he attempts to move 
beyond this version of total rationalisation which Lukäcs perceived as leaving nothing but the 
spirit of the basest calculation and the rule of capital. 9 The desire for an alternative is grounded in 
the realisation that the rationality predicated on the self-conscious subject ultimately annihilates 
that same subject: `Man's domination over himself, which grounds his selfhood, is virtually 
always the destruction of the subject in whose service it takes place. ' 10 As a counter-narrative to 
this underbelly of the enlightenment, Habermas wishes to show that purposive rationality is not 
the only kind of rationality. He augments instrumental reason, which cannot be owned in the 
social, moral and aesthetic spheres, with the construction of a theory of communicative rationality. 
This theoretical perspective `reconstructs the ways in which everyday practices of communication 
already embody implicit and unavoidable appeals to reason. ' 11 
This other, communicative, reason requires explication because it has been expurgated 
through the imposition of `a transformation of domains of communicative action into subsystems 
x Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One. Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society trans. T. McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1984), 157. 
9 Ibid., 371-72. 
10 Ibid., 380. 
I1 Robert B. Pippin, 'Hegel, Modernity, and Habermas', 344 
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of purposive-rational action. ' 12 The alternative form of rationality delineated by Habermas, 
connected to human interaction, continues the project of the enlightenment in that its point of 
departure is the subject - but the self is defined in the midst of the teleological character of 
communication. Habermas claims that 
the human interest in autonomy and responsibility [Mündigkeit] is not mere 
fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only 
thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure autonomy and 
responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the 
intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. 13 
Through his analysis of the status of subjects with regard to their linguistic activity, Habennas 
wants to locate `the cognitive-instrumental aspect of reason in its proper place as part of a more 
encompassing communicative rationality. ' 14 In this way, the enlightenment project can be brought 
to its proper and hope-ful conclusion. 
2.2: Ideal Speech and Intersubjectivity 
The principle of reason that Habermas constructs takes his project, he believes, beyond a 
notion of reason that is fundamentally transcendental and out of the relativistic clutches of a 
radical histoncisation of reason - both fundamentally flawed alternatives `that have bedevilled the 
post-Kantian' philosophical tradition. 15 Instead, communicative reason is embodied in language. 
Habermas argues that all speech acts necessarily raise questions of truth, rightness and 
appropriateness. 16 William Outhwaite nicely summarises Habermas's via media in his suggestion 
12 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One, 339. 
13 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests trans. J. Shapiro (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), 
314. 
14 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One, 390. 
1-5 Robert B. Pippin, `Hegel, Modernity, and Habermas', 343. 
16 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One, 39. 
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that speech acts `presuppose four validity claims: that what we say is comprehensible. that it is 
true, that it is right, i. e. that there is a normative basis for the utterance, and that it is a sincere 
(wahrhaftig) expression of the speaker's feelings. ' 17 To engage in acts of linguistic 
communication is, ultimately, to at least agree with these rational standards as possibilities through 
which the speech act might be judged. Even fallacious and deceitful speech acts enter into the 
bounds of communicative reason: 
Habermas regards "strategic" forms of communication (such as lying, misleading, 
deceiving, manipulating, and the like) as derivative; since they involve the 
suspension of certain validity claims (especially truthfulness), they are parasitic 
on speech oriented to genuine understanding. I 
In the light of his understanding of the nature of speech acts, one can see why Habermas terms 
communicative rationality `quasi-transcendental'. He is concerned, on the one hand, with the 
linguistic embodiment of subjects and the `logical structures that materialize under empirical 
conditions' for a `naturally generated and socially formed subject. ' 19 On the other hand, the 
claims raised by all speech acts, and therefore to be understood as essentially universal, indicate 
that his theory `like the transcendental logic of an earlier period, seeks a solution to the problem of 
the a priori conditions of possible knowledge. '20 in outlining a quasi-transcendental principle of 
reason, Habermas is preserving regulative standards of reason from a territory that is both internal 
to reason and also above its particular uses as a critical norm. 
In the context of a quasi-transcendental principle of reason and its universal pretensions, 
Habermas fashions his most well-known, if not celebrated, concept - the `ideal speech situation'. 
17 William Outhwaite, Hahermas: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 40. 
18 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 287. 
19 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 94-95. 
20 Ibid., 194. 
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Habermas's goal is to delineate the formal ramifications of his reinterpretation of reason so that 
mutuality and mtersubjectivity are attained in a non-coercive context that functions as a regulative 
force on all speech acts. Even if, as Habermas concedes, this is but an ideal, it is contained within 
any example of communicative interaction. 
The concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based 
ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus- 
bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome 
their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated 
conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the 
intersubjectivity of their lifeworld. 21 
Although ideal, Habermas is convinced that he is not indiscriminately imposing a transcendental 
condition on linguistic activity. On the contrary, it is an essential supposition that must be made if 
discourse and argument are to offer full and unconstrained participation. In a lengthy quote 
Habermas explicitly brings the ideal speech situation into the context of his quasi-transcendental 
theory of rationality and, moreover, defends its effective role in speech acts: 
The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere 
construct, but rather an unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in discourse. 
This supposition can, but need not be, counterfactual; but even if it is made 
counterfactually, it is a fiction that is operatively effective in the process of 
communication. Therefore I prefer to speak of an anticipation of an ideal speech 
situation. ... 
The normative foundation of agreement in language is thus both 
anticipated and - as an anticipated foundation - also effective.... To this extent 
the concept of the ideal speech situation is not merely a regulative principle in 
Kant's sense; with the first step toward agreement in language we must always in 
fact make this supposition. On the other hand, neither is it an existing concept in 
Hegel's sense; for no historical reality matches the form of life that we can in 
principle characterise by reference to the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech 
situation would best be compared with a transcendental illusion were it not for the 
fact that ... 
[in contrast to] the application of the categories of the understanding 
beyond experience, this illusion is also the constitutive condition of rational 
speech. The anticipation of the ideal speech situation has ... the significance of a 
constitutive illusion which is at the same time the appearance of a form of life. 
Of course, we cannot know a priori whether that appearance [Vorschein] is a mere 
21 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One, 10. 
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delusion [Vorspiegelung] - however unavoidable the suppositions from which it 
springs - or whether the empirical conditions for the realisation (if only 22 approximate) of the supposed form of life can practically be brought about. 
Whether or not the conditions are such that an ideal speech situation is actualised, it is implied as a 
quasi-transcendental condition of participative discourse. It provides a universal basis upon which 
to argue through and beyond cross-cultural and transhistorical boundaries. Subjects are bound by 
their common linguistic condition and are, therefore, constituted intersubjectively. 
For all the idealism of his position, Habermas argues that if an ideal speech situation is to 
be a concrete reality - where the participants are `motivated solely by the desire to reach a 
consensus about the truth of statements and the validity of norms'23 - then the participants must 
also have what he terms `communicative competence'. Here the actual linguistic performance, the 
pragmatic use of language in concrete situations, is open to a universal, rational reconstruction in a 
manner that bears similarities to a linguistic analysis of the various components of language. 
The assumption is that communicative competence has just as universal a core as 
linguistic competence. A general theory of speech acts would thus describe 
exactly that system of rules that adult speakers master insofar as they can satisfy 
the conditions for a happy employment of sentences in utterances - no matter to 
which particular language the sentences belong and in which accidental contexts 
the utterances are embedded. 24 
This theory of communicative competence and its bed-fellow, a theory of communicative 
rationality, uncover `the universal infrastructure of sociocultural life. '25 On the basis of these 
22 Jürgen Habermas, `Wahrheitstheorien' Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Fetschrift für Walter Schulz (ed. ) H 
Fahrenback (Pfullingen: Neske, 1973), 258-259. Quoted in Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of 
Jürgen Habermas, 310. 
23 Richard Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory (New 
York Routledge, 1995), 50-51. 
24 Jürgen Habermas, `What is Universal Pragmatics? ' Communication and the Evolution of Society trans. I. 
McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 26. 
25 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 282. 
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theoretical foundations, Habermas has provided, he believes, the basis for intersubjective relations 
and social action. His concern is to formulate a notion of rationality that involves not the 
objectification of others but mutual recognition, reciprocity and complimentarity. By arguing that 
these elements are basic components of communicative rationality, he suggests that he is pointing 
to the completion of a modern universalising project that promotes consensus and socio-cultural 
action rather than pandering to `the all-inclusive economic apparatus. '26 Habermas moves beyond 
the individual and the social to an alternative intersubjective space that guarantees individuality 
and social systems but places both in relation to the most basic term of identity, the communality 
of relation. 
The Habermasean project takes as its point of departure the requirement to open up 
rationality as a multidimensional reality. Only through a radical reassessment and remodelling of 
reason can the failed project of modernity brought to its proper and fruitful consummation. The 
means through which this might be attained is the diremption or at least sub-division of reason in 
relation to the exigencies and character of differing contexts or lifeworlds in which human beings 
operate. Habermas claims that the subject can be reconstituted on the basis of the self being 
mediated through communication. This intersubjective self is constructed on the basis of a 
dialectic that brings into play a universal logic of rationalisation and the historical contingency of 
individual situations. This quasi-transcendental allows the creation of a public, communal sphere 
that is ideal, non-coercive and inclusive. The ideal speech situation and participants' 
communicative competency are the building blocks that Habermas contributes to a possible 
reconstruction of the framework within which authentic intersubjectivity can flourish. Participants 
are safeguarded from the domination and totalisation of a purposive rationality and Habermas 
believes that, consequently, his hypothesis is more politically applicable than the `presentism', 
26 Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 30. 
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`relativism' and `cryptonormativism' of the postmodern dissolution of the self. 27 The 
Habermasean strategy is, unsurprisingly, followed in a significant strand of theological 
anthropology. Not least, the emphasis on intersubjectivity, non-coercion and peaceable politics 
are attractive themes that resonate with the terms within which theologians would wish to work. 
To this more explicitly theological work I now turn. 
2.3: The Intersubjective Self as the Subject of Theology 
There is a significant strand of recent theological enquiry in which the analysis of the self 
is framed in terms of an intersubjectivity that is either explicitly dependent on Habermas's work 
or, at the very least, closely resembles the nature of his critique of both the subject of modernity 
and the non-subject of deconstruction. In many respects - and these shall become clearer as I 
proceed with this section of the chapter - the work of Alistair McFadyen is representative of this 
strand of theological anthropology. Nevertheless his presuppositions and, in some cases, 
conclusions, are shared or developed by theologians such as Wolfhart Pannenberg, Colin Gunton 
and Anthony Thiselton. Therefore, inasmuch as McFadyen's book The Call to Personhood28 is 
typical of this theological approach to subjectivity, his study will be the focus of this section of the 
chapter. However, I shall also draw on the work of these other theologians in order to assist my 
subsequent clarification of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. 
Early on in his analysis of the character of the self, McFadyen provides a clue as to the 
theme that might constitute the heart of his theological anthropology. He suggests that the 
27 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 287. 
28 Alistair McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social 
Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
60 
personalism of Buber, Barth and Bonhoeffer assisted his audacious attempt to refashion the 
Christian conception of personhood: 
The key insight which grew out of engagement with these attempts to formulate 
some middle way between individualism and collectivism was the fruitfulness of 
understanding personal being and identity in terms of communication. 29 
Communication is not simply here the essence or degree zero of subjectivity. Rather, it is the 
dynamic vehicle of an identity that is forged through time as human beings are constituted in 
relationship. As McFadyen sees it 
We become the people we are as our identities are shaped through the patterns of 
communication and response in which we are engaged. We carry the effects of 
the communication we have received and the response we have made in the past 
forward with us into every new situation and relationship. This happens most 
obviously, but by no means primarily or exclusively, through memory, and is 
what I later term the `sediment' which is laid down through our communication 
history. It is this which makes us the people we are. 30 
Formed through their communicative interaction with those around them, human beings are 
historical animals who become who they are in their passage through time and their contexts in 
space. The `sediment' of which McFadyen talks is similar in function and consequence to a 
narrative that delivers diverse elements and experiences into a unified `identity'. Thus the person 
is ultimately `dialogical (formed through social interaction, through address and response)' but 
must also be seen as `dialectical (never coming to rest in a final unity, if only because one is never 
removed from relation). ' 11 There is always a provisional element to identity because of the 
29 Ibid., 6-7. The desire to find a way through the modern predicament of individualism versus collectivism 
is shared by Colin Gunton. Gunton believes that `the individualist teaches that we are in separation from our 
neighbour, the collectivist that we are so involved with others in society that we lose particularity. ' Colin E. 
Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 169. 
30 Ibid., 7-8. 
31 Ibid., 9. 
61 
dependence of the latter on relationality: `Persons are the manifestation of their relations, formed 
through though not simply reducible to them. '32 
Thus far the theory of subjectivity that McFadyen is delineating depends chiefly on the 
social, historical and linguistic contexts in which individuals find themselves (in both the senses of 
that term). Yet this de-centred, relational self is supplemented - if not supplanted - by another 
self. This subsequent theoretical move ensures the integrity of the individual self and is made in 
order to safeguard personal identity in response to the crisis of subjectivity. Although he purports 
to `describe individual identity in terms of a response', 33 McFadyen's central concern is to provide 
an intelligible and palpable foundation to the self 
The basis of the position I shall be taking on these issues is the understanding of 
persons as individuals whose consciousness, experience of and interaction with 
the world are internally centred. Conducting oneself from a personal centre of 
being and communication is what makes self-direction - that is, personal control 
of and intervention in oneself and one's interactions - possible. In other words, 
personal centering enables performance as a subject in communication, being an I 
for and before others and for oneself (through self-reflection and 
consciousness). 34 
The provisionality of identity in communicative relation is augmented, or to be more accurate 
anchored, by a reflexive, conscious T. The possibility of a dialogical identity is predicated on an 
anterior, internal unity that centres the self and provides a fixed location from which to securely 
engage with the ebb and flow of communicative interaction. Yet, the formation of this centre and 
subsequent self-awareness is mediated through communication itself. Such a circular strategy has 
its antecedent in Pannenberg's insistence that the 
32 Ibid., 40. 
33 Ibid., 47. 
34 Ibid., 69. 
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consciousness of the ego's unity is mediated through experience of the world, 
insofar as this experience allows the ego to become aware of its own body as 
existing within the context of a world and to construct a social and spiritual self in 
connection with it. This is the self to which one refers when one says "1" 35 
There is here a significant convergence between the two notions of a subjectivity grounded in 
consciousness. First, for both Pannenberg and McFadyen, the person is an internally centred 
reality. Second, this centering in consciousness is facilitated, indeed engendered, by the external 
world of experience. Thus with a strong foundation, there is the `basis for the unfolding of 
36 individual particularity and individual awareness of identity. ' 
There are, then, two distinct though interrelated movements in the production of 
subjectivity - the formation through communication and the solidity of centred being: `personal 
identity is a structure of response sedimented from a significant history of communication. A 
person is centrally organised and, on that basis, may exercise a degree of autonomy as a subject of 
communication. ' 37 Here we see the dialectical nature of subjectivity -a personal, centred identity 
that is both formed in connection and communication with others and fundamentally `owned' by 
the individual: 
My self-understanding is embedded in my communication, and your 
understanding and response to it will be embedded in yours. So I receive a 
reflection of myself in your response. Dialogue may be considered as a process 
of self-transcendence (movement towards the other) and return (receiving oneself 
back from the other). Through giving and receiving ourselves in this way we can 
come to a new understanding of ourselves. 
35 Wolthart Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God trans. P. Clayton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1990), 53. 
36 Ibid., 54. 
37 Alistair McFadyen, The Call to Personhood, 113. 
38 Ibid., 125. 
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Understanding one's self is based on a `genuine mutuality' that is fuelled by a dialectic of 
egression and return. Moreover, self-understanding is produced by an autonomous self reaching 
out - the other mediates and augments self-awareness. 
The terms within which this mutuality is generated, however, are very similar to 
Habermas's formal context for genuine non-distorted communication. First, according to 
McFadyen, `communication and understanding' are to be `rational'. Second, `communication will 
have to be free of constraints, coercion and all other forms of distortion. '39 These formal 
injunctions are imposed in order that a genuine communication can be secured. Reciprocity is 
perverted if subjects communicate outside a context in which misunderstanding is formally 
excluded: 
Unlimited, constraint-free explication, in which the autonomy and responsibility 
of each partner in and for communication is respected and intended as means are 
found to ensure formal reciprocity in the relation (i. e. non-privileged distribution 
of dialogue roles, or symmetrical binding by norms), exhibits a formal ideal for 
communication. It is this ideal to which all communication is or pretends to be 
orientated (it is therefore anticipated in its distortion), and which presents the 
codification proper to the ideal form of life in God's image. 40 
The ideal speech situation ensures both formal reciprocity and provides the grammar proper to the 
way of life of Christians in relation to and with God. Indeed, McFadyen goes so far as to suggest 
that the ideal speech situation as delineated by Habermas `indicates the form of interpersonal life 
as intended by God at creation. ' 41 Habermasean discourse theory represents a pre-lapsarian and 
post-redemptive ideal that mirrors the `dialogical form of God's communication' as triune 
intersubjectivity. 42 This statement of commitment to the ideal speech situation points us to the 
39Ibid., 165. 
40 Ibid., 187. 
41 Ibid. Cf Jürgen Habermas, `Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence', 317ff. 
42 Ibid., 207. 
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model for McFadyen's theological anthropology. He suggests, early on in his study, that one of 
the two `theological components' in his argument is `human existence in the image of the 
trinitarian God. '43 
2.4: The Relational God 
It is the trinitarian God who, according to many contemporary theologians. can redeem 
the fragmented and broken identity of the self in the context of the postmodernity. Anthony 
Thiselton is a good example of this trinitarian perspective. In response to the violence and 
manipulation that defines and controls the postmodern `resituated' self -a position that he is out to 
dismiss - Thiselton posits a self who, via the application of the working hypothesis of a promise 
that he believes is present in the context of both christology and a perichoretic trinity, can be 
reconstituted. 
[This promise] transforms the self because, like the experience of resurrection, it 
`reconstitutes' self -identity as no longer the passive victim of forces of the past 
which `situated' it within a network of pre-given roles and performances, but 
opens out a new future in which new purpose brings a `point' to its life. The self 
perceives its call and its value as one-who-is-loved within the larger narrative plot 
of God's loving purposes for the world, for society, and for the self. 
44 
This reconstitution is possible `from ahead' as we are invited to a form of reconstituted identity in 
relation to Jesus. 45 Thiselton does not provide a programme or outline of practices through which 
the self might be reconstituted (a point I will return to later) but his claims are bold. It is, in the 
main, an understanding - after Moltmann, Boff and Gunton - of the interrelationality of the trinity 
that fuels the radical nature of his alternative to contemporary anthropological discourse. 
43 Ibid., 17. 
44 Anthony C. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self. ' On Meaning, Manipulation and 
Promise (Edinburgh T&T Clark, 1995), 160. 
45 Ibid., 163. 
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Colin Gunton is less cavalier in his discussion of the relationship between the trinity and 
intersubjective existence. Highlighting the importance of the analogous character of statements 
that we make of God, he charts a cautious course between the perfect mutuality of the divine and 
the broken context of nature. Consequently, he suggests that we must not press models of God 
too far in their application to social and communal life. Nevertheless, argues Gunton, the 
perichoretic model of the trinity challenges our understanding of subjectivity and society. 
Through the doctrine of the relational God we can conclude that `a doctrine of human penchoresis 
affirms, after philosophies like that of John Macmurray, that persons mutually constitute each 
other, make each other what they are. ' 46 Gunton ultimately believes that the contemporary 
fragmentation of culture and persons is linked to a unitary conception of God and that through a 
more properly triune conception of the divine we can conceive of and perform a plurality in 
unity. 
47 
This patronage of a social, perichoretic understanding of the trinity is due, in part, to the 
fact that it offers a theological response to the crisis of subjectivity. If, as I suggested in the 
Introduction to this study, contemporary life is marked by a growing fragmentation, then a social 
and communal doctrine of God provides a significant challenge to this context and an alternative 
vision of what might be - in short, hope. Thus, if human beings are the imago Trinitatis, then 
`since God's nature is triune, a society of mutual relationships, life in human nature and the 
Church is analogous to this. The same analogy holds good for society. '48 If God is the being 
whose nature is intersubjectivity par excellence then the human vocation of responding to this 
God must be lived out as intersubjectivity. Jürgen Moltmann summarises this position and 
46 Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 169. 
47 Ibid., 177. 
48 John Thompson, `Modern Trinitarian Perspectives' Scottish Journal of Theology 44 (1990), 360. 
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clarifies the extent to which the human/divme analogy demands a transformation of perspective 
for individual Christians, the church and (ultimately) the world: 
The unity of the triune God is no longer seen in the homogenous divine subject 
nor in the identical divine subject, but in the eternal perichoresis of Father, Son 
and Spirit. This insight has far-reaching consequences for the hermeneutics of the 
history of salvation and human experiences of God; for the doctrine of the image 
of God in human beings and the conception of a creation which corresponds to 
God; for the doctrine of the form and the unity of the church as the `icon of the 
Trinity'; and not least for the eschatological expectation of a new, eternal 
community of creation. The monarchial, hierarchical and patriarchal ideas used 
to legitimate the concept of God are thus becoming obsolete. `Communion', 
`fellowship' is the purpose and nature of the triune God. 
49 
Moltmann's claims are quite breathtaking, but they are founded on a conception of divine 
personhood that is fundamentally relational in character. The outcome of embracing a 
perichorelic, trinitarian conception of the divine is a transformation of atomistic individualism 
into fellowship and communion. The logic of subjectivity, as Habermas might put it, is not to be 
uncovered through a revision of forms of rationality but a through revised conception of God. 
Moreover, it is a model of God that is more faithful to the biblical data of salvation history. 
50 As 
McFadyen puts it 
The form and content of God's communication in salvation history is not that of 
an absolute, totalitarian ruler (monologue); it is an overspilling of the internal 
trinitarian process of communication. The form and content of this 
communication are inseparable, in that it is the trinitarian life-process which 
communicates itself through itself. The dialogical form of God's communication 
cannot be understood apart from the Father's sending of the Son and the 
empowering of the Holy Spirit. God's rule is an abandonment of absolute, 
transcendent power in favour of the grace by which creative appeal is made to 
human freedom and rational understanding: i. e. to the incorporation of human 
49 Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God trans. M. Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1991), xii. 
50 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God trans. M. Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1981), 16- 
20. 
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subjectivity in the relation. Human rule and the exercise of power in this image 
are to be referred to the understanding held by free political subjects. 51 
God's rule is that of a communicative relationality that fosters an appeal to `human freedom and 
rational understanding' in an intersubjective and social context. The trinity is certainly here seen 
as a blueprint for human relations and political interaction. It is no overstatement to suggest that 
Nikolai Feodorov's adage is appropriate for what is being claimed here: The Holy Trinity is our 
social programme. 52 
To summarise. In the second part of this chapter I have outlined Alistair McFadyen's 
theological anthropology (and adherents to corresponding projects) in which the self is perceived 
as dialogical in that it is formed in communicative engagement with others and dialectical in that it 
is never a finished product. Human identity is formed in relationships over time. Yet there 
remains a sense in which identity is formally one's own - the self is a centred being whose identity 
is made manifest in communal being-with-others. In this way McFadyen secures both the 
relational nature of the self and the individual integrii. v of the self. I also demonstrated how 
Habermasean critical theory is utilised by McFadyen in order to delineate the communicative 
character of the subject and that he goes as far as to suggest that the outline of the ideal speech 
situation corresponds to the perfection and non-domination of redeemed humanity. Finally, I 
exposed the trinitarian character of the God who is the ultimate model for human intersubjective 
identity -a God who, against the monologic of atomistic human identity and the monolithic 
authoritarianism of a unitary deity, is identified as perichoretic fellowship. It now remains for me 
to critically evaluate Habermas's communicative rationality and its theological concomitant. 
51 Alistair McFadyen, The ('all to Personthood, 207. 
Quoted by John Thompson, `Modern Trinitarian Perspectives', 360. Cf also Mary Timothy Prokes's 
incorporation of a social doctrine of the trinity into her study of the place and significance of the body in 
theological reflection and the life of the church. Toward a Theology of the Body (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1996), 65-73. 
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2.5: Critical Evaluation 
The philosophical project of Jürgen Habermas, and the work of the theologians who 
closely follow his emphasis on communicative rationality, challenges contemporary theological 
anthropology to examine the framework for, and nature of, human intersubjective relations. 
Moreover, through an explicit critique of postmodern attempts to resituate the self, these 
theoretical undertakings question a thorough-going dismissal of the modem project through a 
reassessment of reason, language and identity. Yet the force of Habermas's formal conditioning 
of the public realm and radical consensus is augmented by theologians with an attempted retrieval 
of the doctrine of the trinity - it is the divine who can be said to provide the most fundamental 
representation of the possibility and conditions for non-dominant, peaceable intersubjectivity. 
Because of the dependence of Alistair McFadyen's communicative-relational model of 
human interaction on the critical theory of Habermas, I will, for the most part, take it as read that 
criticisms of Habermas also challenge the force of the former's argument and the applicability of 
his hypothesis. It is at the point which McFadyen's work departs from Habermas, in his espousal 
of the social doctrine of the trinity, that his originality and distinctly theological credentials come 
into play. Consequently, this critical evaluation will consist of two parts. First, I will assess the 
significance of a communicative rationality and its reconstitution of the subject in both Habermas 
and McFadyen. I will then, second, consider the theological supplement to this reconstruction -a 
model of human sociality that is predicated on the nature and Christian experience of the trinity. 
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2.5.1: The Matter of Exclusion in the Project of Reconstitution 
Criticisms of Habermas's project are legion and I do not intend to rehearse all of them 
here. 53 There are, however, two significant responses to the Habermasean project that I wish to 
outline and comment on at some length. The terms upon which these responses rest are, first, the 
place, purpose and status of embodiment in communicative rationality and, second, the role and 
standing of desire in intersubjective relations. Both themes, I will argue, are deeply problematic in 
the re-constructive enterprises of both Habermas and McFadyen. 
The first of my critical responses to the social reconstruction of the subject is prompted by 
Friedrich Nietzsche's suggestion in The Antichrist that one can distinguish between two forms of 
Christianity: the doctrinal religion that is concerned with original sin, free will, judgement, 
heaven, hell and damnation and the practical religiosity that is evident in pre-Pauline practices of 
the development of character. Nietzsche ties the latter to Jesus and a pre-institutionalised faith: 
It is false to the point of absurdity to see in a 'belief, perchance the belief in 
redemption through Christ, the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian: Only 
Christian practice, a life such as he who died on the Cross lived, is Christian .... 
Not a belief but a doing, above all, a not-doing of many things, a different being 
.... 
States of consciousness, beliefs of any kind, holding something to be true, for 
example - every psychologist knows this - are a matter of complete indifference 
and of fifth rank compared to the values of the instincts .... 
`Faith' has been at all 
times, with Luther for instance, only a cloak, a pretext, a screen, behind which the 
instincts played their game -a shrewd blindness to the dominance of certain 
instincts 
.... 
4 
53 Cf. John Thompson & David Held (eds), Habermas: Critical Debates (London: Macmillan, 1982). 
54 Friedrich Nietzsche, The 7wighlight of the Idols and The Antichrist trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 151. I would want to question Nietzsche's understanding of doctrine 
here but this is not the place for such a discussion. Cf. Chapter Five for a notion of tradition that at least to 
some extent challenges Nietzsche's repudiation and rejection of this tradition. 
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William Connolly, in his commentary on this passage, 
55 suggests that `instincts' here are not to be 
understood a `brutish, biologically fixed force'. 56 Rather, what Nietzsche is proposing is that our 
thought operates across and through several registers and that in his advocacy of instincts he is 
demonstrating the importance of `visceral modes of appraisal'. 57 Connolly, following this 
Nietzschean lead, suggests that `thinking and intersubjectivity operate on more than one register 
and that to work on the instinctive register of intersubjective judgement can also be to introduce 
new possibilities of thinking and being into life. '58 These new possibilities are posited by 
Connolly on the basis that the visceral nature of intersubjective relations is fundamentally 
excluded by contemporary re-assessments of rationality. Indeed, the visceral register is a 
dangerous outsider. Habermas is a case in point. He institutes a vision of the public realm that 
extracts public conflict at a cost: he demands submission to an `infectious insistence upon an 
authoritative model of discourse from which the visceral element is subtracted. '59 The point here 
is that Habermas ignores not only the visceral nature of human interaction but also the need for 
reflection on and experimentation with practices that relate to an `ethic of cultivation'. 
60 These 
are not practices that arise from the need for pragmatic responses to various political, social and 
intersubjective difficulties. On the contrary, they can be seen as arising from a generosity that 
accepts the place of others in the market-place as providing the context and opportunity for 
cultivation. Connolly names this an `ethos of engagement'. 
61 
This ethos of engagement does not eschew the fact of disagreement and the demands of 
agonistic pluralism. This is where attention to the visceral and contingent elements in our thinking 
and practice question the communicative rationality of Habermas. Habermas claims to reject in 
5' William E. Connolly, Why I am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 27-29. 
'6 Ibid., 27. 
'7 Ibid. 
'x Ibid. 
'O Ibid., 35. 
60 Ibid., 36. 
61 Ibid. 
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his quasi-transcendental scheme the transcendental status of the Kantian supersensible. Yet, in 
accepting only a limited space for the contingent and finally imposing a firm foundation for 
intersubjectivity, he is taking one step forward and two back. Habermas claims that 
Transcendental thinking once concerned itself with a stable stock of forms for 
which there were no recognizable alternatives. Today, in contrast, the experience 
of contingency is a whirlpool into which everything is pulled: everything could 
also be otherwise, the categories of the understanding, the principles of 
socialization and morals, the constitution of subjectivity, the foundation of 
rationality itself. There are good reasons for this. Communicative reason, too, 
treats almost everything as contingent, even the conditions for the emergence of 
its own linguistic medium. But for everything that claims validity within 
linguistically structured forms of life, the structures of possible mutual 
understanding in language constitute something that cannot be gotten around. 6` 
It is the logic of linguistic performance that provides the ground for the assessment of validity 
claims and, thus, epistemological justification. There is a sense here that unless the condition of 
intersubjectivity can be judged and evaluated from an Archimedean point then any possibility of 
non-coercion is removed and the public realm, indeed politics, will dissolve. The consequence of 
this fearful stand is in fact - contra Habermas -a refusal of the public. It is, to borrow Gillian 
Rose's designation, `Agoraphobia'. This familiar term is `usually defined as fear of wide open 
space, but the word, more closely observed, is specific. Agora means the market-place, the place 
of assembly; it implies public, articulate space, space full of interconnections, with which you 
cannot enter into exchange. '63 To be more accurate, Habermas is a quasi-agoraphobic: his fear of 
the market-place is only one side of the coin. He accepts contingency, flux and contestation but 
only on the basis that it can ultimately be filtered through a communicative rationality and 
transformed into a unidimensional institutional situation constituted by that filter. In this process, 
the embodied, visceral selves of the agora are reduced to epistemological pawns in the quest to 
02 Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1992), 139-140. 
63 Gillian Rose, Love's Work (London: Chatto & Windus, 1995), 123. 
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remove any non-cognitive element. Not to do so would be to accept the 'irrationalism' of the 
postmoderns. 
The case of Alistair McFadyen is even more difficult to uphold in the face of Conneih's 
Nietzsche-informed apologia for the visceral nature of thought and intersubjectivity. In place of 
bodily practices of faithful intersubjectivity, he asserts the priority of a secure, rationally sound 
theory of relationality. One wonders where an existence that is often so messy and difficult meets 
thought and where it is that the visceral register comes into play in the context of faith. The 
theology of McFadyen, in contrast to Wittgenstein's understanding of the resurrection, is not that 
of a way of life. For Wittgenstein 
Only love can believe the Resurrection. If I am to be REALLY saved what I need 
is faith. And faith is faith in what is needed by my heart and soul, not by my 
speculative intelligence. For it is my soul with its passions, as it were with its 
flesh and blood, that has to be saved, not my abstract mind. 
64 
Wittgenstein's point, like Nietzsche's, is that the mind - rationality - is not everything and that the 
flesh and blood or soul are significant factors in a life of faith. If theological anthropology 
ignores the multidimensional nature of being human and the investment in faith of the viscera then 
this subject is at the very least half-dead. 
McFadyen, however, goes further than Habermas and modifies the latter's understanding 
of intersubjectivity in order to place the self, prior to and apart from communication, on a firmer 
footing. He claims that the self is 'internally centred' and that this centre is the very thing that 
64 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (eds) G. E. M. Anscombe & G. E. von Wright trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 33e. 
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makes interaction possible. 65 This reflexive, internal `1' is the foundation of any mutuality and 
communality. Again, Gillian Rose's reflections are apposite. She rails against such a notion of 
subjectivity anterior to the world and the public realm: 
This self-reliance leaves us at the mercy of our own mercilessness; it keeps us 
infinitely sentimental about ourselves, but methodically ruthless towards others; it 
breeds sureness of self, not ready to be unsure; with an unconscious conviction of 
eternal but untried election. ... 
This unrevealed religion is the baroque 
excrescence of the Protestant ethic: hedonist, not ascetic, voluptuous, not austere, 
embellished, not plain, it devotes us to our own individual, inner-worldly 
authority, but with the loss of the inner as well as the outer mediator. This is an 
ethics without ethics, a religion without salvation. 66 
The univocal imposition of a personally-centred basis for intersubjectivity in fact destroys 
intersubjectivity. Truth, standards and validity begin from what is private and non-negotiable - the 
T. For all his talk of sociality and community, McFadyen is universalising a form of cultural 
solipsism that is only deserted on the occasions that sentimentalism provokes this `I' into giving 
and receiving. Indeed, self-understanding according to McFadyen is mediated by the other in that 
they provide a reflection of who I am. The other is a minor - inert and unreal in itself, save that it 
provides a reflection of me, over there. Its only significance is that it provides an insight into who 
I am - Narcissus. 
The second objection to Habermasean theory and its theological offspring is the role and 
status of desire within the quest for intersubjectivity. Central to this criticism is the argument that 
if one is striving to delineate the basis of and means for agreement then a variety of concerns and 
issues must be met. As Jane Braaten puts it, in relation to her anxiety that in Habermas 
epistemological `justification is the foundation of all forms and dimensions of relationship', is it 
65 Alistair McFadyen, The (all to Personhood, 69. 
66 Gillian Rose, Loves Work, 127. 
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not the case that `mimesis, sympathy, and affection have at least as much claim to this status'? 67 
Braaten's point is that, as with the visceral, there are a number of `registers' through and upon 
which thought and consensus are constituted. Agreements are embedded, to coin a 
Wittgensteinian phrase, in forms of life and procedures that engender consensus, and 
intersubjective communality only exists as a complex ensemble of practices, attitudes and 
theories. I will consider the case of mimesis in more detail in the next two chapters. There I will 
also, in the context of Rene Girard's notion of mimetic desire, consider the status of desire in a 
more wide-ranging discussion. However, in order to set the scene for that specific examination, I 
want to explore how it is that the matter of desire is both included and excluded in Habermas's 
project. 
For Habermas, desire is little more than a social utility. If, through the procedures of 
communicative rationality, desires converge then all to the good. The status of desire here is that 
of a second order constituent of relations between subjects. 68 Habermas 
at best regards desire as an external threat to the autonomy of the rational subject. 
As a result, the transformative potential of desire, its orientation "beyond" that 
may be revealed in and through the recognition of concrete others, is lost; it is 
jettisoned as part of the sweeping critique of "transcendental philosophy. "69 
Habennas is committed to a theory and procedure of universalising rationality that underpins 
intersubjectivity. Selves do not move beyond themselves to another but are implicated in a model 
of mutual understanding. Others subjects are not people who we meet in desiring, bodily 
encounters in which we are taken beyond ourselves, but other subjects who share the capacity for 
67 Jane Braaten, From Communicative Rationality to Communicative Thinking: A Basis for Feminist 
Theory and Practice' Feminists Reading Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse (ed. ) J. Meehan 
New York: Routledge, 1995), 149. 
'x Cf. John Thompson, `Universal Pragmatics' Habermas: Critical Debates, 160. 
69 Anthony J. Cascardi, the Subject of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 271. 
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rationality or the competence for argument that are the essential ingredients for public life. I am 
not for one moment dismissing these factors that Habermas has done so much to bring to the fore 
in contemporary social and political theory. I am simply questioning their priority and the 
concomitant exclusion of other registers (indeed others in general) which (or who) are surely part 
of the diverse fabric that constitutes subjectivity. This reductionism is highlighted by Anthony 
Cascardi: 
In resolving the characteristic antinomies of the subject in relation to a world of 
objects, Habermas has in essence reduced the Other to a merely empirical or 
"perspectival" variation of the self, and this reduction is in turn symptomatic of 
the Habermasean attempt to reconstruct the totality of knowledge based on the 
accessibility of practical "rules" to rational consciousness. 70 
The other is a reflection of social or practical positions and is seen, perspectively. only in 
retrospect. This problem of the other is the result of an understanding of subjectivity which is 
formed in the private sphere and is then - and only then - capable and adequately prepared to 
engage with others in the public sphere of communicative rationality. Desire is dangerous because 
it disrupts this neat division of discreet identities who meet in a clean, regulated forum. Desire is 
that which gives rise to contestation and the demand for recognition, not least of interests and 
goods that may be incommensurable. One can see quite clearly why Habermasean discourse is 
problematic for feminists. 71 
To summarise: in this section I have argued that the communicative rationality of 
Habermas neglects and consequently excludes those registers that stand outside his own 
understanding of what constitutes knowledge. The embodiment or viscerality of selves and their 
`instincts', as Nietzsche calls them, have no place in intersubjective relations. I further suggested 
70 Ibid. 
71 Cf. Joanna Meehan (ed. ), Feminists Reading Habermas. 
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that the visceral returns in the incorrigibility of the body and its central role in any formation of 
communality. This oversight of Habermas is understandable. The inclusion of the visceral 
muddies the waters of a sanitised communicative procedure. In response to the myopic 
perspective of Habermas, I suggested that William Connelly's proposal for an ethic of cultivation 
takes seriously the interaction of plural practices and beliefs. What this discussion of an 
alternative ethic raises is the prospect of an intersubjectivity in which a generosity that does not 
eschew difference may be a central ingredient -a theme I shall return to in the conclusion to this 
study. I also demonstrated that Habermas can only include desire within his communicative 
framework if it serves the purpose of bolstering participation in an ideal speech situation. Desire 
as it may be implicated in problems of recognition and disagreement must be excluded from 
intersubjective relations. This, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Four, is impossible. I then 
extended this critique of Habermas to Alistair McFadyen's associated understanding of 
relationality. McFadyen constructs a self whose basis is a private non-negotiable region or 
`centre' from which subjects are anchored sufficiently to venture into relation. I argued that 
McFadyen was commending a thoroughly narcissistic self for whom the other is but a mirror. It 
now remains for me to examine the more strictly theological element in McFadyen's theological 
anthropology. 
2.5.2: Relationality, the Self and God 
Earlier I outlined the importance for a certain school of theological enquiry of the social 
doctrine of the trinity. I demonstrated how this triune God provided the basis for a constructive 
theological analysis of subjectivity. My task in this part of the chapter is to briefly engage with 
the theoretical and practical implications of this rapprochement between anthropological and 
trinitarian discourse. This I will attempt on two fronts. First, I will assess the logic of similitude 
that is introduced into the analysis of the social model of God and the relational model of 
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subjectivity. Second, through an analysis of the status of analogy and the description of the 
human and divine theatres in the work of theologians concerned to reconstitute the self, I will ask 
whether there is a danger of dissolving differences between God and the world in a quest for 
answers to difficult contemporary questions. 
The sociality of the trinity - the perichoretic relationship or co-inherence of the three 
divine persons - provides the church (and ultimately society at large) with a definitive model for 
intersubjectivity and peaceable living. That is the claim of a myriad of contemporary theologians. 
The relationship between the trinity and social relations is not a new venture in Christian theology. 
Indeed, the Cappadocian Fathers and Richard St. Victor are often seen as forebears of a model of 
God that impacts upon Christian existence and practice. 72 What is new is the insistence that 
adherence to a social doctrine of the trinity, and all that this model of God promises, will 
effectively transform the ways in which human beings will live. 
The theoretical context for this claim of the adherents of the social doctrine is the 
relationship between two models of God and the crisis of subjectivity in a modem context. As 
with McFadyen's attempt to construct a notion of Christian personhood that is relational and 
social in character, the broad framework within which the social modelists work is that of a 
response to the autonomous subject of modernity and its rejection of an autocratic, totalitarian 
God. As Walter Kasper suggests, the challenge facing trinitarian theology is to respond to the 
modern condition: `Above all, the issue is how, in continuity with and yet also in opposition to the 
spirit of the modem age, the human person can be properly understood as the image of the 
72 Cf. E. J. Fortman, The "Triune God (London: Hutchinson, 1972), 76. This is not the place to discuss the 
relevant models of the tradition with contemporary formulations. For a thorough analysis of the major 
similarities and differences, cf. John Thompson, `Modern Trinitarian Perspectives'. 
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trinitarian God. '73 Not surprisingly, in order to respond to (and against) a particular modem 
conception of the self, the social modelists are highly critical of an Augustinian psychological 
analogy in which God's identity is not found in a penchoretic relationship between the three 
persons of the Godhead but in three activities in the individual soul. 74 In place of this unitary. 
monolithic God, the social modelists champion a modification of the Cappadocian relational 
analogy in which, they claim, the emphasis lies with the unity of the three persons in their 
interrelation and coinherence within God. Nevertheless, the identity of these persons is 
suspiciously modern. Cornelius Plantinga demonstrates this point when, in an analysis of the 
social doctrine, he suggests that the identity of the trinity can be summarised in a two-fold 
definition: 
(1) Father, Son, and Spirit are conceived as persons in a full sense of `person', 
i. e., as distinct centres of love, will, knowledge, and purposeful action ... and 
(2) 
who are conceived as related to each other in some central ways analogous to, 
even if sublime% surpassing, relations among members of a society of three 
human persons. 5 
The notion of separate, distinct centres of various activities and attributes suggests that the selves 
who are trinitarian persons are disengaged, atomistic individuals first and from that position move 
into communality. 
This, it seems to me, is the crisis of theological anthropology - an imposition of a 
particular model of the subject onto the Godhead and an idealist belief that if we say often enough 
that these persons are relational then human beings will follow suit. There is no struggle in 
73 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ trans. M. J. O'Connell (London: SCM, 1984), 286. 
74 A particularly noteworthy attack on Augustine's trinitacian theology can be found in Colin Gunton, The 
Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 35-57. 
75 Cornelius Plantinga, `Gregory of Nyssa and the Social Analogy of the Trinity' The Thomisi 50 (1986), 
325 
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McFadyen, Gunton or Thiselton to craft a theological response to a triune God that is appropriate 
for embodied, instinct-saturated human beings. There is, in short, no hard labour of love, no 
paideia. Moreover, there is no content to the human divine analogy but for a simplistic 
correlation. To suggest that the identity of God and the identity of human beings consists in their 
both being relational beings is vacuous to say the least. What is the content of `relational'? Is it 
not true that human beings may be immersed in relations at every waking moment of their lives 
but these intersubjective moments can be violent and jealous and full of misunderstanding? And 
are not intersubjective relations embedded within communities who practice, shape and develop 
theology as well as vice versa? What is required in a theological examination of the subject is that 
these contexts are taken seriously and that hope is offered rather than a simplistic idealism. 
Consequently, an ethically responsible theological anthropology must take account of the violence 
and fragmentation of human interaction as well as the beautiful, the intimate and the loving that 
are part and parcel of life. It would also account for the dialectical and integral relationship 
between thought and practice, ideas and existence. Michel de Certeau offers an insight into the 
implications of this alternative vision in the context of the fecundity of the life and death of Christ: 
Thus, through community practice and Trinitarian theology, the death of Jesus 
becomes the condition for the new church to arise and for new languages of the 
Gospel to develop. The true relation of Jesus to the Father (who gives him his 
authority) and to the Church (he `permits') is verified (i. e. manifested) by his 
death. The Jesus event is extended (verified) in the manner of disappearance in 
the difference which that event renders possible. Our relation to the origin is in 
function of its increasing absence. The beginning is more and more hidden by the 
multiple creations which reveal its significance. 
The relations that subjects are involved in and with are - even in relation to the church and belief - 
constantly renewed, reconstructed and displaced in terms of a logic of difference that marks 
practice and thought. In consequence, relationality is then exposed as encompassing two 
76 Michel de Certeau, `How is Christianity Thinkable Today? ' The Postmodern God (ed. ) G. Ward (Oxford: 
Blackwell), 146-147. 
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dimensions: the synchronic (involving particular groups of subjects in time and space) and 
diachronic (involving the identity of subjects as realised in the context of tradition, change and 
textuality) with all the inevitable engagements, rhythms and collisions that living amidst the two 
entails. The logic of difference, however, does not proceed neatly and sequentially but can be 
characterised as layers of interpenetrating apertures and closures that give rise to a multifaceted 
relationality. 
A second problem with an all too simplistic association of anthropological discourse with 
trinitarian models is closely related to the first. If the first failing of the social modelists is that 
they move too quickly to correlate the divine and human conditions, and follow with a far too bare 
analysis of the identity of both, then any distance between God and human beings is evacuated. 
The logic of correlation pursued by McFadyen and others results in the equivocal nature of 
analogy being either forgotten or ignored and the idealist account of the relationship between God 
and the world follows. For example, McFadyen suggests that in the provision of space for free 
human response to the divine address, the divine-human relationship is structured from God's side 
as a dialogue. '77 In a footnote to this statement, McFadyen then provides a helpful explanation of 
what exactly he means by 'dialogue': 
Dialogue is a relationship in which the mutual orientation of the partners is based 
on their personal uniqueness and discreteness (independence from one another 
and their relation). It is therefore a bipolar interaction involving both distance and 
relation. Because it is based upon the unique identities of each and because these 
must remain unknowable in any final and complete sense by the other, each 
partner must make her or his own independent contribution to the relation (i. e. be 
a subject and originator of communication and communicate herself and himself) 
and give space and time for the other to do the same. So each partner will be 78 
passive and active, the subject (I) and object (Thou) of communication. 
77 Alistair McFadyen, The (all to Personhood, 19. 
79 Alistair McFadyen, The ('all to Per. wnhood 275 n2. 
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Of course, dialogue is central to relations between subjects and I would not want to dismiss the 
presence of dialogue in the human-divine relationship. However. there is an element within 
McFadyen's outline that seems to be all too clear cut. There is no place for uncertainty, absence 
and misunderstanding on the part of human beings. If Jean-Luc Marion's attempt to overcome the 
problem of onto-theo-logy resulted in an almost absolute distance between God and Being (bar 
the bishop), McFadyen's understanding of divine-human dialogue - in its institution of perfect 
reciprocity - annihilates almost any logic of difference between God and the world. Thanks to the 
divine structuring of dialogue, any distancing functions to ensure that dialogue is conducted 
between `discrete' entities in a bipolar relation. There is not here any concession to the doctrine of 
creation and, accordingly, to the fact that the structure of divine-human dialogue might be 
understood as a gift that maintains a distance between God and humanity'while, at the same time, 
enigmatically marks the immediacy of God. The distance and closeness of God is, of course, 
analogous to intersubjective dialogue but this analogy must incorporate the manifest dissimilarity 
of relations because of the status of the participants. 
In contrast to an unproblematic correlation between human and human-divine dialogue, 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, in his study of the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, defines the distinction 
between the human and divine as `diastemic', 79 dependent, that is, on a `spacing' that is 
coextensive with creation. Yet this diastasis is not simply a static chasm between the human and 
the divine, between nature and grace, but a movement of transformation and alteration. 
80 This 
movement is further (and concretely) exposed in Maurice Blondel's point that `To reach God, 
man must go through all of nature and find him under the veil where He hides Himself only to be 
accessible. Thus the whole natural order comes between God and man as a bond and as an 
79 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of 
Yssa trans. Mark Sebanc (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 27ff. W 
Ibid., 31. 
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obstacle, as a necessary means of union and as a necessary means of distinction. "x1 Rather than 
establishing theological anthropology on grounds that emphasise the univocal relationship 
between human intersubjectivity and human-divine relations, Blondel elucidates both the inherent 
equivocation and the attendant discrimination that are required when situating the dialogue 
partners. Crucially, Blondel also establishes this dia-logic without, as with Marion, positing an 
absolute rupture between God and the world. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have considered a major philosophical attempt to reconstitute the subject. 
The critical theory of Jürgen Habermas, along with its theological counterpart, constitutes the 
second of Wenders' two portrayals of the condition of contemporary subjectivity. I outlined 
Habermas's attempt to complete the unfinished project of modernity through a reappraisal and 
reconstruction of reason. Habermas has spent much of his adult life constructing something of a 
theoretical edifice as an alternative to the ubiquitous presence of purposive rationality that has 
triumphed in the modern era. This alternative form of rationality arises in and through human 
beings as linguistic animals and is entitled `communicative rationality'. Habermas's aim is to 
uncover the intersubjective grounds upon which dialogue, and hence politics, can proceed in a 
non-violent, non-coercive manner. His work is taken up in a theological context by Alistair 
McFadyen who, as I indicated, augments Habermasean theory in two ways. First, McFadyen 
proposes a theory of personhood in which, in addition to the intersubjective, communicative 
component of identity, there is a more basic and secure personal centre. Second, McFadyen 
proposes that the model for human relationships and their non-violent character is most fully 
available in the social doctrine of the trinity. Here I added the work of Colin Gunton, Anthony 
81 Maurice Blondel, Action (1893): Essen, on the Critique of Life and a Science of Practice trans. Olivia 
Blanchette (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 410. 
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Thiselton and Jürgen Moltmann (amongst others) to demonstrate the widespread use of this divine 
pattern as an exemplar for human interaction. 
After exposing these philosophical and theological attempts to reconstitute the self, I 
critically evaluated their merits and their defects in terms of what they contribute to the challenge 
of delineating a theological anthropology in a contemporary context. The critical-theoretical 
project of Habermas was seen to exclude two important elements that are indispensable in any 
examination of intersubjective relations - the embodiment of the self and the vicissitudes of desire. 
The displacement of the visceral dimension of being human is particularly grave because of the 
resultant failure to take seriously the embodied practices in which any communication and 
intersubjectivity is embedded. A further difficulty is that any understanding of the public realm 
within which subjects interact is predicated on a knowledge of an anterior subjectivity that is 
independent of others. Indeed, I argued that Habermas leaves us with little more than an 
mutilated, half-self Furthermore, communicative rationality was shown to exclude desire unless 
it was useful as a means of bringing subjects to commit themselves to the principles and 
procedures of the ideal speech situation. Consequently, a desire that attempts to move beyond the 
subject into a drama of recognition and contestation must be excluded as it disrupts the neat and 
tidy parameters within which Habermas establishes intersubjectivity. 
In the theological project of Alistair McFadyen there is, I demonstrated, a related disdain 
for the visceral register of intersubjectivity and the practices within and through which 
communality is contrived. Furthermore, McFadyen not only reconstructs the self on the basis of 
communication but re-centres the self through predicating any external relations on the firm 
grounds of an internal unity. This escape into self-certainty is ultimately a rejection of the public, 
contingent context within which subjectivity is formed. From an ecclesiological perspective one 
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might suggest that it places the individual above any proper ecclesial identity and renders 
communal interaction insignificant apart from its status as a resource (fellowship) for the 
edification of the solitary self. 
Finally, I analysed the import of a particular form of trinitarian theology into recent 
explorations of the status of the self. I demonstrated how many theologians including Moltmann. 
Gunton, Thiselton and McFadyen depend on a model of God as perichoresis for their 
development of a theory of the self in the social sphere. Here the three divine persons co-inhere in 
a perfect example of loving interaction. I criticised the over-simple identification of this model 
with human communality on two grounds. First, I demonstrated how this path to a theological 
anthropology is both idealist and simplistic in that it diminishes the complexities and difficulties 
of intersubjective relations. Second, I argued that the uncritical replication of models of God and 
models of human living ignores the distinctive identities of God and human beings and overlooks 
the dissimilarities between God and the world. Yet again, in preference to the difficult task of the 
cultivation of embodied practices, theology is presented with anthropological discourses that 
volunteer easy solutions to some very difficult, if not tragic, challenges. In response to the evident 
failures of the endeavour to reconstitute the subject I will turn in Part Two to the work of Rene 
Girard. 
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Part Two 
Rene Girard: Life and Work 
As stated in the Introduction, the purpose of this study is to explore possible avenues 
through which theological anthropology can be reassessed and reconceived in a postmodern or 
late-modem context. In Part One I delineated two contemporary anthropological projects - the 
resituation and reconstitution of the self - that accord with Wim Wenders' cinematic portrayal, 
and attempted resolution, of the crisis of fragmentation. Due to the inherent failings of these 
theoretical undertakings I will examine a third project that will, I believe, offer significant 
resources for the reconfiguration of a theological anthropology that is both ethically 
responsible and relevant to the exigencies of a pos-modern context.. As a means to this 
difficult objective, I shall outline and interrogate the wide-ranging hypothesis of cultural and 
religious origins of Rene Girard which, at the very least, embodies a significant critical 
rejoinder to both the contemporary subversion and reconstitution of anthropological discourse. 
Girard's work has stimulated a significant debate over a period of many years that has engaged 
the talents and thoughts of theoreticians of religion, biblical exegetes and theologians. ' 
However, Girard's work, diverse in its disciplinary scope and evolutionary in character, has 
both fascinated and offended commentators in a plurality of intellectual fields, from 
Cf. the special issue of Religion, 27: 3 (1997) edited by James Williams, most of which examines, 
through an engagement with Girardian theory, the question 'Christianity: a Sacrificial or Nonsacrificial 
Religion? ', cf Also the special edition of tiemeia 33 (1985), edited by Andrew McKenna for an 
extensive secondav bibliography. 
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anthropology and literary criticism to psychology and film theory2. The purpose of this 
introduction is to provide an overview of Girard's life and work so that his oeuvre might be 
understood in the context of the significant events of his life as vell as twentieth centum 
French thought more generally. 
Rene Noel Girard was born in the town of Avignon in 1923; the middle name 
bestowed due to the fact that he was born on Christmas day of that year. 3 Girard studied in 
France until 1947, when he graduated as an `archiviste-paleographe' from Ecole de Chartres in 
Paris. He was one of a number of prominent late twentieth-century intellectuals - whose 
influence has proceeded far beyond French borders - who studied in Paris during the period 
surrounding the latter days of the second world war. Thus Girard's intellectual formation was 
contemporaneous with those figures who were to take on the mantle of forging an intellectual 
agenda in an environment dominated by, yet emerging from, the shadow of Sartre's humanist 
existentialism. 4 The importance of Girard's passage through the Parisian education 
establishment at this particular stage cannot be underestimated. In terms of the institutional 
context, as Clare O'Farrell points out, emergence from the Parisian lycee system is almost a 
compulsory requirement if one is to develop an academic career of any significance in France. 
With regards to the period in which Girard's pursued his studies, during the nineteen forties, at 
Lycee Louis-le-Grand `we find Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Le-Goff, Jean-Francois Lyotard and 
2 Cf Marcel Detienne, `Culinary Practices and the Spirit of Sacrifices', Cuisine of Sacrifice among the 
Greeks (eds) M. Detienne & J-P. Vernant, trans. P. Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989), 1-20, Lucien Goldmann, `Marx, Lukäcs, Girard et la sociologie du roman' Mediations 2 (1961), 
1943-53. Cf. also, Towards a Sociology of the Novel, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1975)1 J- 
M. Ougourlian, Puppets of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), C. Wessley, Von Star Wars, Ultima und Doom (Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang, 1997). 
3 In providing this intellectual biography I am drawing on R. Girard, Quand Ces ('hoses C'ommenceroni 
... 
Entretjens amec il'fichel Treguer (Paris Arlea, 1994), Ch. XII, `Une methode, une vie, un homme', 
167-199, R. Girard, 11w Girard Reader (ed. ) J. G. Williams (Nev, York: Crossroad, 1996), `Rene 
Girard:: \ Biographical Sketch', 1-6 and `Epilogue: The Anthropology of the Cross:. Conversation 
Ntiith Rene Girard', 2'62-288, J. Bottum, 'Girard Among the Girardians', First Things 61 (March 1996), 
42-45 
4 Sartre's L 'eire et le Necnit was published in 1943 by Gallimard and his populist `manifesto' of 
existentialism, I. 'Existentialisme est rin humanisme was published in 1946 by Les Editions Nagel. 
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Alain Touraine. At Henri IV we find Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze. Rene Girard and the 
historians Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Andre Burgniere and Pierre Vidal Naquet. "5 Unlike 
most of his peers, however, Girard decided to leave France in order to study in the United 
States. (That Girard was formed both within and without the French system explains to a great 
extent his ambiguous relationship with French intellectual culture and the leading 
representatives of its academic life. ) In the United States Girard pursued doctoral studies. 
again in history, at Indiana University. Three years later Girard received his PhD for a thesis 
entitled `American Opinion of France, 1940-1943'. It was at Indiana that the beginnings of a 
decisive transition in intellectual direction and interests began. Owing to the fact that he was 
French, Girard was appointed to teach classes in French literature; a discipline of which he was 
largely ignorant, at least for the purposes of a university course. Girard immersed himself in 
the works of Stendhal, Proust and Flaubert and, as his literary interests widened, he became 
enthralled by the literature of Dostoyevsky and Cervantes. Perceiving something unique in the 
work of these `classic' authors, Girard was captivated by the way they understood human 
relationships, desires and antagonisms. It was due to this fortuitous turn of events that Girard 
(unwittingly) embarked on the first phase of his career that would culminate in his first major 
work - Mensonge romantique et verite romanesque - published in 1961.6 
The critical response to Mensonge romantique et virile romanesque was extremely 
positive but Girard's interests were already evolving. Alongside his deepening interest in 
literature, now extended to include the Greek tragedians, Girard began to engage with 
anthropological literature in order that he might test his developing theoretical speculation in a 
comparative context. Perhaps more significant in terms of an account of his ideas, Girard's 
work, particularly Alensonge romantiyue et º'erite romanesque, was understood by critics and 
5 Clare O'Farrell, `Pierre Bourdieu: Sociology as a `World Vision' The Judgement of Paris: Recent 
french Theory in a Local Context (ed. ) K. D. S. Murray (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 134. 
6 Rene Girard, Mensonge romantique et i'Erite romatiesque (Paris: Grasset, 1961). English translation, 
Deceit. Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure trans. Y. Freccero (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1965). 
89 
commentators as being harmonious with a tradition of literary and cultural criticism that %N as 
fundamentally suspicious of Freudian psychoanalysis and had, from the nineteen-thirties 
onwards, taken Marx, Hegel and Heidegger as its principal sources and allies. 7 Freud, it is 
true, was to bring an unprecedented influence to bear on French intellectual circles in the late 
nineteen-sixties and nineteen-seventies, thanks in the main to the ascendancy of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Not only was this a distinctive reading of Freud, however, it was also largel} 
inscribed with the social, political and metaphysical concerns that demonstrate the inescapable 
influence of French Hegelianism and Marxism. 8 The French reception of Freud, 
consequently, should be recognised as a radical revision as much as, if not more than, an 
appropriation of his thought. Sherry Turkle encapsulates the distinctiv e social and political 
character of French psychoanalysis when, referring to Lacan's reading of Freud, she suggests 
that, 
He insists, as did Frankfurt's critical theorists, that to talk of `social 
influences' on the individual neutralizes one of Freud's most central 
contributions: the recognition that society doesn't `influence' an autonomous 
individual, but that society comes to dwell within him. 
9 
However, with the Girardian understanding of the role and character of the psyche, this 
`dwelling within' of the social, is taken, as we shall see in Chapter 4, in a radically different 
direction. 1° Granted, the impact of social and socialising processes in determining the 
character of individual psychological phenomena is present in Lacan among others", and is 
7 Cf. Goldmann, Towards a Sociology of the Novel, 1-17,156-171; Vincent Descombes, Modern 
French Philosophy trans. L. Scott-Fox & J. M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), esp. 9-54. 
x Cf. Sherry Turkle, Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud's Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1978); 
Samuel Weber, Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan s Dislocation of Psychoanalysis trans. M. Levine 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
Turkle, 1'sv choanalyiic Politics, 74. 
10 For a useful comparison of the theoretical approach of Lacanian psychoanalysis and the Girardian 
hypothesis cf. Eugene Webb, The New Social Psychology of France: The Heritage of Jacques Lacan' 
Religion 23 (1993), 61-69 & `The New Social Psychology of France: The Girardian School' Religion 
(1993), 255-263. 3 
Most notably, the `founders' of French psychology, Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon. Cf. G. 
Tarde, The Laws of l, nilalioii, trans. E. Clews Parsons (New York: Henry Holt, 1903); G. Le Bon, The 
('rcnrd trans. R. A N\e (London: Transaction, 1995). 
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central to a full comprehension of Girard's engagement with Freud. Nevertheless. the 
influence of Cartesian and Hegelian philosophy on twentieth-century French psychoanalysis. 
even in Lacan's emphasis on the linguistic constitution of subjectivity, served to create an 
understanding of personal identity that was, in many respects idealist. 12 Through his 
exploration of literary and anthropological sources, Gard moved towards a less essentialist 
view of subjectivity and, concomitantly, to a position more distinctively his own. 13 This 
position, as we shall see, was to be particularly unfashionable as Girard moved towards a 
`thick' anthropological description through which might be found answers to political and 
social crises - just at a stage of French intellectual life where politics was becoming thoroughly 
aestheticised. 14 The result of this exposition and criticism of cultural, literary and societal 
forms - along with his idiosyncratic and powerful critique of Freud - was the publication of La 
violence el le sacre, probably Girard's best known book. 15 
During this period of some eleven years between the publication of Mensonge 
romantique el virile romanesque and La violence et le sacre - an interval in which he also 
published numerous articles as well as books on Proust and Dostoevsky16 - Girard's personal 
commitment to, and academic interest in, Christianity remained unspoken - if not wholly 
concealed - in his published work. Nevertheless, the implicit necessity of the Christian 
narrative as an antidote to the violence inherent in cultural and religious forms, hinted at in La 
12 C£ Eugene Webb, The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France (Seattle 
University of Washington Press, 1993), Chapter 2. 
13 The development of Girard's understanding of subjectivity shall be discussed in Chapter 4. Suffice it 
to say at this stage that the evolving character of his work suggests that le Systeme Girard has always 
been something of a system in process. 
14 The aestheticization of politics has a long history. Cf. D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: 
An Enquiry, into the Origins of Cultural ('hattge (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). For a consideration of 
more recent examples of aestheticization, cf T. Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986) and F. Jameson, `Postmodernism and Consumer Society' Postmodern Culture (ed. ) H. 
Foster (London: Pluto Press, 1985), 111-125. 
1' Rene Girard, La violence et le sacrcc (Paris Grasset, 1972). English translation, i iolence and the 
Sacred trans. P. Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). 
16 Rene. Girard, 1'rou. ct: A collection of ('ritual Essays (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1962) & 
1)osioieiski: chi double a /'unite (Paris: Plon, 1963) trans. Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor 
1)ostoevv. skv" (New York: Crossroad, 1996). 
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violence ei le sacre and later proposed in more explicit terms in Des Chases cuchee. s dupui. s la 
Jondation du monde17, was not lost on at least one critic. 
lg Only recently, however, has 
Girard talked of the personal and intellectual significance of a conversion experience that 
occurred while he was working on his first book. 19 Girard, until this defining moment a 
lapsed Catholic, recounts how this conversion was two-fold in its character. First, through his 
reading of, in particular, Proust and Dostoevsky, Girard began to question the cynical and 
ultra-critical `debunking' that was so central to his developing project - Alen. songe romantique 
el º'c¬rW romanesque. The execution of a `pure demystification' that Girard identifies as his 
approach to both texts and theory in the nineteen-fifties, very much in line Nti ith the 'spirit of 
the atheistic intellectuals of the time' 10 , was thoroughly questioned as 
he found himself 
attracted to the Christian elements of the great novels which he read and studied closely. 
Thus, the initial elements of his conversion could be described as intellectual-literary in 
character. The second stage of Girard's return to the Catholic Christianity of his birth was of a 
considerably more personal kind, relating to the fear generated by skin cancer and the 
awareness of his mortality, but, as he insists, the two moments of this journey of faith are 
intimately connected. 
With the publication of Des ('hoses cachees dupuis la fondation du monde, the 
pivotal position of Girard's Christian faith in his hypothesis became evident. Of a work that is 
presented as a theoretical triptych, the central panel is wholly devoted to a delineation and 
theoretical defence of the remarkable nature and significance of the gospels. Accordingly, in a 
post- or even anti-Christian milieu, such a theoretical approach was both unfashionable and 
17 Rene Girard, Des (hoses cachees dupuis la fondation du monde: Recherchen avec Jean-Michel 
Oughourlian et Gui Lefort (Paris: Grasset, 1978). English trans. Things Hidden Sinice the Foundation 
of the World. - Research Undertaken in Collaboration with Jean Michel Oughourlian and Gut- Lefort 
trans. S. Bann & M. Meteer (London: Athlone, 1987). The issues surrounding culture, religion, 
violence and the significance of Christianity shall be considered in Chapter 3. 
19 Cf Hayden White's hostile attack on the Christian implications of the thesis outlined in Violence and 
the . ti'acrecl; 'Ethnological 
"Lie" and Mythical "Truth" Diacritics 8: 1 (1978). 2-9. 
19 R. Girard, Ouanc/ ('e. s C'ho. se., Commenceront, (Paris: Arlea, 1994), 190-195 
20 R. Girard, The Girard Reader, 28 
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controversial, especially as Girard's reading of the scriptures demands, as we shall see in the 
next Chapter, that these religious texts are central to any comprehension and transformation of 
social and cultural forms. Considerably more than a work that offers hope for the pretensions 
of embattled Christian souls in a secular context, Des Cho. e., cacNe. s dupias la fondation du 
monde incorporates and integrates nearly twenty years of Girard's theoretical toil. Here one 
can see that central to the intelligibility of Girard's oeuvre is the delineation of a particular 
anthropology that, while having evolved since Mensonge romantique e/ verite romane. sgiIt', 
underpins his engagement with literary, anthropological, philosophical, ethnological and 
theological material. Since the publication of Des Choses cachee. s dupui. s la fondation du 
monde, Girard has principally developed his anthropology in relation to specifically Christian 
themes and problems as well returning to one of his favourite literary figures - William 
Shakespeare. 21 In 1982 Girard published his study of the scapegoat, Le Bouc emissaire22 and 
three years later came , 
La Route antique des hommes perº"ers23, a study that, according to 
Philip Goodchild, `has shed an incomparable light upon the Book of Job. '-4 Both of these 
studies locate anthropological discourse within a specifically religious and, ultimately, 
Christian context. 
It is this anthropology and its application to the present status of the human being in a 
theological context that constitutes the dominant concern of the present study. Consequently, 
my next task shall be an exposition and analysis, in Chapters 3 and 4, of the Girardian 
hypothesis. In order to facilitate such a task, Girard's work shall be outlined in a manner and 
structure that follows that of Des Choses cachees dupuis la fondation du monde. There, 
Girard divides his hypothesis into three sections, `Fundamental Anthropology', `The Judaeo- 
21 R. Girard, Shakespeare: L'. feux de I'envie (Paris: Grasset, 1990) English translation, A Theater of 
fnt: William Shakespeare trans. Y. Freccero (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
22 - R. Girard, Le Boric emissaire (Paris: Grasset, 1982). English translation, The Scapegoat (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
,; R. Girard, La Route antique des hommes pervers trans. Y. Freccero (Paris: Grasset, 1985). English 
translation, Job, the 1Iclim of his People trans. Y. Freccero (London Athlone Press, 1987). 
Philip Goodchild, `Job and Sacrifice: The Price of Piety' ('onti, ze, rtal Thought: Violence, Sacrifice 
1)esire (eds) M. Dillon & P. Fletcher (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming). 
9, 
Christian Scriptures' and `Interdividual Psychology. In the present study . the 
first tw o 
sections of Girard's theoretical triptych shall be considered in Chapter 3, while his description 
of what he terms `interdividual' psychology shall be examined in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Girardian Hypothesis I 
Introduction 
In the course of Part One of this study I examined the current status of the 'self, in 
terms of both contemporary social theory and postmodern philosophy and also in recent 
theological anthropology. First, in Chapter One, I considered both two attempts to marry a 
negative theology with a negative anthropology in response to the problem of what Frederic 
Jameson has called `the fragmented and schizophrenic decentering and dispersion' of the 
subject 1. Second, in Chapter Two, I outlined two approaches to the philosophical and 
theological implications of this fracturing of the narratives in which human self-understanding 
is formed and transmitted. In the work of Habermas and McFadyen I demonstrated the 
manner in which each has attempted the reconstitution of the subject. Put crudely, these two 
chapters can be characterised as exposing a somewhat uncritical espousal of the death of the 
subject and a superficial rejection of the postmodern challenge to theological anthropology; 
both standpoints providing, as far as this study is concerned, manifestly inadequate responses 
to the demand to refigure a theological subject. In an attempt to construct a more satisfactor} 
F. Jameson, `Cognitive Mapping', Marxism and the Interpretation of ('uhure (eds) C. Nelson &L 
Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988), 3 51. 
and nuanced theological reading of the character of human being in the novel, outlandish 
territory that constitutes the anthropological landscape of Chapters One and Two I will 
delineate the wide ranging hypothesis of Rene Girard. If as we have seen, contemporary 
anthropological concerns are characterised by the need to explore regions, considered newl\ 
discovered, in the midst of a dissatisfaction and disaffection with previous attempts, then 
Girard's work offers - even if taken as some sort of heuristic fiction - significant tools that 
help address the questions and difficulties that arise both in mainstream theological enquiry 
and in terms of the obvious failures of the projects considered thus far. Girard's hypothesis is 
not however a straightforward critical response to the present status of the subject. Rather, it is 
as much, if not more, an attempt to provide a constructive anthropological hypothesis in an 
interdisciplinary context. While Girard's understanding of the configuration of identity 
through desire constitutes a more existentially grounded theoretical apparatus for the 
accomplishment of the aims of this study, it will be necessary to analyse the three main 
sections of his hypothesis since there are many themes and issues that are presupposed in 
Girard's explicit interrogation of the constitution of subjectivity. In this examination of 
Girard's work, consequently, I shall initially consider his investigation of the genesis and 
subsistence of cultural and religious institutions and the weight he gives to Biblical revelation 
before moving to a detailed consideration of his understanding of the constitution and 
dynamism of subjectivity. 
3: 1.: Fundamental Anthropology 
In his exploration of a plethora of cultural, religious, and philosophical questions, 
Girard commences with the anthropological question par excellence: what is the origin of the 
species? In response to this question, Girard's project can be understood as one providing a 
speculative account of the genesis of humankind -a `moiphogenetic hypothesis. '2 Hence, 
2 Cf. Paul Dumouchel, `A Morphogenetic Hypothesis on the Closure of Post-Structuralism' 
(hndersianrding Origins: ('onlemporarv J7ews on the Origin of Life, Minid, and Society (eds. ) F. J 
Varela & J-P. Dupuy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 77-90. 
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fundamental anthropology: a reflection on the process by which humans became distinct from 
other animals and formed cultural institutions. 3 In an attempt to define the parameters of the 
enquiry more precisely, a second question is presented: What historically identifies the human 
as peculiar in the animal realm? The undertaking that Girard is attempting to realise in his 
reply to these rudimentary questions is designated as an exploration of the `process of 
hominization' - `a science of man. '` Girard is eager to disabuse the reader of any notion, 
contra Foucaults, that we are observing the phenomenon known as the 'end of man. ' This 
critical response to a Foucauldian erasure of Enlightenment `Man' should in no way be seen, 
however, as a an attempt to retrieve the self-sufficient, disengaged subject of modernity. 
Girard shares a pessimistic heritage of twentieth century French anti-humanism that has 
witnessed the emptiness and despair resulting from the failure of utopian projects in both 
political and intellectual contexts. ' Girard's objective is to prevent the irresponsible rejection 
of questions concerning the nature and status of sociocultural processes and the configuration 
of subjects in the development and arrangement of these processes. Hand in hand with an 
exploration of such anthropological questions goes a thorough-going examination of the 
problems surrounding the place and standing of `self and `other'. 
7 
3 There are echoes here of Heidegger's `Fundamental ontology' which, as he notes, `puts the concrete 
question: What is the human being? ' M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 4th ed. trans 
Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 1. What distinguishes Girard's answer to 
the question (What is the human being? ) is the attention given to the `natural history of human beings. ' 
Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 182. 
t R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 7,84ff. 
Cf M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 
1970), 387, Foucault predicts the coming erasure of man `like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the 
sea' . 6 Cf especially V. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1980) and E. Webb, The 
Self Between: h'rom Freud to the New Social P. ýtychology of France (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1993) For Girard's place in this intellectual collage cf. Hayden White, 'Ethnological "Lie" and 
Mythical "Truth" Diacritics 8: 1 (1978), 2-9, an interesting discussion which considers the relationship 
between Girard and, amongst others, Foucault, Deleuze and Levi-Strauss. 
7 Cf 'An Interview with Rene Girard', in R. Girard, To Double Business Boma!: Essays on Literature, 
rtlimesis, and Anthropology (London, The Athlone Press, 1978), 199-201. These latter concerns of 
identity and alterity with be examined in Chapter Four. 
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At the time of the publication of Girard's theories, 1972 in the case of La Violence et 
le 
. sacre and 1978 for Des chores cachees 
depuis la fondation du monde. such a project ss as 
particularly unfashionable. However, the later Foucault's insistence on exploring new 
possibilities for understanding and `creating' subjectivity suggest that the perceived death of 
one dominant configuration of subjectivity raised as many problems as it sol% ed. The 
Girardian project purports to inform the present sociopolitical situation marked by the 
insecurity and uncertainty of transition and crisis, and, ultimately, to offer the possibility of 
fording new ways of conceiving questions of subjectivity as well as alternative ways of living. 
8 
Girard is not interested, in his more anthropological discussion, with the disappearance of the 
self but with an exploration of the genesis and development of culture. He asserts that `no 
single question has more of a future today than the question of man. '9 Nevertheless, in 
harmony with recent criticisms of Enlightenment anthropology, Girard contends that a 
`displacement is occurring' 10 in which - and this, I believe, is Girards major contribution to 
anthropology - the theme of mimicry is foremost. Mimesis, mimicry, or imitation, is 
considered as fundamental - to learning and to cultural formation. 
il 
Girard's positioning of mimesis at the centre of his anthropology is not, as he accepts, 
a new departure. French social psychology of the late nineteenth century, particularly the 
work of Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde, was considerably more attentive to the role of 
imitation than its Freudian counterpart in which the individual, rather than the social and 
cultural context, was deemed to be the proper site of psychological research. 
l, However, this 
understanding of imitation evident in France at the fin de . siecle was 
heavily coloured by `the 
optimism and conformity of a triumphant petite bourgeoisie. ' 
13 Mimesis was, consequently, 
K Cf R. Girard, Ouand ('es (, ommenceront...: Entretiens avec Michel Treguer (Paris: Arlea, 1994), 
120-156. 
9 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 7. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Ibid., 7. 
12 Cf. Eugene Webb, The Self Between: From Freud to the new Social Psychologis of France, 3-26. 
We shall return to this theme in Chapter 4. 
13 R. Girard, Ming.,; Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 8. 
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perceived through the restricted filter of the quest for 'progress' in which the cohesive. rather 
than divisive, role of imitation was emphasised. Together with this modern bourgeois \ ision, 
the understanding of mimesis since the time of Plato has, Girard contends, been limited to the 
role of representation and it has ignored `kinds of behaviour involved in appropriation. ' 14 
This `essential dimension of acquisitive behaviour' 15, neglected since Plato's reflections on 
imitation in The Republic, is also the `dimension of conflict. ' 16 This is where Girard's work 
exhibits its originality: the imitation of others and the imitation of their desires breeds a rivalry 
born of the conflict that results from the attempt to acquire what is another's for oneself: 
As I imitate the desire of my neighbour, I reach for the object he is already 
reaching for, and we prevent each other from appropriating this object. His 
relation to my desire parallels my relation to his, and the more we cross each 
other, the more stubbornly we imitate each other. My interference intensifies 
his desire, just as his interference intensifies mine. This process of positive 
feedback can only lead to physical and other forms of violence. 17 
Girard argues that although animals share a propensity for mimesis, some form of 
evolutionary shift occurred which resulted in the termination of control of the mimetic 
process through instinctual braking mechanisms such as patterns of dominance and 
submission. '8 In short, the result of acquisitive mimesis is that it gives rise to mimetic rivalry 
which, without any fonn of instinctual control, generates conflict and reciprocal violence. 
14 Cf. Plato, The Republic 2nd ed trans. D. Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), Book X, 595a-608b, 
421-439. 
Is R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 8. Cf also, `An Interview with Rene 
Girard', in R. Girard, To Double Business Bound: Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and Anthropolof y, 
200-201. Here Girard defends this understanding of acquisitive mimesis from the criticisms of Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe in his %ypography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (ed) C. Fynsk (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 43-138. 
16 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 10. 
17 R. Girard, `Discussion', Solent Origins: Waller Burket, Rene Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith on 
Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation (ed. ) R. G. Hamerton-Kelly (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
1987), 122-123. 
1ý Cf. R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 94. 
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3. -2.. - The Formation of Social Structures 
The threat of violence necessitated, according to Girard, the development of social 
structures in order that human societies might survive the onslaught of the mimetic crisis -a 
stage at which reciprocal violence threatened the very existence of the community. Girard 
illustrates the efficacy of prohibitions and ritual as, respectively, preventatiti e and curative 
measures. Girard readily acknowledges the constructive and pedagogical virtue of mimetic 
behaviour and, indeed, characterises it as `the essential force of cultural integration'. As one 
of Girard's interlocutors, Jean-Michel Oughourlian, suggests in Things Hidden Vince ihr 
Foundation of the World, 
Without mimesis there can be neither human intelligence nor cultural 
transmission. Mimesis is the essential force of cultural integration. Is it also 
the force of destruction and dissolution, as the evidence of prohibitions 
suggests? 19 
Oughourlian's contribution here is twofold. In his statements concerning the impact of 
mimesis he accords a positive role to it in terns of cultural transmission and integration. `0 
Yet, in his question that completes his interpolation, Oughourlian highlights the ruinous 
possibilities that Girard discerns in the character of mimesis, so often ignored and hidden. If, 
however, we firstly consider the place of mimesis in the transmission of culture, Girard has, in 
an examination of the `modem ideology of absolute innovation', exposed the way in which 
imitation, or repetition is an indispensable, and highly formative, ingredient in any innovative 
process: 
Until quite recently, the Japanese were dismissed as mere copiers of Western 
ways, incapable of real invention in any field. They are now the dri\ ing force 
behind innovation in more and more technical fields. When did they acquire 
that inventive spark which, supposedly, they lacked? At this very moment, 
imitators of the Japanese - Koreans, Taiwanese - are repeating the sane 
19 Ibid., 17. 
20 Cf also Girard's remark that, if human beings suddenly ceased imitating, all forms of culture would 
vanish. ' 'things Hidden Sinice the Foundation of the World, 7. 
100 
process. They, too, are fast turning into innovators. Hadn't something 
already occurred in the 19th century, when Germany first rivalled and then 
surpassed England in industrial might? The metamorphosis of imitators into 
innovators occurs repeatedly, but we always react to it with amazement. 
Perhaps we do not want to know about the role of imitation in innovation. 21 
The product of mimesis rather than genius, innovation is, Girard contends, the outcome of a 
fundamental process of a human being's involvement in the social and cultural milieu. Thus, 
mimesis underpins human identity and its development. Nevertheless, Girard's main concern 
is with the acquisitive and conflictual character of much mimetic behaviour indicated by 
Oughourlian's question - and prohibition testifies to this destructive potentiality. 
3: 3.: The Function ofProhibition. s 
The role of prohibitions is, quite simply, to prevent acquisitive mimesis: any occasion 
or event which might give rise to violence or intense rivalry is forbidden or contained. 
22 As 
Girard suggests, for the most part their effect is this straightforward: 
All occasions or events that might give rise to real violence, even intense 
rivalries or forms of competition that are often tolerated or even encouraged 
elsewhere in society, are prohibited. 
23 
There are, however, more `absurd' types of behaviour that Girard and his collaborators 
maintain are likewise prohibited due to their mimetic character. An interdiction in `traditional 
societies' on the repetition of the gestures and words of another member of the community 
and `of the use of proper names', as well as a `fear of mirrors' because of their association 
21 R. Girard, `Innovation and Repetition' SubStanrce No. 62/63 (1990), 14- 
22 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 10,41. 
23 Ibid., 10. 
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with the devil', is indicative of a heightened awareness of the effect of mimesis that is absent 
in modem western societies. 24 
Imitation doubles the imitated object and produces a simulacrum that can in 
turn become the object of types of magic. When ethnologists comment on 
such phenomena, they attribute them to a desire for protection against so- 
called imitative magic. And this is also the explanation they receive (from the 
natives) when they inquire into the raison d'etre of prohibitions. 25 
This structural impediment to particular forms of mimetic behaviour attests to an awareness on 
the part of traditional societies of the relation between mimesis and violence: `They know 
more about desire than we do, whereas our ignorance keeps us from understanding the unity of 
all prohibitions. ' 26 Contrary to societies, like our own, where violence has a `conceptual 
autonomy'27, traditional societies recognise the reciprocity of conflict. `What permits us to 
conceive abstractly of an act of violence and to view it as an isolated crime is the power of a 
judicial institution that transcends all antagonists. ' 29 Yet the judicial system is simply a 
different mechanism for restraining the effects of conflictual inimesis; if it were to fail, `the 
imitative character of violence' would become manifest once more. 
29 Indeed, Girard believes 
that mimetic conflict is `the true common denominator of prohibitions. ' 30 But it rarely 
appears as such; it is always interpreted as an evil manifestation of the sacred, the vengeful 
fury of the divinity. '31 Thus, there is, Girard contends, a link between the prohibition of 
mimesis and its violent consequences and the prohibition of all images in some religions. 
32 
24 Ibid., 10-1 H. 
2 Ibid., 11. 
26 Ibid. 
- Ibid., 11-12. 
2 Ibid., 12. Cf. also Violence and the Sacred, 16-17 where Girard explores the relationship between 
modern western judicial systems and the termination of the process of revenge. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 14. Cf Violence and the Sacred, 219-222. 
31 R. Girard, 1 hing. % Hidden Since the Foundation (? f the O"orld, 14 
12 Cf. 1 iolenrce and the Sacred, 151-152 
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This emphasis on the religious dimension and its relation to %iolence is. in the 
Girardian hypothesis, of particular significance. It again highlights that which is `deep and 
sinister' about the human condition. 13 The terror of mimesis brings reflection on the `subject' 
down to earth and demands that attention be paid to that which we would rather ignore or 
forget: that human beings are not immune from the desire to appropriate and, therefore, are 
susceptible to mimetic conflict. This is evident even in Plato's understanding of mimesis: 
When, in The Republic, Plato describes the undifferentiating and Violent 
effects of mimesis, one can note the emergence of the theme of twins and also 
that of the mirror. It must be admitted that this is remarkable, but then no one 
has ever attempted to read Plato in the light of ethnology. And yet precisely 
such a reading is necessary in order truly to `deconstruct' any `metaphysics'. 
Aside from the pre-Socratics, to whom Heidegger and contemporary 
Heideggenan thought return, there is only religion, and one must understand 
religion in order to understand philosophy. Since the attempt to understand 
religion on the basis of philosophy has failed, we ought to try the reverse 
method and read philosophy in the light of religion. 
34 
Girard is not attempting to usurp philosophy in order to return theology to the position of 
queen of the sciences. Rather, he is suggesting that by attending to religious phenomena and 
structures - in this case, prohibitions - we can understand more fully the significance of 
philosophical and metaphysical themes that attempt to define, in a more abstract manner, truth 
and value and, moreover, we may more profitably question their veracity. 
35 The necessity for 
this questioning arises from the cultural importance of mimesis. The reduction, in western 
culture, of the significance of mimesis to `modalities of imitation' such as speech and 
behaviour - on the order of simulacrum' - ignores the conflictual aspect of mimesis. 
36 
33 The phrase is Wittgenstein's. Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, (ed. ) R. Rhees, trans. A. C. Miles 
(Doncaster: The Brynmill Press, 1979), 16e: `this deep and sinister aspect is not obvious just from 
learning the history of external action, but we impute it from an experience in ourselves. ' For a further 
exploration of the 'deep' and 'sinister' in this Wittgensteinian context, cf. John Churchill, `Something 
Deep and Sinister' Modern Theology 8: 1 (1992), 15-37. 
34 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Fundation of the World, 15. 
35 Here, the influence of Durkheimian sociology and its emphasis on `social facts' as underpinning 
culture and identity can be detected. Cf Emile Durkheim, The Elementar}-Form. s of Religious Life 
trans. K. E. Fields (New York The Free Press, 1995). However, Durkheim contends that mimesis and 
'mimetic rites' are distinct from 'human nature' \ýhich can more successfully be explored in relation to 
morality and moral codes. C. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 361-362 
36 R. Girard, Ihing. s Hidden Since the T oundation of the If orld, 17 
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Consequently, the cause of mimetic rivalry and conflict is concealed, the `rivalr\ provoked by 
an object, the acquisitive mimesis which must always be our point of departure. '37 Not only is 
Girard suggesting that the common denominator of all prohibitions is their `antimimetic 
38 character', he is making a bolder assertion that, 
not only the prohibitions but also ritual and ultimately the whole structure of 
religion can be traced back to the mechanism of acquisitive mimesis. A 
complete theory of human culture will be elaborated, beginning with this 
single principle. 39 
3: 4.. - The I'ic(image Mechanism. 
While prohibitions are designed to prevent or control mimesis, ritual operates as a 
curative tonic. The prevalent dangers surrounding the mimetic process - 'literally one of 
culture difference being reversed and effaced as it gives way to reciprocal violence' - can, if 
unfettered lead, Girard contends, to a `mimetic crisis'. '0 The mimetic crisis represents 'a 
conflictual upheaval that destroys social organization'. The ritual context transforms, through 
the concentration of mimetic energy, the conflictual disintegration of the community into 
social collaboration. ' 41 Traditional societies `abandon themselves, in their rituals, to what they 
fear most during normal periods: the dissolution of the community in the mimetic crisis. '42 
This conscientious mimicry of a communal disintegration into a mimetic hysteria in a 
controlled ritual environment, rather than destroying the community, acts as a palliative: `it is 
37 Ibid., 18. 
38 Ibid., 19. 
Ibid., 18. 
40 Ibid., 20. Cf also, Violence and the Sacred, 89-92. 
41 Ibid., 20,48. 
42 Ibid., 22. 
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as if they believed that a simulated disintegration might ward off the real disintegration. 43 
Thus, the effect of ritual is a restoration of peaceful and ordered existence. 44 
It would seem at this stage that Girard is proposing that social structures arose 
spontaneously ex nihilo - as if some primitive `common sense' saved the day. Reflecting 
further on the ritual process, Girard posits the second central feature of his hypothesis - 
alongside mimetic behaviour - the `victimage mechanism'. 
45 However, this characteristic of 
the hypothesis is important; the victimage mechanism provides ritual and prohibition with an 
all too powerful sting in the tail. Ritual concludes with the immolation of a victim and, argues 
Girard, this culmination is synonymous with the `conclusion of the mimetic crisis enacted by 
the ritual. '4 In other words, the violent consummation acts as a closure to the potentiality of 
violence engendered by the mimetic crisis; it is the last word'. 47 The missing link in the 
consideration of ritual concerns the force which unites the collective against the sacrificial 
victim. It is Girard's contention that what `had in fact united the community and put an end to 
a real mimetic crisis' was an `original spontaneous murder. '49 The victim of this original 
murder was, by necessity, arbitrary: `Only an arbitrary victim can resolve the crisis because 
acts of violence, as mimetic phenomena, are identical and distributed as such within the 
community. No one can assign an origin to the crisis or judge degrees of responsibility for 
it. '. 49 The victim simply acts as the focus for conflictual mimesis. In other words, the 
violence of one against one, engendered by mimetic conflict, becomes the violence of all 
43 Ibid. 
44 Cf R. Girard, 'Discussion', Violent Origins: Walter Burket, Rene Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith on 
Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation (ed. ) R. G. Hamerton-Kelly (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1987), 128. Here, Girard summarises the role of ritual and prohibition: in my last three books, I tried 
to show, among other things, that the implicit contradictions between the "dos" and the "don'ts" that 
must emerge from the successfully misunderstood victimage, the inevitable tension between the ritual 
imperative and the prohibition imperative, can be regarded as the true source of cultural innovation in 
the nonhistorical phases of human culture. ' 
45 Girard claims that `All religious rituals spring from the surrogate victim, and all the great institutions 
of mankind, both secular and religious, spring from ritual' Violence and the Sacred, 306. 
46 R. Girard, Thi, zgs Hidden Since the Foundation of the Iforld 23. 
47 Ibid., 24 
48 Ibid., 25, 
49 R Girard, 1 hings Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 15, 
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against one. It is the `allegiance against a common enemy' which is primary, not the identity 
of the victim. 50 As Girard himself explains, 
The general direction of the present hypothesis should now be abundantly 
clear; any community that has fallen prey to violence or has been stricken by, 
some overwhelming catastrophe hurls itself blindly into the search for a 
scapegoat. Its members instinctively seek an immediate and violent cure for 
the onslaught of unbearable violence and strive desperately to convince 
themselves that all their ills are the fault of a lone individual who can be easily' 
disposed of 51 
Moreover, it is this common allegiance at the conclusion of the crisis which is the resolution of 
conflict - identity is restored through the destruction of difference. 
52 As Richard Kearney 
suggests, this sacrifice is `the immolation of the `other' on the altar of the `saine'. '53 The 
victim, in turn, acquires an ambiguous status. Held responsible for the communal disorder, 
the victim is `believed to have brought about his own death' and yet, as also responsible for 
the renewal of peace, the victim is regarded as sacred. '' Consequently, Girard declares that, 
the observation of religious systems force us to conclude, (1) that the mimetic 
crisis always occurs, (2) that the banding together of all against a single victim 
is the normal resolution at the level of culture, and (3) that it is furthermore 
the normative resolution, because all the rules of culture stem from it. 
55 
50 Ibid., 26. 
1 R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 79. 
52 Ibid., 95. Difference is consequently controlled by the structuring role of prohibition and taboo which 
prevent complete indifferentiation and, therefore, the convergence of mimetic desire and a subsequent 
mimetic crisis. Cf. Jean-Michel Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, 
Possession, anal Hypnosis trans. E. Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 149. Cf. also, R. 
Girard, (rand ('es Commeneeront...: Eniretiens av¬'c, l fichel Treguer (Paris. Arlea, 1994), esp. Ch. 
VIII, ' L'un et le mutiple', 90-119. 
53 Richard Kearney, `Myths and Scapegoats: The Case of Rene Girard' Theory, Culture 4-Society 12 
1995), 1. 
4 This ambiguous status of the victim is captured wonderfully by Jacques Derrida in his observation 
that `The people's shudder of admiration before the "great criminal" is addressed to the individual who 
takes upon himself, as in primitive times, the stigma of the lawmaker or the prophet'. J Derrida, 'Force 
of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"' Deconstruction and the Possibility qf. 111. wice. D. 
Cornell, %I. Rosenfeld & D. Gray Carlson (eds. ) (London: Routledge, 1992), 40. 
SS R. Girard, Thing. Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 27 
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The victimage mechanism - the convergence of conflictual mimesis onto an arbitrary victim - 
is the very basis of social and cultural institutions. It is this mechanism which underpins both 
prohibition and ritual which are instituted in response to the original murder. Therefore, post- 
immolation behaviour is characterised by `two principle imperatives': 
(1) Not to repeat any action associated with the crisis, to abstain from all 
mimicry, from all contact with the former antagonists, from any acquisiti,, e 
gesture toward objects that have stood as causes or pretexts for rivalry. This 
is the imperative of the prohibition. (2) To reproduce, on the contrary, the 
miraculous event that put an end to the crisis, to immolate new victims 
substituted for the original victim in circumstances as close as possible to the 
original experience. This is the imperative of ritual. 56 
According to Girard, then, the cultural order is brought into being through the violence 
of the victiinage mechanism, and it is that violent episode which defines the character of the 
emergent community and its structure: `Rituals and prohibitions can be seen as directed 
toward the same end, which is the renewed order and peace that emerge from the victimage 
mechanism; the prohibition and the ritual attempt in different ways to ensure that peace. '57 
3: 5.: The Nature of Religion 
The convergence of internecine violence and cultural formation are clearly outlined in 
Girard's hypothesis. 58 More controversial is Girard's belief that these first cultural 
fi-aineworks are invariably religious. Girard, in Things Hidden, echoes his famous 
proposition in Violence and the Sacred that `Violence and the sacred are inseparable'59 
56 Ibid., 28. 
57 Ibid., 29. In many respects, the structural primacy of religion in the foundation and development of 
social and cultural institutions again indicates the influence of Durkheim's sociology on Girard's 
thought. This socio-historical approach undermines the criticism that Girard is simply Hegelian in his 
understanding of the constitution of subjectivity through violence and overcoming. Moreover, Girard's 
consideration of violence and its correspondence with the sacred carries, as he claims, 'Durkheim's 
insight to its conclusion'. Cf Violence acid the Sacred, 306-307. 
Sx As Andrew McKenna puts it, `In the beginning was the victim'. `Introduction' Semeia 33) (1985), 58. 
59 R. Girard, 17olence and the Sacred, 19. 
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To understand human culture it is necessary to concede that only the damming 
of mimetic forces by means of the prohibition and the diversion of these 
forces in the direction of ritual are capable of spreading and perpetuating the 
reconciliatory effect to keep the peace. The sacred is violence, but if religious 
man worships violence it is only insofar as the worship of violence is 
supposed to bring peace; religion is entirely concerned with peace, but the 
means it has of bringing it about are never free of sacrificial violence. 60 
As we shall see later in the chapter when we consider Girard's reading of the Judaeo-Christian 
scriptures, modem societies no longer produce - at least in a straightforward and so concealed 
manner - religious structures established through violence. There is, in contemporary western 
culture, abundant knowledge and understanding of the scapegoat mechanism -a 
comprehension that acts as a check to the occurrence of such surreptitious phenomena and 
6' 
any re-creation of true religious systems. ' This theme of recognition and misrecognition is 
fundamental to Girard's conception of the efficacy of the sacred in the production and 
reproduction of cultural forms: `The production of the sacred is necessarily and inversely 
proportional to the understanding of the mechanisms that produce it. '62 
Nevertheless, there remains an ambivalence regarding our institutions and the inherent 
threat of violence. Here, Girard borrows the psychoanalytic concept of `transference' to 
" highlight his exposition of the modern western context. 
Religious phenomena are essentially characterized by the double transference, 
the aggressive transference followed by the reconciliatory transference. The 
reconciliatory transference sacralizes the victim and is the most fragile, most 
easily lost, since to all evidence it does not occur until the mechanism has 
completely `played itself out'. We remain capable, in other words, of hating 
6 
our victims; we are no longer capable of worshipping them. - 
60 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 32. 
61 Ibid., 33. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 37. 
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Girard's point is that structure and structural processes persist in which , ictimage occurs. 
although a greater awareness of the consequences of such processes forecloses an uncritically 
blind commitment to them. However, as Oughourlian suggests, there remains the 
submergence of `an immemorial history, properly speaking, a diachronic dimension that 
remains inaccessible to modes of contemporary thought. ' 64 There remains, consequently, the 
possibility of a muted form of victimage that is, for the most part, ignorant of the sacralizing 
process which remains hidden from view. Exemplary, according to Girard, `is the ideological 
opponent, the class enemy, the older generation or the fools that govern us, the ethnic 
minorities, the ethnic majority, the misinformed, etc. ' It is this 'malevolent' process of 
65 
transference that is invested with significant authority - political and intellectual. Thus, 
victimage continues even when its processes are in some sense stripped of the sacred, 
demythologised as it were. Yet, through observation of the `religious', one can understand 
more fully than elsewhere the mechanisms of violence: 
religious systems - despite the transfigurations brought about by interpretation 
of the sacred - are based on a keen observation both of the kinds of behaviour 
that lead human beings into violence and of the strange process that puts an 
end to violence. These are generally the kinds of behaviour that religious 
systems prohibit, and it is this process, roughly, that they reproduce in ritual. 66 
As with the structural processes evident in ritual and prohibition, so the metaphysics 
of the sacred - characterised by divine vengeance - underpin a fundamentally violent 
configuration of social cohesion and identity. By displacing the responsibility for violence 
from the community to a deity, internecine violence is enveloped in an `imposing mystery ' 
and moves guilt, in a mythic transference to a god, from the location of its occurrence to the 
realm of the ethereal. 67 
4 Ibid., 34. 
6, Ibid., 37-38. 
66 Ibid., 41-42. 
67 Ibid., 42 
109 
While it might be objected that Girard has reduced `heterogeneous phenomena' to an 
all-encompassing monogenetic theory, Girard is insistent that his hypothesis, or model, allows 
for `infinite variation'. 69 What is being described by Girard is `the object of a fundamental 
and founding recognition. ' `The whole theory is based on the already interpretive character of 
religious phenomena in relation to the founding event. ''' As Oughourhan points out, the 
Girardian thesis `is primarily not a theory of religion but a theory of human relations and of 
the role that the mechanism of victimage plays in these relations. The theory of religion is 
simply a particularly noteworthy aspect of a fundamental theory of mimetic relations. '7° What 
Girard presents, however, is not exclusively a theory concerning the mystification that is 
intrinsic to religion and its structures. Oughourlian, somewhat controversially, includes within 
the scope of Girard's hypothesis a wide range of theoretical disciplines in the hwnan sciences 
that must equally be challenged by this hypothesis: modem psychology, ethnology and 
philosophy, to name but a few. 7' `All readings remain mythic if they do not take into account 
the radical reading of mimesis and its consequences. ' 72 Mimesis, in any attempt to understand 
human identity, culture and society, is central. 
3: 6.: Cultural Development, Institutions and their Origins 
As we have seen, Guard suggests that the driving power behind religious thought and 
practice is mimesis: `its concentration in a victim makes it a pacifying and regulating force, the 
positive mirnesis found in ritual. '73 However, the efficacy of religious structure, in particular 
ritual and prohibition, depends to a great extent on a necessary deception regarding the 
founding murder and the progressive distancing of a community from its impact and reality. 
Thus, there is, in the development of culture the need for the concentration of power (in, for 
68 Ibid., 44. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 48. 
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example, sacred kingship) that acts as a means of transferring power from the community (a 
power exercised in the killing of an innocent victim) and thus discharging `the community of 
all responsibility. '74 The evolution of institutions, and therefore culture, is consequentlN 
established upon violence itself: 
To return to the starting-point of our theory, we propose that in all human 
institutions it is necessary to reproduce a reconciliatory murder by means of 
new victims. The original victim is endowed with superhuman, terrifying 
prestige because it is seen as the source of all disorder and order. Subsequent 
victims inherit some of this prestige. One must look to this prestige for the 
source of all political and religious sovereignty. 75 
Indeed, in terms of the rise and reinforcement of centralised communal power in the figure of 
the sovereign, Girard believes that only religion can fully explain such a phenomenon: `the 
paradox of ritual gives rise to the paradox of central power. '76 In the sacrifice of a king, for 
example, the `power of the sacred' is immediate and present. Yet, in the case of the divine, 
there is an absence which necessitates a repetition of the primordial event and, in some sense, 
a reproduction of the divine presence. 
77 The sacred founds, underpins and sustains cultural 
institutions and their order. 
This exploration of the foundation and continuation of cultural forms undermines, 
Girard believes, the prevalent attitude that he refers to as `cultural Platonism'. This approach 
to social organisation claims that the specificity of institutions implies that their emergence can 
only be known through an appeal to pre-existent forms - whether these are understood within 
or beyond the subject is of principal importance. It can be defined as, 
74 Ibid., 52. 
7s Ibid., 53. 
76 Ibid., 55. 
77 Ibid., 56. 
the unexamined conviction that human institutions have been and are what 
they are for all eternity, that they have little need to evolx e and none 
whatsoever to be engendered. Human culture is an immutable idea that is 
immediately available to any human being who begins to think. To grasp it 
one has only to look within oneself where it resides, innate, or otherwise 
outside of oneself, where it can be found legibly inscribed in the heavens. as 
in Plato. 78 
It is obvious that the opposite contention, that cultural institutions do have an intelligible 
founding mechanism, will, however, be unacceptable to certain contemporary theorists and 
Girard is profoundly aware of the objections of the practitioners of deconstruction. 79 This is 
due to the emphasis in Girardian theory upon a `real' founding event that can be readily 
excavated. Two points must be made here. Firstly, Gard is not suggesting, in the delineation 
of his theory, that we can reconstruct the actual event that constitutes cultural origins and 
social structures. This is because, as Andrew McKenna puts it, 
The victim is the supplement of origin in which, that is, in whose expulsion, 
the origin is (re)constituted. We are not speaking here of an historical 
reconstruction, which Girard recognizes as impossible ... , 
but of a generative 
principle whose very erasure accounts for properly mythological 
reconstructions. 80 
Secondly, Girard suggests that, with the development of his theory of the foundation of 
cultural institutions through violence and sacrifice, `the beginning and the end of the 
"deconstruction" are at hand since its accomplishment amounts to a "reconstruction" which 
begins at the common matrix. '81 With such a deconstructive reconstruction, Girard believes 
that his hypothesis makes significant gains that others cannot secure: `The genetic and 
structural perspectives are joined in a type of analysis that transcends the limits of previous 
methods. " Indeed, deconstruction suffers from the same theoretical deficiencies that Girard 
78 Ibid., 59. 
79 Ibid., 62. 
90 A. J. McKenna, 'Supplement to Apocalypse: Girard and Derrida', 52. Cf also, A. McKenna, 
Violence and Difference. Girard. Derrida, and Deconstruction (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1992), especially Ch. 3, 'Violence and the Origin of Language', 66-115. Cf., R. Girard, Things Hidden 
Since the P'Oundaiiorr of the World, 44, and R. Girard, 'Generative Scapegoating', I ioleni Origins, 89. 
Kt R. Girard, things Hidden Since the Pouirdation of the World, 62. 
82 Ibid. 
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perceives in so much philosophical, psychological and social-theoretical speculation - the lack 
of an anthropological basis. 93 
3: 7.: Mystification Through Myth 
Even though the status of the founding murder and its reconstruction are ineluctably 
related to the indeterminate dialectic of genesis and structure, Girard is adamant that the 
process of cultural formation had to be suppressed. Such a contention is further promoted in 
his distinctive reading and demystification of myths. He believes that the founding murder 
constitutes the `generative mechanism of all mythology. '84 In opposition to Levi-Strauss - for 
whom myth `is nothing more than the fictive representation of cultural development' - Girard 
insists that myth represents `the transfigured account of a real violence. ' 85 `Transfigured' 
because the mythical account is that of the murderers. Thus, the representation of the 
founding murder is such that the victim (and not the murderers) is held responsible for the 
`disorder culminating in a unanimous gathering against it. '86 This distortion of the victim's 
role and status in the mythic account, however, leaves the community hostage to its own lie: 
The representation [the myth] is determined by the violent reconciliation and 
the resulting sacralization. The victim is thus represented with all the 
attributes and qualities of the sacred. Fundamentally, then, the victim doges 
not belong to the community; it is the community that belongs to the victim. 
83 Ibid., 63. It should also be pointed out that Girard disassociates his own hypothesis from the (human) 
sciences that might be accused of being hostage to a metaphysics of presence: `The attitude to 
philosophy that still dominates the various methodologies of the human sciences cannot accommodate a 
hypothesis of this kind. Everything is still subject to the ideal of a mastery that arises immediately and 
intuitively, from direct contact with the data - this is perhaps one aspect of what we nowadays refer to 
as the `metaphysics of presence. ' 437. 
Rt R. Girard, things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 105. 
xi Ibid., 109. Because his work is underpinned by linguistic structuralism, Girard contends that Levi- 
Strauss cannot recognise `a mimetic and violent reciprocity that destroys all cultural differences in 
recalih, and that does not exist 0, r4v in the text. ', 109. 
86 Ibid., 108. 
87 Ibid., 111. 
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As we have noted, the victim is furnished with the glory appropriate to one who is responsible 
for the restoration of order. The mythical account is a portrayal of homicide in %tihich the 
murderers refuse to accept the innocence of the victim and their own culpability. Yet the 
tensions inherent in mythical accounts point to events - of a definitely violent character - that 
these descriptions actually enshroud in order to justify the permanence and righteousness of 
extant cultural forms. Girard, then, employing his own `hermeneutic of suspicion'88, attempts 
to unmask any mythical justification or rejection of the violence focused on the figure of the 
scapegoated victim: 
The particular combination of themes that we find in mythology, the signs of 
crisis and the signs of reconciliation against and around the victim can be 
explained, perfectly and completely, only by the presence of a necessarily real 
lynching behind the myth. 89 
Thus, we are presented with a theory that provides a (textual) example of the nature of the 
composition of societal existence founded on a murder: `[Mythology's] real project is that of 
recalling the crises and the founding murder, the sequences in the realm of events that have 
constituted or reconstituted the cultural order. '90 In uncovering the deception inherent in the 
accusation against the victim (and now, of course, the hero/god) Girard believes that he has 
laid bare the `concealed yet truly simple truth of mythology. ' 
91 However, it is not the case 
that Girard has acquired a knowledge of the machinations of myth-making and its cryptic 
character without the help of a tradition of revelation. This revelation, hesitant at first, is 
evident, Girard contends, in `texts of persecution'. 
88 The phrase `hermeneutic of suspicion' is, of course, that of Paul Ricoeur. `This hermeneutics', he 
states, `is not an explication of the object, but a tearing of off masks, an interpretation that reduces 
disguises'. P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation trans. Denis Savage, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 30. Cf also, Mark I. Wallace, `Postmodern Biblicism: The 
Challenge of Rene Girard for Contemporary Theology' Modern Theology 5: 4 (1989), 309-325 which 
critically appraises Girard's hermeneutic strategy. For a more extensive example of Girard's treatment 
of myth, cf. R. Girard, The Scapegoat trans. Y. Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986). 
89 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 118. 
90 Ibid., 120. 
91 Ibid 
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19. Girard makes an even bolder claim concerning his `laying bare' the truth of myth when he 
proclaims that `1 will not hesitate to assert that this is the first truly `hard' finding in the explication of 
mytholow ', 119. 
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3: 8: Texts of'Per. secution 
The mythological account of the victimage mechanism exhibits a mentality which can 
be characterised as both deceitful and sacrificial. 92 However. Girard perceives in the 
desacralization of western culture a tendency towards the disclosure of the operation of the 
victimage mechanism `that is progressively less obscured by ignorance. '93 Consequently, the 
possibility has arisen, especially in the west, for societies to replace myth by an `awareness of 
persecution. ' 94 This awareness is exhibited in `persecution texts'. These texts employ a 
perspective that is similar to the type of distortion operative in myth. The innocence of the 
victim and the arbitrary nature of the violence brought upon the victim are still concealed and 
denied. 95 However, texts of persecution do not proceed to any form of exaltation of the 
victim - the victim has not been `sacralized'. 
96 The effect of the victimage mechanism is 
diminished and desacralization of society ensues. 
97 As Girard explains, 
In so far as light is shed on the victimage mechanism, concepts like violence 
and unjust persecution become thinkable and begin to play a larger role in 
cultural institutions. The production of myth and ritual simultaneously 
declines and eventually disappears entirely. 
98 
Texts of persecution also reveal the slow process of revelation of the founding mechanism and 
the move towards desacralization. This process of revelation - an uncovering of the 
victimage-mechanism - makes it `impossible to rehabilitate a sacrificial mechanism in the 
process of decomposition because growing awareness of these mechanisms is what 
92 This deceit is intrinsic to a sacrificial order which is characterised as one that conceals the truth of the 
victimage mechanism and perpetuates its part in the life of societies and their response to the mimetic 
crisis. 
''' R. Girard, Thinks Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 126. 
94 Ibid., 126. 
95 Ibid., 127-128. 
96 Ibid., 127. 
97 Ibid., 130 
98 Ibid., 127. For an application of this process in a modern context, weaving Girardian theory with the 
concerns of philosophy. literature and contemporary news stories, cf. Gil Bailie, 1 lolence Unveiled:: 
Hu, nwuiiv at the ('ro. s. croxrdc (New York Crossroad, 1995). 
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decomposes them. '99 However, Girard argues, another step of 'advanced desacralization' is to 
come. 100 This advancement is urgently required because. 
The whole of humanity is already confronted with an ineluctable dilemma: 
human beings must become reconciled without the aid of sacrificial 
intermediaries or resign themselves to the immediate extinction of 
humanity. 101 
The condition which underpins reconciliation is a total renunciation of 102 Consistent 
with much post-war French thought which exudes a fundamental pessimism103, Girard's 
consideration of the mechanisms of violence constitutes a salutary caution against 
complacency in `advanced' western societies. However, contrary to the same tradition, Girard 
considers such reconciliation to be possible. The constraining influence of the victirnage 
mechanism can and must be superseded: The definitive renunciation of violence, without any 
second thoughts, will become for us the condition sine qua non for the survival of humanity 
itself and for each one of us. ' 
104 This imperative derives its force not only from the fact that 
violence, in its modem technological form, can bring about the utter destruction of the planet 
but because, as Girard reminds us, `If man acts as he has in the past and abandons himself to 
mimetic contagion, there will be no victimage mechanisms to save him. ' 
105 The revelation of 
the violence at the heart of western culture is, then, a double-edged sword. However, if there 
is to be peace rather than destruction, Girard believes that this can only be effected by the 
`unperceived but formidable' influence of the Judaeo-Christian scriptures. 
'06 It is the Gospels 
99 Ibid., 128. 
100 Ibid., 137. 
101 Ibid., 136. This concern is powerfully broached in Girard's account of Cold War existence in his 
declaration that, `Today the reign of violence is made manifest. It assumes the awesome and horrific 
form of technological weaponry. These weapons, as the "experts" blandly inform us, are what is 
keeping the whole world in line. The idea of "limitless" violence, long scorned by sophisticated 
Westerners, suddenly looms up before us. Absolute vengeance, formerly the prerogative of the gods, 
now returns, precisely weighed and calibrated, on the wings of science'. i'iolencc and the Sacred, 240 
102 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 137. 
103 Cf Hayden White `Ethnological "Lie" and Mythical "Truth"` Diacritics 8ý 1 (1978), 2-9 and Kate 
Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism (London: Hutchinson, 1986). 
104 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 137. 
10> Ibid. 
1O( Ibid., 138. 
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which `unearth victims of collective violence and reveal their innocence. ' 1`17 No longer must 
the truth of destruction, and the possibilities of alternative ways of living, remain hidden. 
Girard's exploration of the development of cultural and social practices. and the 
integral role played by the sacred, leads, as we have seen, to a consideration of the distinctive 
and unprecedented influence of the Jewish and Christian biblical traditions. However, the 
peculiar character of these traditions does not imply that they stand, from beginning to end, as 
entirely disconnected from other mythological and religious traditions. In addition to the 
matchless originality of the bible in its treatment of violence, victimage and the foundation of 
cultural forms, Girard perceives an affinity between, in particular, the themes and structure of 
world mythologies and some of the oldest material in the Old Testament. Jog Thus, the three 
`moments' characteristic of myth outlined by Girard - dissolution in conflict, unanimous 
collective violence, and the development of interdictions and rituals - are often evident in Old 
Testament narratives. Exemplary here are the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of 
Eden, the account of Noah and the flood and, thirdly, the sacrifice of lsaac. 
109 In all these 
mythic accounts, society and even nature appear as a whole being put in order, or in which 
order is being re-established. In general these belong to the end of the victimage account, the 
place where the logic of the hypothesis expects to be'. 
1 10 While accepting, therefore, that 
there are biblical myths which share familial characteristics with non-biblical myth, Girard's 
task, without ignoring nor rejecting the similarities, is to highlight the distinctive nature of the 
biblical type. This particularity of Jewish and Christian narratives is evident in their disclosure 
of sacrificial violence. It is from this perspective that Girard can claim that the Bible reveals 
`things hidden since the foundation of the world. ' 
III The importance of this claim can be seen 
107 Ibid. 
'°x Ibid., 141. 
109 Ibid., 142 - 43. 110 Ibid., 143. 
Hi Ibid., 160. The quotation is from Matthew, 13: 35 
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in the unique status granted in Girardian thinking to the much derided religious traditions of 
the west. This estimation is admirably explained by Paul Dumouchel who suggests that, 
The Judaeo-Christian tradition constitutes, from the viewpoint of Girard's 
theory, a religion which should not exist. A religion which preaches 
forgiveness not only towards the innocents but also towards the guilty. 
towards one's own enemies, reaches out to the heart of the mimetic 
mechanism that generates the sacred and destroys it, or at least endangers its 
proper functioning. Such a religion cannot proceed from that mechanism. 112 
Just as texts of persecution represent an advancement in the slow process of desacralization, 
the Old Testament bears witness to a progression away from a sacrificial mentality which 
obscures the inbuilt structural inevitability of violence. This can be seen particularly in the 
prophetic tradition through which `the three great pillars of primitive religion - myth, sacrifice 
and prohibitions' - are subverted. 
113 It is not until the Gospels, however, that the reality of the 
victimage mechanism is truly revealed in the life and death of Jesus. 
As we have seen, Girard demonstrates the extent to which biblical myths share the 
characteristics of mythology generally. Yet there is something idiosyncratic about the biblical 
type. Old Testament narratives such as the story of Cain and Abel describe the founding of 
culture (Cainite) and law (God's enunciation of the law against murder) as dependent on a 
murder. 114 The distinguishing feature that disjoins the biblical myth from cognate examples 
of the genre is the lesson which it teaches - `that the culture born of violence must return to 
violence'. t1s Thus, `in addition to its unquestionable significance as myth, a much greater 
power of revelation than that of non-Judaic myths' is evident. 
' 16 For Girard the biblical theme 
of revelation is central. Summing up the difference between non-Judaic myths and those 
112 Paul Dumouchel, `Introduction', I iolence and Truth: On the Work of Rene Girard (ed. ) P 
Dumouchel (London: Athlone, 1988), IT 
113 Ibid., 155. 
114 Ibid., 146. 
115 Ibid., 148. 
116 Ibid., 149 
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myths prevalent in the Old Testament, Girard demonstrates what he believes to be the radical 
significance of the latter. 
Suppose that the texts of mythology are the reflection, at once faithful and 
deceptive, of the collective violence that founds community: suppose that they 
bear witness of a real violence, that they do not lie even if in them the 
victimage mechanism is not falsified and transfigured by its very efficacy; 
suppose, finally, that myth is the persecutors' retrospective vision of their own 
persecution. If this is so, we can hardly regard as insignificant a change in 
perspective that consists in taking the side of the victirr, yroclaiming the 
victim's innocence and the culpability of his murderers. 7 
Only through disclosure of the sacrificial order can violence be overcome and, in the 
Old Testament narratives, the victimage mechanism is unveiled. The consequence of this 
`inverse movement' of biblical myth is that `rehabilitating the victim has a desacralizing 
effect. ' 118 The sacred and its concomitant cultural forms no longer conceal or defer the 
responsibility for victimage. The consideration and appropriation of biblical revelation thus 
demands change and transformation: the possibility of alternative ways of living - new cultural 
forms - is the unavoidable implication that issues from the revelatory text. The prophetic 
tradition is exemplary in its revelation of the sacrificial mentality and its call for 
transformation, especially in its subversion of `myth, sacrifice and prohibitions' - the three 
great pillars of religion. The configuration of this prophetic subversion is `invariably 
governed by the bringing to light of the mechanisms that found religion; the unanimous 
violence against the scapegoat. ' 
119 Moreover, this tradition still has considerable relevance for 
today. We (in advanced western society), Girard believes, share a common experience with 
the crisis ridden `people of God' to whom the prophets spoke. Pertaining to both is a 
`religious and cultural crisis in which the sacrificial system is exhausted and the traditional 
117 Ibid., 148-149. 
118 Ibid., 153. 
119 Ibid., 155. 
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order of society dissolves into conflict'. 12 Consequently, the use of prophetic themes and 
metaphors can be highly effective in comprehending our own contexts. 121 
It is the suffering Servant of Yahweh who serves as the climax of Old Testament 
revelation. The Servant, contrary to the mythological and sacrificial motif, is presented as 
innocent and as having no affinity with violence: 
A whole number of passages lay upon men the principal responsibility for his 
saving death. One of these even appears to attribute to men the exclusive 
responsibility for that death. `Yet we esteemed him stricken, smitten by God, 
and afflicted' (Isaiah 53,4). 122 
The importance of the recognition of culpability, of the burden of guilt, for the death of the 
servant is, according to Girard, the actualisation of the desacralizing process - 'It was not God 
who smote him; God's responsibility is implicitly denied. ' 123 Nevertheless, as Girard points 
out, there is still `some ambiguity regarding the role of Yahweh. ' 124 God is still implicated in 
the violent process as are the primitive deities who serve as a tool necessary for the deflecting 
of responsibility away from the persecutors. 
Even if the human community is, on several occasions, presented as being 
responsible for the death of the victim, God himself is presented as the 
principal instigator of the persecution. `Yet it was the will of the Lord to 
bruise him' (Isaiah 53,10). 125 
120 Ibid., 155. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., 157. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
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Only with the early Christian communities' reflection on the life, ministry and death of Jesus 
are the stifling dynamics of mythology and sacrificial culture full}- dissolved: the truth of the 
26 scapegoat is written for all to see in the text of the Gospels. ' 1 
3.9: Gospel Revelation 
In attending to the New Testament, Girard highlights the uniqueness of both the 
Gospels and the person of Jesus. While there is continuity between the developing revelation 
of the prophetic tradition and the Gospel account of the life and death of Jesus, there is also a 
dramatic breach characterised by the incomparable quality of Gospel desacralization. The 
efficacy of Gospel `demythologisation' is, as with Old Testament narratives, related to the fact 
of revelation but with the Gospel accounts of the story of Jesus comes an unequivocal 
declaration of those `things hidden'. Unbearable and unintelligible to its recipients, the 
announcement of the `good news' -a phrase that seems almost oxymoronic in view of this 
revelation's impact on Jesus' life - leads to a violent climax: `Within the perspective of the 
Gospels, the Passion is first and foremost the consequence of an intolerable revelation, while 
being proof of that revelation. It is because they do not understand what he proclaims that 
Jesus' listeners agree to rid themselves of him. ' 127 The consequence of the life, and in 
particular, the death of Jesus is that the violent logic of the sacred - unanimous violence, the 
scapegoat and disavowal of human responsibility - is forcefully exposed in the Gospel text. 
As Girard and Guy Lefort suggest, 
the Passion is presented as a blatant piece of injustice. Far from taking the 
collective violence upon itself, the text places it squarely on those who are 
responsible for it... . 
There is a complete `deconstruction' of the whole 
primitive system, which brings to light the founding mechanism and leaves 
men without the protection of sacrifice, prey to the old mimetic conflict, 
126 Ibid., 1 58. 
127 Ibid., 166. 
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which from this point onwards will acquire its typically Christian and modern 
128 form. 
Moreover, this `deconstruction', according to Gard, has a potency and efficacy with regard 
to disrupting the status and sway of myth and the identification of the actuality of persecution 
that inevitably results in the lessening of their violent dominance of cultural frameworks and 
institutions. `The Gospels make all forms of `mythologizing' impossible since, by revealing 
the founding mechanism, they stop it from functioning. ' 129 Thus, the Gospels have a unique 
role and authority in the consideration and criticism of cultural, social and religious forms - 
even in the secularized context of modem western societies. 
By an astonishing reversal, it is texts that are twenty or twenty-five centuries 
old - initially revered blindly but today rejected with contempt - that will 
reveal themselves to be the only means of furthering all that is good and true 
in the anti-Christian endeavours of modem times: the as-yet ineffectual 
determination to rid the world of the sacred cult of violence. 
130 
As so often in Girard's reading of the Gospels, revelation is central. Added to the impact of 
the revelation of the violence of `religion' is the fact that in `submitting to violence', Christ 
`uproots the structural matrix of all religion. ' 
131 Hence, Christianity, as Girard sees it, is 
radically at odds with previous religious traditions and institutions in its character and must be 
read and understood as such. Any attempt to reappropriate Christianity in terms of the rubrics 
of the sacrificial and the violent must be unconditionally resisted. 
Uncompromising in his assessment of the Gospels as unique cultural texts through 
which a subversion of violent cultural forms alone occurs, Girard believes that modem thought 
is, in its emancipatory reasoning, dependent on the disclosing character of the accounts of 
1 28 Ibid., 170. 
129 Ibid., 174. 
30 Ibid., 177-178. 
131 Ibid., 179. 
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Jesus. However, a rejection of the Gospels can, it seems, result in a reassertion of a sacrificial 
mentality and a return to founding mechanisms. Part of the problem is that as modern 
thinkers, `We believe that we monopolize the unmasking of all masks - while in reality our 
boldest thoughts in this domain are still based, however unconsciously, on the Gospels. 
Perhaps modem thinkers are only rediscovering - in a series of tentative and misguided steps 
that will presently stop appearing to be motiveless - the mechanism of the founding murder 
and the masking of it, which the gospel revelation has quite literally `shattered'. ' 132 -1-his 
`shattering' influence of the Gospels is exhibited in the theme of the Kingdom of God which 
is central to the active undermining of sacrificial virtues. `The Kingdom', Oughourlian 
suggests, `is the substitution of love for prohibitions and rituals - for the whole apparatus of 
the sacrificial religions. ' 133 Thus, the announcement of the Kingdom demands the end of 
vengeance and reprisal. Careful attention, however, must be paid to the difference between 
the Gospel understanding of violence and that which operates in the considerations of modern 
commentators. 
People imagine either that violence is no more than a kind of parasite, which 
the appropriate safeguards can easily eliminate or that it is an ineradicable trait 
of human nature, an instinct or fatal tendency that it is fruitless to fight. But 
the Gospels tell a different story. Jesus invites all men to devote themselves 
to the project of getting rid of violence, a project conceived with reference to 
the true nature of violence, taking into account the illusions it fosters, the 
methods by which it gains ground, and all the laws that we have verified over 
the course of these discussions. 
134 
The confidence with which Girard offers his hypothesis and its verification is based upon the 
this `different' story of Jesus and the open Kingdom, contrasted sharply by Girard and his 
interlocutors with the `closed kingdom' of violence. 
' 35 This significance of this contrast is 
that only with Jesus is there `the complete elimination of the sacrificial for the first time - the 
I. " Ibid., 191-192. 
133 Ibid., 196. 
134 Ibid., 197. 
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end of divine violence and the explicit revelation of all that has gone before'. 
136 Thus. argues 
Girard, there cannot be a sacrificial reading of the Gospels, only a reading that is radicall\ 
anti- sacri ficial: `To say that Jesus dies, not as a sacrifice, but in order that there may be no 
more sacrifices, is to recognize in him the Word of God - `I wish for mercy and not 
sacrifices'. ' 137 Indeed, the crucifixion and death of Jesus did not result in his sacralization. 
Jesus did not become divine as part of a post-sacrificial designation: he was crucified because 
of his divinity. 138 
It is also significant that the Gospel narratives underline the `naturalistic character of 
his death' and his `human powerlessness before death'. 139 There is, according to Girard, an 
important distancing here from violence and the sacred in the refusal of Jesus to accede to the 
demands of the crowd that he demonstrate his divine nature. 140 However, although Jesus 
illustrates his utter humanity, he is, without doubt, divine. For, 
to recognize Christ as God is to recognize him as the only being capable of 
rising above the violence that had, up to that point, absolutely transcended 
mankind. Violence is the controlling agent in every form of mythic or 
cultural structure, and Christ is the only agent who is capable1 of escaping 
from these structures and freeing us from their dominance. 
4 
The consequence of the life and death of Christ is that there is now the possibility of an 
alternative - non-violent - way of life. Jesus has taught humankind their vocation `which is to 
throw off the hold of the founding murder'. 
'42 
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Girard has unearthed what, for him, constitutes the central tenet of the Gospel 
message. Nonetheless, if the Gospels offer humankind the possibility of a non-sacrificial 
existence, the question begs itself, Why has this life not been grasped? Girard's ans«er is that 
`historical Christianity took on a persecutory character as a result of the sacrificial reading of 
the Passion and the Redemption'. 143 Such a reading reinfused the deity with violence. 
Exemplary is the Epistle to the Hebrews which. argues Girard, 
re-enacts what is re-enacted in all earlier formulations of sacrifice. It 
discharges human violence, but to a lesser degree. It restates God's 
responsibility for the death of the victim, it also leaves a place, though 
indeterminate, for human responsibility. Sacrificial theology is on the same 
level as the theology implied in the second Isaiah. 144 
Hence, the life-giving revelation of the Gospels becomes, once again, hidden from sight. As 
retrospective Christian reflection considered the significance of Jesus, a tendency developed- 
and this Girard believes is particularly exhibited in the dependence on sacrificial motifs in 
Hebrews - which resacralized and remythologized the Christian narrative. The story of Jesus 
was consequently reduced to the same order as that of the Suffering Servant; little more than a 
text of persecution. This sacrificial elaboration was further developed and amplified as 
Christianity evolved and became a State religion with the result that, `Historical Christianity 
covers the text with a veil of sacrifice'. 145 This is not, however, a process that destroys, in 
Girard's eyes, the unique character of Christianity. The veracity of the anti-sacrificial nature 
of the death of Jesus will prevail and the `subversive and shattering truth contained in the 
Gospels' will be `understood world-wide'. 
146 The importance of this Gospel truth has never 
been more relevant than today, because, 
143 Ibid., 225, 
144 Ibid., 231. 
«S Ibid., 249. It must be noted, however, that Girard has somewhat softened his view of the 
resacralizing process in the Letter to the Hebrews. He even suggests that it acted as a textual scapegoat 
in the logic of his hypothesis. Cf Rebecca Adams, `Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: A Conversation 
with Rene Girard' Religion u, u1 Literature 25: 2 (1993), 9-33. 
14( Ibid., 252. 
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Either we are moving ineluctably toward non-violence. or vv e are about to 
disappear completely. But precisely because the present situation is an 
intermediary one, it allows mankind to avoid the enormous problems it now 
147 
poses. 
The 'either/or' character of this diagnosis of the contemporary cultural situation is certainly 
stark. Perhaps it might even be said to be an overstatement which, in order to highlight the 
seriousness of the contemporary global predicament, oversimplifies the human plight. 
Nevertheless, Girard's point is that social and political life is full of hard choices that offer the 
possibility of a hopeful future or disaster. In such a context, the way of the Gospels is, he 
believes, the only means to elude the violent impasse of cultural victilnage. This truth will not 
only change western humanity's perception of the foundation of its cultural heritage but will 
also effect any understanding of human interaction and socialising processes. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we took as our first task the delineation of Rend Girard's hypothesis of 
the genesis of cultural and religious forms. This hypothesis, taking the human propensity for 
mimesis as its point of departure, was seen to account for the creation of social structures - in 
particular, prohibitions, ritual and myth. Prohibitions prevent acquisitive mimesis from 
spiralling out of control and advancing to the point of a full-blown mimetic crisis, while ritual 
acts as a palliative measure in which the mimetic crisis is played out in an institutionally 
controlled environment. However, it is Girard's contention that these social and religious 
forms are underpinned by the murder of an innocent victim through a unanimous violence 
animated by the dynamism of mimesis. Myth, in turn, narrates the events of these founding 
moments and development of these cultural forms but in a manner which expurgates the 
founding murder as murder and exonerates those responsible. In the process of this deceptive 
147 Ibid., 258. 
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reinterpretation, the victim is ambiguously perceived as the cause of this internecine violence 
and yet as the means of the restoration of peace - the victim is transformed. In the light of the 
process he outlines in his hypothesis, Girard can claim that `violence is the sacred. ' 148 
In this chapter we also charted the breakdown of this violent cultural synthesis, 
particularly in what Girard calls the demythologizing role of `texts of persecution' and, 
ultimately, in the Judaeo-Christian scriptures. The absolute singularity of the Gospels is found 
in their revelation of the violent constitution of religion, society and culture and, most 
importantly, that through Jesus humankind can forge alternative cultural forms established on 
non-violent practice. In order to understand the framework in which this practice might be 
placed and performed, it is essential to attend to the third part of Girard's hypothesis - 
interdividual psychology. To that subject matter we shall now turn in Chapter Four. 
148 R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 19. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Girardian Hypothesis II 
Introduceion 
In the previous chapter I outlined the character and content of the first two parts of the 
theoretical triptych that constitutes the Girardian hypothesis -a description of the ubiquitous 
influence of mimesis in the construction and reconstruction of the distinctively `human' as 
well as the concomitant development of cultural and social institutions, and Girard's 
contention that only in the light of the Gospels can there be the possibility of non-violence. In 
this chapter the aim is to complete the exposition of the Girardian hypothesis with an overview 
and exploration of his `interdividual' psychology. This elucidation of what, in the context of 
this study, is the most important part of Girard's work, shall be realised in four stages. First, I 
will introduce the area of research that Girard finds most fascinating desire. In this initial 
section I will present an outline of the central themes of Girard's interdividual psychology. I 
will then, second, examine the relationship between mimesis, desire and subjectivity. Third, 
after a consideration of sexuality, I shall consider Girard's relation to Freud. Reading Girard 
in parallel with psychoanalysis provides a means to further highlight the `postmodern' 
character of Girard's conception of subjectivity and will provide a theoretical bridge, via a 
critical evaluation, to an assessment of the applicability of Girard's work in the field of 
theological anthropology. Finally. I shall return to the gospels; the only context. Girard 
believes, in which subjectivity can be fully and peaceably realised. 
1.1. Interdividual Psychology 
In an attempt to advance the implications of his anthropological theory, Girard has, on 
many occasions, scrutinised a difficult and somewhat elusive topic that supplements his 
discussion of Fundamental Anthropology. Indeed, this is one field of inquiry that 
`particularly' interests him in relation to anthropology and the genesis of humankind: a 
mimetic approach to the problem of desire. Desire according to Girard is `a distinctively 
human phenomenon that can only develop when a certain threshold of mimesis is 
transcended. ' I Although mimesis is itself etiologically prior to closely related phenomenal, 
desire is a notable ingredient in the process of hominization. Girard proposes that the event 
which characterised hominization was a `rigorous symmetry between the mimetic partners. '3 
This symmetry brought about two things among human ancestors: 
the ability to look at the other person, the mimetic double, as an alter ego and 
the matching capacity to establish a double inside oneself, through processes 
like reflection and consciousness. 4 
Tracing the mimetic configuration of hominization allows Girard to combine his consideration 
of human origins with a theory of psychology and human interaction. The result is designated 
as 'interdividual' psychology. Card's emphasis in the final section of Things Hidden5 is on 
the modem western experience of subjectivity. As Girard has indicated, in pre-modem and 
1 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World in collaboration with J-M Oughourlian 
and G. Lefort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 283. 
Such as desire, representation, violence and so forth. 
3 R. Girard, ihinngs Hidden, 284. 
t Ibid. 
5 things Hidden provides the most systematic and thorough investigation of mimetic desire in the 
Girardian corpus. However, in this discussion of Girard's interdividual psychology, I shall draw on a 
number of thinkers who have appropriated and developed Girard's thought. 
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so-called `primitive' societies the possibility of conflict arising from mimetic symmetry ' as 
prevented or controlled through rigid cultural patterns. However, in modern society such 
frameworks no longer, for the most part. exist. Thus, declares Girard, the `liberation of 
mimetic desire' is an omnipresent feature of our times. 6 Gone are the `external obstacles of 
traditional societies. '7 Desire is, it seems, free to run its course. However emancipatory this 
might sound, Girard's study of the `mechanism' of desire is a salutary warning against the 
illusion that human beings have sovereignty over their desire. This note of caution, expressed 
by Girard with regard to the ramifications of an unobstructed desire consecrated in 
contemporary culture as the actualisation of human emancipation, could be construed as 
paternalistic if not lamentably reactionary. Girard, however, is not for a moment suggesting - 
as his delineation of the violent constitution of cultural forms should make clear - that western 
society ought to, or can, return to a peaceful, structured origin. 8 
I do find it absurd that people should greet with a fanfare the liberation of a 
desire that is not being constrained by anyone. But I find it even more absurd 
to hear people calling for a return to constraints, which is impossible. From 
the moment cultural forms begin to dissolve, any attempt to reconstitute them 
artificially can only result in the most appalling tyranny. 9 
Although aware of the destructive implications of the imposition of prohibitions in an attempt 
to constrain the force of desire, Girard's consideration of the mechanism of voracious desire is 
nevertheless coloured by the violent possibilities of its unfettered dynamism. Desire is `a 
process of mimesis involving undifferentiation; it is akin to the process of deepening conflict 
that issues in the mechanism of re-unification through the victim. ' 
10 Hence, desire cannot be 
rent from the victirnage mechanism: 
6 Ibid., 285. 
Ibid. 
x Girard is by no means positing a 'state of nature' either in terms of a Hobbsian violence between 
atomised aggressors or the peaceful individualism of the noble savage as delineated by Rousseau in the 
Soc"ia! ('o, lrurl. 
9 R. Girard, Things Hidden, 286. 
10 Ibid., 287. 
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Desire is what happens to human relationships when there is no longer any 
resolution through the victim, and consequently no form of polarization that is 
genuinely unanimous and can trigger such a resolution. But human 
relationships are mimetic nonetheless. We shall be able to discover. beneath 
the `underground' (in the Dostoevskyan sense) and always deceptive form of 
individual symptoms, the dynamic style of the sacrificial crisis. In this 
instance, however, there can be no ritualistic or victimary resolution, and, if 
and when it becomes acute, the crisis ensues - what we call psychosis. 
' l 
Girard's attitude to the liberation of desire as a consequence of the vast 
transformations of institutional life that has characterised modernity can appear to be, as in the 
passage quoted above, pessimistic if not despairing. Girard does, however, recognise the 
indispensable role of mimesis: a `highly developed mimetic capacity' is necessary `in situating 
oneself correctly in one's own culture. ' 12 Formative contexts such as `apprenticeship, 
education and initiation' depend upon this capacity. I? Such mimetic behaviour is 
commendable because of its non-acquisitive character and should be distinguished from 
acquisitive forms of behaviour which give rise to rivalry. If mimetic behaviour is to be 
constructive it is essential that it is in some way directed. Yet there are no criteria which allow 
an objective assessment of what constitute `good' or `ill' forms of behaviour to imitate. 
Indeed, the problem is exacerbated by the process that Girard, after Gregory Bateson, calls the 
`double bind. ' If a disciple imitates the behaviour of a master then the master naturally enjoys 
the role of model and thus proclaims `imitate me. ' However, as Girard explains, `if the 
imitation is too perfect, and the imitator threatens to surpass the model, the master will 
completely change his attitude and begin to display jealousy, mistrust and hostility. ' 14 Parallel 
to the imperative to imitate me is the contrary declaration `Do not imitate me! ' Thus, the 
disciple is left in a confusing and contradictory state that is labelled the 'double bind. ' 
Girard's concern is that in modern society all barriers have been removed to the `freedom of 
Ibid., 288. 
Ibid., 290. 
jz Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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desire', the consequence of which is to put indvýiduals in a situation that is inherently 
confusing and disorienting. ' 5 Individuals are consequently susceptible to the perplexing force 
of the mimetic double bind. 16 
So far, we have seen how Girard understands the dynamics of desire and its intrinsic 
relation to mimesis. As suggested in his treatment of Fundamental Anthropology. central to 
Girard's analysis of human identity is his assertion that imitation, or to use his own term, 
mimesis is the key to learning and social formation. Mimesis has, as we have seen, been 
regarded, since the time of Plato, as synonymous with 'representation. ' 17 This limitation has, 
Girard and his followers18 believe, ignored two factors: that mimesis is 'universal' and that it 
is `polymorphous in its manifestations. ' 19 In Girard 's usage, 
Mimesis is said to be a "mechanism" that generates patterns of action and 
interaction, personality formations, beliefs, attitudes, symbolic forms, and 
cultural practices and institutions. 20 
As a result, human individuals cannot escape the mimetic `mechanism' which underlies as 
well as engenders all characteristics of social existence. Indeed, Jean-Michel Oughourlian 
proposes that the universality of mimesis is evident in the three `dimensions' central to the 
mimetic mechanism, space, time, and the species itself: `mimesis is imitation in space, 
1) Ibid., 291 
16 Bateson suggests that such a conflicting imperative taught to a child often results in schizophrenia. 
Cf Things Hidden, 291-294. 
17 R. Girard, Things Hidden, 8. 
19 By the term `followers' I am including those thinkers who follow Girard's theoretical lead and have 
developed his hypothesis in a variety of contexts. One could mention Jean-Michel Oughourlian, Mikkel 
Borch-Jacobsen, Eugene Webb, Stephen Bann, Michel Serres, Eric Gans, James Alison, Raymund 
Schwager, Andrew McKenna and, in some of her work, Julia Kristeva. I am not suggesting that these 
figures are uncritical disciples - far from it - but rather that they owe some intellectual debt (great or 
small) to Girard's work. 
19 J-M. Ourghoulian, The Puppe! of Desire: The Ps chology of Htivsteria, Possession, and Hypnosis 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 4. 
" P. Livingston, Models of Desire: Rene Girard and the Psychology of Mimesis (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1992). 2 
13? 
repetition in time, and reproduction in the species. 
"1 Understood as a general principle of 
human behaviour, the positing of a mimetic mechanism facilitates a greater understanding of 
social forms. Behaviour which purports to represent the fulfilment of the desires of an 
autonomous individual is the focus of suspicion. It is the arena of the `interdivvidual' - the 
forms of identity and interaction engendered by imitation - which eschews solipsistic 
assumptions and provides an alternative model for understanding the complexities of human 
subjectivity. In Girard's outline of the interdividual nature of the constitution of identity, 
rather than being sovereign or self-assured, the subject is understood as the `self between'22 or 
the `uncertain' self 23 This social dimension does not, however, reveal why mimesis has been 
such a neglected area of research. This anomaly might be the result of an unwitting evasion of 
questions relating to `kinds of behaviour involved in appropriation. ' 24 It is the acquisitive 
dimension of mimetic behaviour which introduces the theme of desire into Girardian 
psychology. 
-1.2: Mimesis, Desire and Subjectivity 
The play of mimetic forces - the way we imitate in order to acquire language and be 
initiated into cultural forms - highlights the self's radical dependence on others for subjective 
identity. In terms of our desires, Girard contends that we do not autonomously choose objects 
of desire but, here too, the uncertain subject rears its head in that it is the Other who 
determines these objects for us. `Man is the creature', in the opinion of Girard, `who does not 
know what to desire, and he turns to others in order to make up his mind. We desire what 
others desire because we imitate their desires. ' 25 Accordingly, Girard defines mimetic desire 
as `a desire according to Another' as opposed to `a desire according to Oneself, that most of 
`I J-M. Ourghoulian, The Puppet of Desire, 4. 
22 The term is Eugene Webb's, The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France 
ýSeattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1993). 
`3 P. Livingston, Models of Desire, 5-7. 
24 R. Girard, 1 {pings Hidden, 8. 
1 :NR. Girard, `Discussion' 1 iolent Origins (ed. ) R. G. Hamerton-Kelly (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1987), 122 
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us pride ourselves on enjoying. '26 The myth of the self-sufficient subject suggests the 
existence of a binary (subject-object) configuration of desire. The subject of the mimetic 
hypothesis, however, desires what another desires: desire is mediated. As Girard analyses it. 
desire is 'triangular'. 27 The course of desire is not set as a direct route from the subject of 
desire to the object desired but via the mediator or model whose desire for the object is 
imitated: `One desires, in other words, what one learns to desire by watching the example of 
the mediator., 
29 
The centrality of a dynamic of mimetic desire in Girard's description of identity 
fosters an account of subjectivity that undercuts any pretensions to self-assurance. However, 
while much postmodern philosophy has stressed human finitude and the limits of knowledge, 
that is, the epistemological limitations of the human subject, Girard's radical 
reconceptualization of intersubjective relations arises from more general anthropological 
concerns. Consequently, in his consideration of the interdividuality of identity, Girard looks 
to the unsettling coincidence of desire as a key to understanding not only that which 
constitutes the self, but also that which holds identity in check. The latter can be observed in 
the way that Girard conceives of desire as promoting a loss of self in a mimetic relationship - 
subject and model become as one. Pinpointing the character of their convergence Girard 
remarks that To untie the knot of desire, we have only to concede that everything begins in 
rivalry for the object. '29 To understand the operation of desire is to reflect on the value which 
objects are granted. The contention that self-sufficient human beings desire objects because of 
some inherent value is, Girard argues, an illusion. Rather, an object is desired because it is 
desired by an other - desire is mediated by a model. Girard also suggests that the value of an 
object `grows in proportion to the resistance met with in acquiring it. '30 Corresponding to a 
6 R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Nove164. 
27 Cf. R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 3-6. 
28 E Webb, The S'e/f Between. 92. 
R. Girard, things Hidden, 294. 
30 Ibid., 295. 
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growth in value of the object is a growth in the prestige of the 'model'. The model gains 
prestige in the mechanism of rivalry. The mimetic process is such that the more difficult the 
object is to obtain the more important becomes the possession of it: 'Since the model 
obstinately bars access to it, the possession of this object must make all the difference between 
the self-sufficiency of the model and the imitator's lack of sufficiency, the model's fullness of 
being and the imitator's nothingness. ' 31 This radical desire for ontological fullness is 
described by Girard as `metaphysical desire. ' Rather than desiring an object for some intrinsic 
value, my desire is the desire of an other's desire and, moreover, desire itself originates in a 
desire for the being of the other, the model. Essential to any understanding of the dynamics of 
mimetic desire, then, is a realisation that the imitator suffers from `an essential indeterminacy 
or lack. '32 
Metaphysical desire fuels the acquisitive mimesis of the uncertain subject. Suffering 
from this essential indeterminacy or lack, the subject perceives the ontological fullness of the 
model and, consequently, desires the object of the model's desire, believing this object can 
guarantee the same plenitude of being. However, this object-desire is, in essence, the signifier 
of a more fundamental desire. The subject desires not simply the object of the other's desire, 
but the very being of the other: `Imitative desire is always a desire to be Another'. 
33 In 
consuming the other, the subject will become, so he or she believes, a true self and a new, full 
ontological status will be gained. This subject of desire -a primary and metaphysical desire - 
`has no identity of its own prior to the identification that brings it, blindly, to occupy the point 
of otherness, the place of the other. '34 The object of desire, while its importance cannot be 
discounted in the operation of mimesis, is not the principal motivation of mimetic desire. 
Rather, it is the one who possesses or enjoys the object who is the real object of desire: it is 
31 Ibid., 296. 
32 P. Livingston, Models of Desire, 5. 
33, R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 83. 
34 M. Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject trans. C. Porter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1988). 48. 
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not a matter of having but rather of being. '35 If Girard's circumscription of metaphysical 
desire (indeed, mimetic desire in general), and its pivotal role in constructing the self, offers a 
scheme by which to portray subjectivity, then it is necessary to ask what this self might look 
like. To this subject of desire we now turn. 
4.3: The Subject of Desire 
The subject of mimetic desire is, as we have noted, entirely distinct from the self 
posited by a substantial part of the western philosophical and psychological traditions. 
Responsible for the character of what has arguably been the foremost understanding of the self 
in modernity, the Cartesian self represents a celebration of the stability and precedence of 
rationality over matter, emotions and others: cogito ergo sum. Borrowing Robert Hamerton- 
Kelly's schernatization36, the Freudian subject - prone to the effects of unconscious forces - 
could be designated as the libido ergo sum. The Girardian subject, however, could not be 
characterised as mimor ergo sum. Due to the fact that there is no `self prior to mimesis, it 
would be more accurate to propose mimesti et sum, `imitation happens and I am'. It is the 
play of mimetic desire which constitutes the self. That is, if there is no other, no imitation of 
another's desires, there can be no self: it is mimesis, and that alone, that makes one human, 
that constitutes the self, and that makes possible one's entry into the sphere of language'. 
37 
The radically dependent nature of the mimetic subject is more than implicit in Oughourlian's 
use of the term `holon'. 
38 He chooses this term as it suggests the `qualities of the purely 
psychological entity, that structure in constant becoming at the heart of continuous exchanges 
with similar structures'. 
39 Mimetic desire deter iines the construction and nature of each 
35 R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, 192. 
36 Cf. Ibid. 
37 J-M. Ourghoulian, The Puppet of Desire, 15. 
zx Afler Arthur Koestler, Me Ghost in the Machine (New York: Macmillan, 1968). Cf. J-M. 
Ourghoulian, The Puppet (? f Desire. 16. 
J-M. Ourghoulian, The Puppet of L)esire, 16. 
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holon, each self. Thus, in relation to choosing objects of gratification, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen 
suggests that, 
In order to achieve its own pleasure, the ego has to take a detour, one that 
causes its own pleasure to pass through that of another. And this detour is 
identification (mimesis), resemblance (homoiosis). One only enjoys, in 
fantasy, as another: tell me whom you are miming and I will tell you who you 
are, what you desire, and how you enjoy. 40 
Thus far I have simply outlined the topos upon which the contours of subjectivity can 
be redrawn: the mimetic hypothesis. However, in relation to mimetic desire, the self can be 
further substantiated in two distinct ways. Firstly, in Girard's view, the fullness of 
subjectivity, as we shall see41, can only be reached with reference to transcendence. Secondly, 
and less ambitiously, the subject can be seen in some ways as a tentative unity through the 
character of the memory: `It is the memory that guarantees ontogenesis by holding the subject 
together through the course of his history'. 42 Yet phenomena such as memory, consciousness 
and representation are etiologically posterior to mimesis, as is violence, but the very dynamics 
of mimetic desire suggest, as outlined in Girard's Fundamental Anthropology, that conflict is 
more generally consequential than any other secondary factor. 
It is the object of desire which acts, at least initially, as the focus of the imitator's (or 
subject's) attention. However, Girard contends that the importance of the object and any 
differences between the subject and model soon become non-existent. 
43 Mimetism is a 
40M. Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, trans. C. Porter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1988), 21. 
41 In the final section of this chapter. Cf., `Interdividual Psychology and the Gospels'. 
42 J-M. Ourghoulian, 1 he Puppet of Desire, 6. Ougourlian's reflections on memory could be 
augmented by a discussion of the narrative constitution of the self and, in particular, with Ricoeur's 
distinction between the self as ipse and idem. Cf P. Ricoeur, Oneself a. s Another (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. 2-3 & 118-1191 cf also, Anthony Paul Kerby, . (arratis'e and the Self 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
3 R. Girard, Things Hidden. 299. 
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contagion which not only infects the subject but which also returns to contaminate the model. 
The consequence is a loss of distinction between the subject and model. 
These vanishing differences are nothing more than interruptions m reciprocity, 
and they always involve an element of the arbitrary, since they are rooted in 
the victimage mechanisms and mimetic rivalry; they dissolve in the face of 
violence, which makes everything return to the pure state of reciprocity. 44 
The fact that there are no longer any distinctions, no way of differentiating between subject 
and model, suggests that the two protagonists have become doubles. Doubles, declares 
Girard, `display the reciprocity of mimetic relationships' - all differences are hallucinatory. 
45 
The dynamics of mimetic desire and its rivalrous consequences are omnipresent even when the 
symmetry of the mimetic relationship is eliminated. 
The reciprocal violence transforms every model into an anti-model; although 
the imitators now differ from the model rather than resembling him, the 
reciprocity is still maintained, precisely because everyone is trying to break 
away from it in the same way. The desire is always the same, even when it no 
longer involves belief in the transcendent status of the model. 46 
Girard suggests that phenomena such as psychosis, manic depression and the `democratization 
and vulgarization of what we call neuroses'47 are the result of living in a cultural context 
where there are few barriers to the propagation of mimetic desire. Accordingly, competition 
and object-centred desire are not actively discouraged - on the contrary, one could argue, they 
are powerfully encouraged. Such a cultural context can be characterised as one which 
reinforces `mimetic competition and the `metaphysical' quality of the related tension'48 
`Everything comes down to the relationships between the mimetic rivals, each of which is 
44 Ibid. 
4' Ibid., 302. 
46 Ibid., 300. 
47 Ibid., 307. 
48 Ibid. 
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model and disciple to the other. '49 Girard sees such a dynamic as providing a clue to a 
definition of madness: 
Being rational - functioning properly - is a matter of having objects and being 
busy with them; being mad is a matter of letting oneself being taken over 
completely by the mimetic models, and so fulfilling the calling of desire. It is 
a matter of pushing to final conclusions what distinguishes desire - only very 
relatively of course - from animal life and of abandoning oneself to a 
fascination with the model, to the extent that it resists and does violence to the 50 subject. 
Between the two - madness and rationality and, Girard suggests, violence and peace - lies no 
great barrier which must be traversed. Here again, the victimage mechanism rears its head: 
`Desire itself leads to madness and death if there is no victimage mechanism to guide it back 
to "reason" or to engender this "reason". '51 Only through the reordering of desire can order be 
re-established, can the sacrificial crisis be terminated, a reordering that occurs via the 
scapegoat whose murder produces and reproduces societal forms in which the management of 
difference and indifference is pivotal. As Oughourlian suggests, 
It is this mimetic symmetry - which generates disorder and violence, and is in 
a perpetual disequilibrium - that is stabilized by the scapegoat mechanism: the 
zero hour of culture and the zero degree of structure. The culture produced by 
this differentiating mechanism will possess a structure based on asymmetry 
and difference. And, this asymmetry and the differences associated with it 
form what we call the cultural order. 
52 
Girard's discussion of Fundamental Anthropology which I outlined in Chapter 3, moves the 
reader along the path from disorder to order and the institutional forms - ritual, myth and 
prohibition - that enable the establishment and re-establishment of culture and society. 
Although modern cultural forms, particularly the judicial systems of western democracies, 
control violence and symmetrical mimetic relations in a way that often short-circuits full- 
49 Ibid., 310-311. 
50 Ibid., 311. 
il Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 312. 
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blown victimage mechanisms, the `confusion' generated by the symmetry of these relations 
(between doubles) can be understood in the context of a `return to the pre-sacrificial, 
undifferentiated state of mimesis. '53 By understanding psychopathology from the perspective 
of the mimetic hypothesis, it can be argued that - and this provides a more satisfactory 
understanding of the process of psychosis - there is only a `grading of intensity in the 
mechanism of conflictual mimesis. ' 54 
The descriptive and interpretative strength of the mimetic hypothesis is evident when 
one considers its aptness for comprehending and assessing the fluidity of identity and the 
problems of theoretical coordination; how can one map the complexities of subjectivity? The 
efficacy of such an account is in stark contrast to those (largely modem) approaches that take a 
somewhat static concept of `selfhood' as a point of departure and thus determines the sense in 
which any dysfunctional state - madness, sexual deviancy or various functional incapacities - 
is understood. 
55 In attending to the subject who is 'uncertain', Girard has uncovered a 
significant resource for interpreting the heterogeneous possibilities subsumed under the term 
`the human condition'. Although Girard's work undermines any pretensions to exalt a fixed 
and stable self - grounded in epistemic certainty, totalising self-reflexivity or self-presence - 
this does not suggest a withdrawal from consideration of the experience, complete with all its 
conflicts and paradoxes, that informs any reflection on the constitution of the self. This is 
particularly evident when Girard's understanding of the mimetic subject is extended to the 
realms of hypnosis and possession. 
'3 Ibid., 313. 
54 Ibid., 316. Girard's interlocutors in Things Hidden - both practising psychiatrists - believe that this 
investigation of mimetic desire reveals why a psychotic state can be either momentary or enduring. 
" Michel Foucault's study of the history of madness is exemplary in exposing the ideological frame 
within which subjectivity is defined and ordered. Cf. M Foucault, AIadire.,. s and ('ii'i/iza! io z: A H, sior}' 
cif J, zsa, ni v in the Age of Recz. soF1 trans. R. Howard (London: Tavistock, 1967). 
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The observation of a move from doubles to psychosis, via desire for an object, throe. s 
light, Girard and his interlocutors believe, on the states of hypnosis and possession. In both 
these latter cases the point of departure for an exploration of the mechanisms involved is 
distinct from those that induce psychotic behaviour. While, as we have seen, the psychotic 
structure belongs to a `pre-sacrificial "time'"', `hypnosis and possession, by contrast, are 
situated in a post-sacrificial "time", a structure that is symmetrical and differential. ''' No 
object is central to the phenomena of hypnosis and possession, yet mimetic desire remains 
powerfully at work: the hypnotic state can be perceived as a `caricature of interdividual 
psychological mechanisms. '57 What is significant in each of these psychological states, as 
well as hysteria, is the presentation of desire, the suggestion, inherent in any movement toward 
what seems to be a loss of self. Often, according to Oughourlian, the processes of hypnosis 
and possession can be understood as peaceful mimesis - `mimesis without any element of 
rivalry since the model invites the subject to copy the model's desire. 58 
4.4: Desire, Sexuality and Freud 
From the perspective of the Girardian hypothesis. the effects of mimetic desire, 
unbounded and `supra-individual'59, seem to refuse mastery and control. Andrew McKenna 
endorses this perspective with his claim that `Our relation to the world is mediated by other 
subjects, not by their ideas but by desire, which is neither their desire nor ours to do as we or 
they would with it, rather, it does with us exactly as we would not, for will and desire are 
antinomial, antithetical. ' 60 Through consideration of the elusive and fluid character of 
mimetic desire even the most complex variations in social and institutional life are accounted 
56 Ibid., 3 17. It is differential because the `subject under hypnosis never loses sight of the difference 
between himself and the hypnotizer, the god who is possessing him. ' 
57 Ibid., 320. 
518 Ibid. For a more thorough discussion of the role of mimetic desire in phenomena such as hysteria, 
Possession and hypnosis cf. J-M. Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire, esp. 73-97,188-241. 
9 Thomas F. Bertonneau, The Logic of the Undecidable: An Interview with Rene Girard' f aroIe. s 
Uc I r. ý: (I('LA h*rc'nch Studies 5 (1987), 19. 
60 McKenna, l ioleirce and Difference: Girard, Derrida, and Decon iruciion (Urbana: t'niversit' of 
Illinois Press, 1992). 204. 
141 
for and demystified. With regard to hypnosis and possession, states of consciousness that are 
considered strange, even magical, in their ancient as well as modem contexts, Girard re,, eal s 
the ubiquitous nature of that which engenders the production of such phenomena. Equally 
mystifying in contemporary western consciousness is sexuality - particularly in a context of a 
transformation of the culture of confession in which sexuality is now subject to the public gaze 
of the chat-show settee rather than the privacy of the confessional or the analyst's couch. With 
the dissolution of `oppressive' social mores that ensured the restraint of the libido and the 
privacy of sexual activity, so the story goes, western subjects may freely indulge and explore 
what was once renounced and repressed. Such a view has been undermined by Foucault's 
reflections on the `Repressive Hypothesis'. It is Foucault's claim that while deliberations on 
sex and sexual behaviour have multiplied in the modem era, this phenomenon can be 
construed not as liberating but rather as the development of a . scientia sexualis, a regime 
through which power is exercised over bodies, desire and sexual behaviour. 
6' As Foucault 
suggests, 
This is the essential thing: that Western man has been drawn for three 
centuries to the task of telling everything concerning his sex; that since the 
classical age there has been a constant optimization and increasing 
valorization of the discourse on sex; and that this carefully analytic discourse 
was meant to yield multiple effects of displacement, intensification, 
reorientation, and modification of desire itself. Not only were the boundaries 
of what one could say about sex enlarged, and men compelled to hear it said, 
but more important, discourse was connected to sex by a complex 
organization with varying effects, by a deployment that cannot be adequately 
explained merely by referring it to a law of prohibition. A censorship of sex? 
There was installed rather an apparatus for producing an ever greater quantity 
of discourse about sex, capable of functioning and taking effect in its very 62 
economy. 
Foucault's analysis is of particular importance due to its exposition of the relation between the 
production of discourses concerning sex - however complex and multifarious - and the 
61 M. Foucault, The Hislorv of Sexualihy: I chime 1, An Introduction trans. R. Hurley (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1981). Interestingly subtitled in French, La 6 olonte de. sai'oir, to emphasise the transformation 
of the economy of desire in a post-Enlightenment context and the disciplinary implications of this 
theoretical mutation. 
62 Ibid., 23, 
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techniques of controlling and categorising what came to be known as deviancy. 
63 From a 
Girardian perspective, however, Foucault's analysis is only partial. for while desire is 
undoubtedly produced and reproduced through the significant cultural shifts that Foucault 
outlines, the ways in which desire itself is implicated are largely ignored. What Girard 
suggests is that, contra Foucault and the pretensions of a scientia sexualis, sexuality can be 
interrogated through an analysis of mimetic desire and understood in terms of intersubjective 
relations; this is especially true with cases of so-called `deviancy'. 
At the basis of sexual `deviation' and psychopathology, claims Girard, is the all too 
real configuration of mimetic desire. Thus, Girard contends that masochism and sadism are 
linked to a failure to overcome an obstacle-model and the success of another: failure and the 
status of the other are central. Jean-Michel Oughourlian helpfully summarises Girard's 
position with regard to masochism: 
[T]he subject becomes weighed down by failure and devalued in his own 
eyes, and at the same time the surrounding world becomes enigmatic. Desire 
can easily see that appearances cannot be trusted. It lives more and more in a 
world of signs and indices. Failure is not sought for its own sake but in so far 
as it signifies quite a different thing - the success of another, obviously, and 
only this other is of interest to me, since I can take him as model; I can enrol 
in his school and finally obtain from him the secret of the success that has 
always eluded me. 64 
The masochistic subject, overtaken by metaphysical desire, wants to reproduce the 
`relationship of inferiority, contempt and persecution that he believes he has - or really does 
have - with his mimetic model. '65 Rather than credit the unconscious with responsibility for 
the masochistic imperative, it is Girard's contention that we must abandon the notion that there 
63 Ibid., esp. Ch. 2, `The Perverse Implantation'. 
64 R. Girard 1 hi»g. % Hidden, 327-328. 
65 ibid., 130. 
14J 
are 'inscrutable instincts and impulses of a specifically masochistic kind. 
66 Consequently, in 
order to understand the masochistic condition, one must attend to the fact that. 
The subject has repeatedly observed the disillusionment that he experiences 
when he defeats his own rival and remains the unchallenged and secure 
possessor of the object. To counteract such disillusionment, this subject will 
henceforth place all his faith in an impenetrable obstacle. The only type of 
model that can still generate excitement is the one who cannot be defeated, the 
one who will always defeat his disciple. 67 
The sadist, meanwhile, `plays the role of the model and persecutor. Here, the subject 
imitates not the desire of the model, but the model himself, in what now forms the major 
criterion for selecting this model: his violent opposition to all conceivable aspirations of a 
normal human being. '68 The term `normal human being' may well be contentious, but 
understood in the context of mimetic desire it makes perfect sense; human being is contrasted 
with the self-constituted god: `To invite brutal treatment from a love partner who plays the 
role of the model, or conversely to treat the partner brutally - making him submit to the ill- 
usage one believes oneself to suffer at the model's hands - is always to seek to become a god 
mimetically. ' 69 In becoming a god, the subject must be involved in a violent economy of the 
negation of the other or, in the case of masochism, self-abnegation in the face of the model. 
Girard, in opposition to Freud, wants to demonstrate that it is not the libido, nor the 
unconscious, that determines our sexual preferences. Rather; `Mimetism is the motive force, 
and the specifically sexual appetite is taken in tow. ' 
70 As with masochism and sadism, argues 
Girard, so too with homosexuality - it is the `eroticizing of rivalry. '71 Indeed, for Girard, the 
dynamics of sexuality are constantly `controlled by rivahy. '72 The subject always makes `the 
(t Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 332. 
68 Ibid., 332. 
69 Ibid., 334 
70 Ibid., 335. 
71 Ibid., 146. 
72 Ibid., 343, 
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rival play an active part as an intermediary, literally that of `mediator' between himself and the 
object': 
The human subject does not really know what to desire, in the last resort. He 
is quite incapable on his own of fixing his desire on one object and, on his 
own, of desiring that object consistently and relentlessly. That is why he is 
given over to the paradoxes of mimetic desire. 73 
The prominence given to psychopathology and psychosis in the Girardian hypothesis 
is of no small significance, and two points will serve to highlight their importance. First, in 
contemporary western societies, as we have seen, the controlling mechanisms that ensured 
differentiation and the regulation of mimetic desire in traditional societies - through sacrifice, 
prohibition and myth - are no longer extant. This general move towards desacrilization, 
however, has not released human individuals and societies from the difficult negotiation of 
mimetic desire and its consequences. 74 In Girard's view the contemporary task of confronting 
desire and its implications is made even more difficult by the fact that the mimetic process 
`does not, in our world, unfold in the light of day, in crises that involve the whole community 
and attain a level of paroxysm and near-frenzy so that the victimage mechanisms can be 
unleashed. '75 Mimetic desire works rather in a `subterranean fashion. '76 
Second, Girard's concern in his discussion of sexuality and psychopathology, is to 
eradicate what he terms the `Platonic' foundation of psychology. In emphasising the 
`triangular' configuration of mimetic desire and in undermining any pretensions to a simplistic 
essentialism with regard to subjectivity, Girard's target is Freud and post-Freudian 
7' Ibid. 
74 Cf. R. Girard, i lolence and the Sacred, 188, where Girard suggests that the phrase "modern world" 
seems almost like a synonym for "sacrificial crisis". ' 
7' R. Girard 1 hings Hidden, 349-350. 
76 Ibid., 350. 
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psychology. Freud's thought and heritage requires, in Girard's view, an active 
'deconstruction. ' 77 
The work of Sigmund Freud is highly significant for an understanding of both the 
originality of Girard's thought and the latter's application to theological anthropology. 
Freud's work represents a major shift with regard to perceptions of the self in the modem era. 
and it is an intellectual transformation in which desire (particularly unconscious desire) plays a 
dominant role. Girard's engagement with Freud is broad-based. It consists of an exploration 
of the most important texts in Freud's development of psychoanalytic theory and practice as 
well as those later works that Girard believes have been treated as more `mythological' and 
hence marginal, Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism. While the latter are of 
considerable interest, I want to focus here on Girard's interrogation of psychoanalytic theory 
as it bears directly on the theme of this study - Girard's delineation of an `interdividual' 
anthropology. In doing so, I will consider two areas in which Girard's critique of Freud helps 
to unfold and fill out his own hypothesis. These areas are the Oedipus complex and 
narcissism. 
Freud's Oedipal triangles are, Girard contends, an example of materialistic Platonism. 
In Freud's account of intersubjective conflict, because of the omnipresence of triangular 
relationships, there must be an archetypal triangle somewhere of which all the other triangles 
are reproductions. '78 This triangular model could only be found, in the context of the 
nineteenth-century materialism of which Freud was a proponent, in this world and Freud's 
milieu - that of the Viennese bourgeoisie79 - provided the familial triangle: `Since there can be 
77 Ibid., 351. 
78 Ibid., 355. 
79 Cf George Steiner, Real Presences: I.,; 'T'here Anything in What We Say? (London: Faber & Faber, 
1989), 109 for a compelling description of the unconscious - `The Freudian tripartite scenario of the 
psyche (itself so beautifully a simile of the cellarage, living quarters and memory-thronged attic in the 
bourgeois house)... ' 
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no question, for modem materialists, of setting the archetypal triangle outside this world, in 
some eternal, intelligible kingdom of ideas, such as Jung, up to a point, imagined, the Platonic 
idea has to be brought down into this world. Obviously the family triangle is the only possible 
candidate for the archetypal role, given these circumstances. '80 Dismissive of these Freudian 
triangles, Girard reiterates his belief that triangular desire is only of a mimetic kind: 
What is missing in Freud is exactly what is missing in Plato - an 
understanding that the mimetic is itself a desire and is therefore the real 
`unconscious' (supposing that there is still any point in keeping such a term). 
Non-representational mimesis is perfectly ca? able - uniquely capable - of 
giving rise to all forms of triangular rivalry. 8 
Freud's error is, in Girard's eyes, the result of his obsessive attachment to Oedipal triangles 
that constitute a metaphysical foundation for an analysis of human interaction, the genesis of 
desire and conflict. `To sum up: once you have missed the process of mimetic rivalry, you are 
forced to revert to an archetypal vision, and once you are trapped in this vision, you really 
have to come up with something like the Oedipus complex. ' 
82 
While there are significant and incommensurate differences between Freud's 
standpoint and his own, Girard suggests that the former certainly exhibited a `mimetic 
intuition'. 81 Indeed, Girard is convinced that the Oedipus complex follows the route of 
mimesis as its basis but `Freud saw the path of mimetic desire stretching out before him and 
deliberately turned aside. '84 This turning aside, so Peggy Boyers suggests, resulted in Freud 
converting `mimetic desire into a mere symptom of the greater, all encompassing Oedipal 
80 R. Girard Things Hidden, 355. 
xl Ibid., 359. 
sý Ibid., 363. 
xz R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 169. Girard's attitude to Freud is one of tremendous respect 
despite his substantial disagreements with Freud's theories. Cf Oughourlian's remarks in Things 
Hidden, 367; 'You see him [Freud] as an observer of the highest order, but none of the conceptual 
re. culis that you find in his work seems to be worth keeping. ' 
94 Ibid., 171. 
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desire. '85 In constructing his Oedipus complex it was Freud's contention that rivalry occurs 
with the model because of a straight-forward, unmediated desire for the object, while Girard's 
mimetic hypothesis suggests that imitation of the model leads to desire for the object. 
Furthermore, Girard considers a hypothesis founded upon mimetic desire to be not only 
different to the Oedipus complex, it is also superior. Freud failed on two accounts. In his 
`attempt to isolate the three elements of mimetic desire: identification, choice of object, and 
rivalry'86 and in his obstinate attachment to the `cumbersome necessity' of the desires 
repressions? Freud was unable, believes Girard, to discern the superior explanatory 
effectiveness of the mimetic hypothesis. In contrast to Freud's complexes, `as an 
interpretative tool the concept of mimetic rivalry is far more serviceable than the Freudian 
complex. '98 In other words, the mimetic hypothesis does away with the mystification of the 
Oedipus complex, its dependence on a `romantic lie' of object-oriented (binary) desire and, 
significantly, that which Girard objects most to in Freudian psychoanalysis - the `obstinate 
attachment - despite all appearances - to a philosophy of consciousness. '89 Although the 
unconscious is the most celebrated of Freud's innovations, particularly in that it effectively 
decentres the rational, self-conscious subject, it is grounded, Girard believes, on the 
assumption of consciousness: Freud `first assumes this consciousness and then gets rid of it in 
a kind of safe-deposit box, the unconscious. In effect he is saying: ego can suppress all 
consciousness of a patricidal and incestuous desire only if at one time ego truly experienced it. 
Ergo sum. '90 Freud, as a result of his philosophy of consciousness, confines the three 
elements of his theory - identification, choice of object and rivalry - `to a solipsistic context, a 
traditional philosophic subject, instead of identifying them as a fundamental trait of all human 
relations, the universal double bind of imitated desires. '91 Consequently, Girard believes that 
his own position `does away with the unconscious. ' 92 
x' Peggy Boyers, `After Freud: Sacrificial Crisis and the Origins of Culture' Salmagundi 41 (1978), 137. 
86 R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 180. 
S7 Ibid., 183. 
ss Ibid. 
99 Ibid., 176. 
90 Ibid., 177. 
91 Ibid., 18_' 
92 Ibid., 183 
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It is, however, in Girard's consideration of Freud's theory of narcissism and its 
relation to mimetic desire that the required `deconstruction' of the metaphysical prejudices 
upon which psychoanalysis is established can be accomplished. Narcissism for Freud 'occurs 
when the subject takes himself as an object. ' It implies `a primary, basic narcissism' that 
`affects all individuals. ' 93 The fact that Freud posits a narcissistic imperative based on desire- 
for-self suggests that, for Freud, there are two poles to desire: object-desire which, in the 
context of the Oedipus complex, is the maternal object, and the unique type of object that I 
ain for myself' 94 However, 
From the mimetic perspective, the two poles cannot be inversely 
proportionate as they are with Freud. The mimetic process implies that 
`narcissism' and submission to the other can only exacerbate one another. 
The more narcissistic you become - or the more `egoistic', as it used to be 
said - the more you become morbidly `object-directed' or 'altruistic'. Here I 
am merely redefining the mimetic paradox that is the foundation of our 
anthropology and our psychology. ' 95 
The radical separation of object- or subject-directed desire is, in the context of the mimetic 
hypothesis, an illusion. The two are intimately connected, not as with Freud in a proportionate 
relation, but in the fact that both are determined by the configuration of desire. This 
interdependence is brought to light through an investigation of the sexed nature of desire in 
Freud - `Object-directed desire, which is principally masculine' and narcissistic desire `which 
is principally feminine. '96 The feminine character of narcissism is classically designated as 
coquetry but, contra Freud, Girard discerns a strategic use of self-desire rather than an 
essential trait of the eternal feminine. 
93 R. Girard Thinge Hidden, 367. 
94 Ibid., 368. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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The coquette knows a lot more about desire than Freud does. She knows % ery 
well that desire attracts desire. So, in order to be desired, one must convince 
others that one desires oneself. That is how Freud defines narcissistic desire. 
as a desire of the self for the self. If the narcissistic woman excites desire. this 
is because, when she pretends to desire herself and suggests to Freud a kind of 
circular desire that never gets outside itself, she offers an irresistible 
temptation to the mimetic desire of others. Freud misinterprets as an 
objective description the trap into which he has fallen. What he calls the self- 
sufficiency of the coquette, her blessed psychological state and her 
impregnable libidinal position, is in effect the metaphysical transformation of 
the condition of the model and rival, which we outlined earlier. 97 
Coquetry - not, it should be noted, a phenomenon confined to women - is constructed by 
desire for desire: `everyone has to try to convert to his own benefit mimetism that is still 
seeking a point to fix on which it will always find by reference to other desires. '98 Thus, the 
logic of narcissism and object-directed desire is one and the same - mimetic desire. `The 
definition of narcissism and of object-directed desire always imply one another reciprocally: 
narcissism is what object-directed desire really desires, and object-directed desire is what 
narcissism does not desire - what, by virtue of the fact that it is not desired, feels itself to be 
`impoverished' in relation to the colossal richness of narcissism. '99 It is this plenitude of the 
other that fuels desire: `The intact narcissism of the other is the indescribable paradise where 
the beings that we desire appear to live - and it is because of this that we desire them. ' 
100 Yet, 
this belief in the other's self-sufficiency and assurance, their `intact narcissism', is the 
`phantasm of desire par excellence. ' 101 In Girard's compelling and vivid description of desire 
in Freud, a damning conclusion is reached: 
Narcissism is in fact the final manifestation of the idol worshipped by the 
Romantics. It gives its own mythological character away when it turns 
uncritically to the narcissus myth and interprets it as a myth of solipsism, 
while in reality the image behind the mirror (as in the story of the nymph 
Echo) conceals the mimetic model and the struggle between 
102 
97 Ibid., 370. 
98 Ibid., 371. 
99 Ibid., 375. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 375-376. 
102 Ibid., 377. 
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Freud's mistake, according to Girard, was to suppose that desire, whether object- 
directed or narcissistic, is `primary' and independent of imitation and a model. 103 He failed to 
realise that desire is a desire determined by another. It was within a mythological framework 
that Freud consequently encapsulated his supposed doctrines. Girard belle, , es that all the 
`phenomena described by Freud' (i. e. the pleasure principle and the death instinct, narcissism 
and the power of the libido) can be drawn together and understood as a `process of mimetic 
rivalry, with the model first metamorphosing into an idol and then turning into an obstacle and 
a hateful persecutor, which reinforces his sacred status. ' 104 In his observations of human 
interaction that formed the basis for his psychoanalytic theory, Freud described the effects of 
mimetic desire, but he failed to identify them as such. ] °' Because of this failure, he could not 
divorce psychoanalysis from a mythology that conceals the acquisitive nature of desire: 
In the light of the mimetic theory, the Freudian distinction between Oedipal 
and object-directed desire on the one hand, narcissistic regression on the 
other, simply does not hold up; it is rooted in Freud's particularly strong 
tendency to segregate `worthy desires' from `unworthy' ones and to activate 
victimage mechanisms that psychoanalysis cannot criticize because it is 
wedded to them - because they remain fundamental to any kind of 
mythology. 106 
In the light of a philosophical romanticism and his blindness to victimage mechanisms, it 
could have been Freud, rather than Narcissus, that Ovid was describing when he suggested that 
`He fell in love with an insubstantial hope, mistaking a mere shadow for a real body. ' 
107 In 
Girard's view, it is only when one recognises the `body' that is mimetic desire that hope can 
be substantial. The way to this recognition, as I outlined in the last chapter, is only possible 
because of the revelatory significance of the person and life of Christ and is, as a result of this 
revelation, available to all in the text of the gospels. 
103 In Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 16-17, Girard designates the belief that object-oriented desire arises 
from a self-sufficient subject the `romantic' lie or illusion (mensofnge romanrtique). 
104 R. Girard Things Hidden, 411. 
105 Ibid., 410. 
106 Ibid., 381. 
107 Ovid, Melamcnphoses trans. M. M. limes (Harrnondsworth: Penguin, 1955), 85 
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4.5: Interdividual Psychology and the Gospels 
There is little doubt that Girard's hypothesis is wide-ranging. In this chapter alone I 
have illustrated how Girard believes that an interrogation of mimetic desire, its character and 
its dynamism, sheds light on a variety of areas of what we might term the `human condition': 
identity, conflict, sexuality, psychopathology, neurosis, to name but a few. Certainly the 
pretensions of such a universally applicable cultural theory are enormous and, unsurprisingly, 
have attracted significant critical attention. I shall consider some important critical evaluations 
of the Girardian hypothesis in the next chapter, but, without doubt, it is Girard's claims 
regarding the centrality of the Judaeo-Christian scriptures in the conception and construction 
of a peaceful, non-sacrificial culture that has invited the most hostility. If anything, this 
hostility can be understood as part of a theoretical milieu that is anti-religious or, in teens of 
apathy rather than antipathy, that perceives recourse to the transcendent as in some way 
dehumanismg. 10s It is not as though Girard considers such animosity as incomprehensible, he 
wishes, rather, to warn of its consequences: 
What arouses the modem conscience against any form of initiation or 
conversion is a refusal to allow any distinctions - they are now considered 
hypocritical, in the gospel sense - between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence. This refusal is in itself quite reasonable and commendable, but it is 
sacrificial all the same because it takes no account of history. At the present 
moment, sacrifice is being sacrificed; culture in its entirety, especially our 
own culture, historic Christianity, is playing the role of the scapegoat. We 
attempt to wash our hands of any complicity with the violence that lies at the 
origins, and this very attempt perpetuates the complicity. We all say: if we 
had lived in the time of our forefathers, we would not have joined ourselves 
109 with them to spill the blood of the artists and philosophers. ' 
The contemporary social situation of advanced western countries is identified by Girard as a 
cultural condition in which the `dynamic content of the Judaeo-Christian revelation is being 
108 C. Girard's remarks concerning the the adverse response of other intellectuals to his interest in 
religion. Thomas F Bertonneau, The Logic of the Undecidable: An Interview with Rene Girard', 9-10. 
109 R. Girard Things Hidden, 399. 
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brought to a conclusion' and in which predominates `people's burning indignation about 
everything that still expels, oppresses and persecutes. ' 110 Positive though this sounds, Girard 
also perceives a subterranean counterpoint, as it were, to the admirable and important cry for 
justice: `the spirit of hatred and violence that is itself an aberration. The proof of this lies in 
the fact that the Judaeo-Christian text is misunderstood; people try to erase it completely from 
our memories and take pleasure in the idea that by now the process is more or less 
complete. ' III Although ambiguous in character, the modem age is, Girard believes, 
apocalyptic: 
When I say that modernity is apocalyptic, I mean that it is revelatory. Certain 
of the choses cachees are being revealed. ... 
It goes back to the disavowal of 
the sacred at the beginning of our culture, Judaeo-Christian culture. The 
argument against the sacred cannot, if it is to differentiate itself from the 
sacred, use the methods of the sacred. Our epoch is characterized by the on- 
going revelation of the human origin of violence. 112 
To move beyond the sacrificial is to embrace the apocalyptic, not in terms of doom and 
gloom, but rather in attending to the often-concealed sacrificial obstacles that, in the name of 
peace and security, perpetuate the logic of the sacred. This imperative can only be satisfied 
through the gospel texts in which, Girard claims, interdividual psychology is present. 
113 
In this second exploration of the gospel texts, now considered in the light of 
interdividual psychology, Girard concentrates on the notion of skandalon. In Girard, the term 
can be understood as an exact counterpoint `to how love in the Christian sense works. ' 
114 The 
term skandalon never refers to `a material object. ' 
I1s Rather, it `is the obstacle/model of 
mimetic rivalry; it is the model in so far as he works counter to the undertakings of the disciple 
110 Ibid 
ill Ibid 
112 Thomas F. Bertonneau, 'The Logic of the Undecidable: An Interview with Rene Girard', 13 
113 R. Girard 1 hings Hidden, 416. 
114 Ibid. 
Il' Ibid. 
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and so becomes an inexhaustible source of morbid fascination. ' 116 The nature of. skandalon is 
only fully understood, claims Girard, in terms of the reciprocity of its effect: 
Scandal is a relationship that has equally bad consequences for the person 
who provokes it and for the person who submits to it. Scandal is always a 
relationship of doubles, and the distinction between the person provoking the 
scandal and the person undergoing it will always tend to vanish; the passive 
object of scandal becomes an agent of it and contributes to its diffusion. That 
is why Christ says, `woe to man by whom scandal comes', for his 
responsibility can extend to many people. 117 
Notice here that Girard is insistent on human culpability and accountability for the 
machinations involved in scandalous relations: `If humanity will not transform the Kingdom 
of violence into the Kingdom of God without suffering or danger, then there will inevitably be 
scandals. ' 118 This `inevitability', however, is not due to the mescapability of historical 
necessity or an extrinsic divine will. As Girard explains, `The historical process is inevitable, 
but it is human rather than divine. Scandal always arrives through humans, and it always 
affects other humans: this circular process is that of doubles and of all the expressions of 
mimetic desire that we have been discussing. ' 119 This process of conflict, the `stumbling 
block' to peace and consonance between desiring subjects, is rooted in the Old Testament but 
finds its fullest expression in the gospels. There, the `notion of skandalon gets rid of 
everything `thing-like' and `reified' in the Old Testament notion, as well as dispensing with its 
sacrilized character. The skandalon avoids the reefs on which philosophical thought has 
always run aground, from the Greeks up to our own time: empiricism and positivism, on the 
one hand, and on the other, the tendency to subjectivize, idealize, and derealize everything. 120 
It is Christ who undermines both the false extremes prevalent in the competition between 
prevailing ideologies and the structures of the sacrificial: `He is depriving humankind of the 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., 418. 
119 Ibid., 424 
111) Ibid. 
120 Ibid., -425. 
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last of the sacrificial crutches. ' 121 What characterises the Christian (or 'quintessential") 
scandal is `the fact that the founding victim has finally been revealed as such and that Christ 
has a role to play in this revelation. ' 122 The revelation of Christ does not demand the end of 
mimetic behaviour (if such a thing were possible) but it does demand - in revealing the 
`supreme scandal' of the cross - an end to the victimage mechanism and the worship of the 
gods of violence. 
The Cross is the supreme scandal not because on it divine majesty succumbs 
to the most inglorious punishment - but because the Gospels are making a 
much more radical revelation. They are unveiling the founding mechanism of 
all worldly prestige, all forms of sacredness and all forms of cultural meaning. 
The workings of the Gospels are almost the same, so it would seem, as the 
workings of all earlier religions. That is why all our thinkers concur that there 
is no difference between them. Another operation is taking place below the 
surface, and it has no precedent. It discredits and deconstructs all the gods of 
violence, since it reveals the true God, who has not the slightest violence in 123 him. 
The gospels compel us to imitate the `sole model who never runs the danger - if we really 
imitate in the way that children imitate - of being transformed into a fascinating rival. ' 
124 This 
`sole model' is, of course, Christ; he is the one who offers, in Girard's terms, `not the slightest 
hold to any form of rivalry or mimetic interference. There is no acquisitive desire in him. As 
a consequence, any will that is really turned toward Jesus will not meet with the slightest of 
obstacles. His yoke is easy and his burden is light. With him, we run no risk of getting caught 
up in the evil opposition between doubles. ' 125 
Much of Girard's analysis of the state of advanced western cultures seems to be 
deeply pessimistic. However, his foreboding tone also serves to highlight the radical 
1`1 Ibid., 428. 
122 Ibid., 429. 
121 Ibid. 
1 V4 Ibid., 430. 
125 Ibid. 
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possibilities that the gospels open up for humankind. On the one hand, Girard declares that 
`Following Christ means giving up mimetic desire' 126 while, on the other, he is adamant that 
the gospel text opens for us a `new perspective. ' 127. The Judaeo-Christian scriptures (read in a 
non-sacrificial manner) can make us realise that the present (critical) context cannot be 
condemned as a senseless or meaningless cultural cul-de-sac into which we have fallen. On 
the contrary, there is now a different path along which humankind must travel: 
The non-sacrificial reading of the Judaeo-Christian scriptures and the thinking 
that takes the scapegoat as its basis are capable of coming to terms with the 
apocalyptic dimension of present times without relapsing into frightened 
hysteria about the `end of the world'. They make us see that the present crisis 
is not an absurd dead-end into which we have been pitched by a scientific 
error in calculation. Interpreting the present in this way is not an attempt to 
force outdated meanings on mankind's new situation, nor is it a desperate 
attempt to stop new meanings from coming across; there is simply no need 
for frivolous expedients of this kind. We have carved out such a strange 
destiny for ourselves that we can bring to light both what has always 
determined human culture and what is now the only path open to us - one that 
reconciles without excluding anyone and no longer has any dealings with 
128 violence. 
In short, Girard is suggesting that it is only the incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
that facilitates peace, love and ultimately salvation from violence and destruction. In the 
interrogation of desire and the psychological constitution of the subject, Girard's enquiry 
conveys a hopefulness born of the persistent influence of the gospel text: `A new kind of 
humanity is in the process of gestation; it will be both very similar to and very different from 
the one featured in the dreams of our Utopian thinkers, now in their very last stages. ' 
129 
12( Ibid.. 43 l. Although, as I will show in the next chapter, Girard has modified his position since the 
ublication of Thin s Hidden. 127 Ibid., 435. 
128 Ibid., 445. 
121) Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
Girard's work offers a re-reading of anthropological theory and texts (in the widest 
sense of the term 'anthropology) in a post-critical context. This reconception can in no way be 
understood, however, as an intellectual exercise in which the object of discussion - human 
being - is simply approached with contemporary theoretical concerns in mind. It is a 
hypothesis that, if it is to be taken seriously, requires a praxis that is radical in nature. P() The 
radical praxis that Girard suggests is rooted in the gospels and can only be performed in 
relation to the demands of non-acquisitive imitation of Christ. Thus Girard presents a moment 
of decision - the either/or that requires immediate and constant negotiation - between the 
sacred which is violence and the more demanding path of Christ-like mimesis in which the 
victimage is renounced131: `On the one side are the prisoners of violent imitation, which 
always leads to a dead end, and on the other are the adherents of non-violent imitation, who 
will meet with no obstacle. ' 132 
In his delineation of the three-fold hypothesis of cultural origins, the revelatory power 
of the Judaeo-Christian scriptures, and interdividual psychology, Girard points the way to a 
new understanding of the human condition. This originality, particularly in its depiction of an 
alternative, mimetic approach to subjectivity, is surprisingly similar to, yet different from, 
Montaigne's characterisation of being human. `Between ourselves', Montaigne warns his 
reader, `there are two things that I have always observed to be in singular accord: 
supercelestial thoughts and subterranean conduct. ... 
They want to get out of themselves and 
escape from the man. That is madness: instead of changing into angels, they change into 
130 The use of `radical' here is deliberate and accords with John Caputo's explication: `By "radical" I do 
not understand "foundational" but rather racinated, rooted in a dense and inextricable system of roots, of 
factical pregiveness, which antedates me and my attempts to disentangle it. ' Against Ethics: 
('ontrihulions to a Yoetic. S of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), 254 n 14 Cf further J. Derrida, Of Grammatolog" trans. G. C. Spivak 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 101-102. 
IIR. Girard things Hidden, 199. 
112 Ibid., 430. 
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beasts; instead of raising themselves, they lower themselves. These transcendent humors 
frighten me, like lofty and inaccessible places. ' 
133 In relation to the sacred, the `supercelestial' 
sphere of the sacrificial is the territory of `subterranean conduct'. In relation to Christ, the one 
who reveals the transcendence of the anti-sacred, Montaigne's analysis cannot in Girardian 
terms hold good; in the case of the imitation of Christ, the false transcendence of a desire 
centred on appropriation and the violent expulsion of otherness is conceived as the outcome of 
a subjectivity which is itself false. Only in relation to Christ, the divine Logos, can 
subjectivity be fulfilled m what Girard calls the `sur-transcendence of love. ' 
134 
In Chapter Seven, the conclusion, I will attempt to develop this Girardian 
understanding of authentic subjectivity as the performance of the sur-transcendence of love. It 
is nevertheless important to acknowledge that the Girardian hypothesis has received a 
significant amount of criticism and in the next chapter I shall attend to what I consider to be a 
number of the most notable and serious challenges to Girard's theoretical conclusions. 
133 The Complete Esser y. s- of MoPttaigt' trans. D. M. Frame (Stanford Stanford University Press, 1958), 
Ill xiii, p. 856. 
114 R. Girard Things Hidden, 2.13. 
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Chapter Five: 
Critical Evaluation 
Inlroduciion 
After outlining the main characteristics of Girard's hypothesis and before proceeding 
to the more constructive task of exploring the potential shape and character of a theological 
anthropology after Girard, it is essential to evaluate this hypothesis in the light of the wider 
discussions that it has provoked. It is not surprising that an approach to social, cultural and 
human origins and identity as wide-ranging and as ambitious as Girard's should have been the 
subject of a significant amount of critical debate. Since an examination of the full range of 
critical appraisals of Girard's work is beyond the scope of this study I will be interrogating 
those specific evaluations of his hypothesis that explicitly encroach upon on anthropological 
problems and themes. 
The analysis of the Girardian corpus undertaken in the previous two chapters suggests 
that there are two foci to Girard's theoretical ellipse: the human propensity for mimesis and 
the ubiquitous recourse of human groups to victimage mechanisms and the sacrificial; the 
former developed with respect to the mediated character of the production and reproduction of 
desire. Commentators on Girard's NN ork have largely concentrated on the second constituent of 
this twofold hypothesis, particularly in theological elaborations where the distinctive (non- 
violent) role of the Gospels and Girard's hermeneutic of suspicion ha%e provided profitable 
tools with which to explore the character and exigencies of Christian belief. As an exploration 
of theological anthropology, however, the particular interest of this study is the first strand of 
Girard's hypothesis and this chapter will largely exclude unrelated material. Nevertheless, 
because of the integrated nature of Girard's work, there will often be allusions to the entire 
spectrum of his thought. Thus, I shall not be exploring criticisms of Girard's biblical 
hermeneutic which is called into question both on the level of its universal claims (by 
hermeneuts) and in terms of the detailed readings of particular biblical texts (by biblical 
scholars). ' Rather, in this chapter I wish to engage with what I believe to be the most serious 
theoretical charges laid at the feet of Girard's anthropology - that it is founded on a notion of 
human being that is inherently violent, that the interdividual subject is stripped of agency and 
that his understanding of Christianity is fundamentally positivist when it comes to his 
understanding of the efficacy of gospel revelation. I will begin with the first of these issues, 
the omnipresence of violence in the Girardian hypothesis, where I hope to answer Girard's 
critics. With regard to the insufficient role of agency in Girard's interdividual configuration of 
the subject, I hope to demonstrate that such criticisms are invalid. Finally, concerning Girard's 
understanding of revelation, I will elaborate the problems through an examination of tradition. 
5.1: The Violence of Desire 
There is little doubt that the subject of mimetic desire seems to be ceaselessly 
confronted with the danger of, and potentiality for, internecine violence. It is this prevalence 
of all things savage that invites a substantial amount of adverse criticism from Girard's 
interlocutors. This is because, while it is theoretically uncomplicated, Girard's hypothesis 
A good example of each approach is, respectively, Mark 1. Wallace, `Postmodern Biblicism The 
Challenge of Rene Girard for Contemporary Theology' Modern 7heologv 5: 4 (1989), 309-325 and 
Robert North, S. J., 'Violence and the Bible: The Girard Connection' 11w Catholic Biblical Oharter/' 
47: 1 (1985), 1-27. 
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seems to present violence as a constant. Girard himself is aware that what he outlines could be 
seen as little more than a `hostile dialogue between Self and Other which parodies the 
Hegelian struggle for recognition. '2 It is the hostility of the intersubjectix e `dialogue' that 
raises significant questions concerning Girard's anthropology. Is Girard presenting a concept 
of human identity that is founded upon the propensity for violence, almost Hobbsian in form, 
in which alterity is synonymous with threat? The reference here to Hegel is illuminating as 
Girard is accused of grounding the constitution of subjectivity in a quasi-Hegelian fashion: as 
a struggle for recognition culminating in a violent overcoming. 3 Indeed, as this reference to 
the master-slave dialectic is provided by Girard himself, in a discussion of novelistic truth, it 
seems that he is damned by his own words. The essential point here, and it is one that is 
seriously incriminating if upheld, is that if it is the case that all Girard has done in developing 
an `interdividual' concept of intersubjectivity is to expand and resituate an Hegelian 
framework, then surely he is guilty of John Milbank's charge of predicating human identity on 
an `ontology of violence'. 4 More serious, however, is Milbank's suggestion that the 
unmitigated nature of the human propensity for mimesis and the ensuing violence of mimetic 
relations as conceived by Girard is more akin to Manicheanism than Christian anthropology. 
5 
The necessity of answering such criticisms is not simply to establish Girard's `orthodoxy' but 
to examine whether there is more to Girard's work than a manifesto of despair. This question 
of violence and, in particular, its relation to the theological import of Girard's work, is 
complex and in order to interrogate these criticisms thoroughly I will proceed in three steps. 
First, it is necessary to examine something of Girard's intellectual context and the content of 
the Hegelianism that seems to be an indispensable ingredient of his hypothesis. Second, I will 
assess Girard's anthropology in the light of the inheritance that informs his intellectual 
2 R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1965), 111. Prior to this invocation of Hegel, Girard suggests that this 
dialogue is the 'concrete' towards which the novelist gropes in his or her work -a realm of specificity 
and actuality that is in marked contrast to the dreams of `solipsistic idealism and positivism. ' 
3 Indeed, Gillian Rose claims that Girard's declaration that the mimetic hypothesis is dissimilar to the 
Hegelian master-slave dialectic is spurious. Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient 
ti'ociett' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 144. 
4 J. Milbank, theology and Social 7heonv: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 394. 
John Milbank, `Stories of Sacrifice' Moxlern theology 111 (1996), 42. 
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enterprise and, finally, I will closely interrogate the Guardian economy of desire in the light of 
the previous analysis. 
While Girard's understanding of subjectivity and human interaction is distinctive, it 
owes a great debt, as we saw in the last chapter, to his engagement and ultimate rejection of 
Freud. Just as important for an understanding and evaluation of Girard's project, however, is 
a particularly French reading of Hegel that, supplemented by the residual influence of 
Marxism and Heideggerian existentialism, supplanted neo-Kantianism as the dominant 
philosophical force in France during the first part of this century. 6 The significance of this 
radical accommodation and adaptation of Hegel, and its influence upon Girard, can be more 
fully appreciated with reference to the seemingly all-pervasive influence of a set of seminars 
given by a Russian emigre, Alexandre Kojeve. These lectures revolutionised French 7 
philosophical reflection between the 1930s and the 1960s and situated Desire at the centre of 
philosophical anthropology. Indeed, it has been suggested that Kojeve's project so dominated 
French thought that all subsequent philosophical reflection either declared `Hegel will draw us 
together' or, after 1968, `Deliver us from Hegelianism. '8 In relation to Girard, Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe goes as far as to propose that Girard's conception of acquisitive mimesis and 
mimetic desire are based `in actual fact on Kojeve's interpretation of the dialectics of desire in 
6 Mention should also be made of the advent of Structuralism and Post-structuralism. While Girard 
cannot be simply pigeon-holed as Structuralist or Post-Structuralist, Andrew McKenna has argued that 
the reading of Girard and Derrida in tandem is helpful in elucidating the work of both. Cf. A. McKenna, 
Violence and Difference: Girard, Derrida, and Deconstruction (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1992). 
7 There is little biographical material in English that charts Kojeve's life and influence. Cf however 
Mark Lilla, The end of philosophy: How a Russian emigre brought Hegel to the French' 11 S April 5 
1991,3-5. 
x V. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox & J. M. Harding (Cambridge: CLIP, 
1980), 13. The watershed of 1968 is proposed by Descombes, 171-172. and E. Webb, The Self 
Between. /"rom Freud to the New Social Psychology of France (Seattle University of Washington 
Press, 1993), 4. It seems that the failure of the 1968 uprisings to realise a socialist utopia led to a 
disillusionment with Marxism (and Hegelianism, i. e. the omnipresence of the dialectic) and a move 
towards psychoanalysis as a theoretical and explanatory tool in the face of discontent. 
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Hegel's Phenomenology. '9 Who then is Kojeve and why is his work seminal to Girards 
description of the character and dynamics of the desiring subject? 
Between 1933 and 1939 Kojeve lectured on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit at the 
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. 1° Kojeve augmented (and, he believed, corrected) 
the Idealism of Hegel with a Marxist and existentialist reading of the Phenomenology. I 1 For 
Kojeve the interpretation of Hegel was no ivory tower endeavour - it was the central means of 
influencing, or rather determining, the way in which human destiny was to unfold: 
We can therefore say that, for the moment, any interpretation of Hegel, if it is 
more than idle chatter, is but a programme of struggle and of work (one of 
these "programmes" being called Marxism). And that is to say that the work 
of an interpreter of Hegel is equivalent to the work of political propaganda.... 
For it is possible that in reality the future of the world and therefore the 
meaning of the present and that of the past depend, in the last analysis, on the 
way in which we interpret today the Hegelian writings. 12 
Kojeve placed the dialectic of Master and Slave at the centre of, and as the key to 
understanding, what he considered to be the most significant of these `ýcrits hegeliens', the 
9 P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics trans. C. Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). 81 
Lacoue-Labarthe's assertion is not without truth, although, as I hope to show, Girard's project diverges 
sgnificantly from that of Kojeve. 
A. Kojeve, Introduction ä la Lecture de Hegel (ed) R. Queneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1947). An 
abridged version is available in translation, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (ed. ) Allan Bloom, 
trans. J. H. Nichols (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). All quotations will be taken from the 
English edition unless otherwise specified. 
II Robert B. Pippin suggests that Kojeve's philosophical anthropology was `much influenced by Hobbes 
and Heidegger as well as Hegel. ' R. B. Pippin, `Being, Time, and Politics: The Strauss-Kojeve Debate' 
History and "Theory, 32: 2 (1993), 138-161. There is little doubt that Kojeve's reading of the 
Phenomenology is influenced by Marxism, even if, as Allan Bloom contends, it is a reading that 
responds to a dissatisfaction with the `thinness of Marx's account of the human and metaphysical 
grounds of his teaching. ' Cf. the editor's introduction to A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of 
Hegel, viii. 
12 A. Kojeve, `Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme' Critique 7 (1946), 366; `On peut donc dire que, pour le 
moment, toute interpretation de Hegel, si elle est plus qu'un bavardage, n'est qu'un programme de lutte 
et de travail (l'un de ces " programmes " s'appelant marxisme). Est c'est dire que l'oeuvre d'un 
interprete de Hegel a la signification d'un oeuvre de propagande politique.... Car il se peut 
qu'effectivement I'avenir du monde, et donc le sens du present et la signification du passe, dependent en 
derriere analyse de la facon dont on interprete aujourd'hui les ecrits hegeliens. ' 
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Phenomenology. It is the fight for recognition which is essential to becoming a self - an 'I'. 
1 
Kojeve, like Hegel' 4, posited a distinction between the desire to fulfil instinctual needs or 
`appetites' and a higher Desire. This higher Desire is human desire and must win out over the 
purely animal desire. Human Desire, however, is not, as is animal desire, simply instinctual: 
Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the 
other; if he wants "to possess" or "to assimilate" the Desire taken as Desire - 
that is to say, if he wants to be "desired" or "loved", or, rather, "recognized" 
in his human value, in his reality as a human individual. 15 
This "recognition", however, is not simply a matter of some supplementary status 
which sorts the masters from the slaves - it is an essential characteristic of human identity. As 
Kojeve declares, `the human being is formed only in terms of a Desire directed towards 
another Desire, that is - finally - in terms of a desire for recognition. ' 
16 Thus Kojeve, in 
positing the fight for recognition as pivotal, suggests that the Phenomenology, presents an 
`account of universal history in which bloody strife - and not `reason' - is responsible for the 
progress towards the happy conclusion. ' 
17 The conclusion being, of course, Absolute 
knowledge and the End of History 8. As Descombes suggests, Kojeve `bequeathed to his ' 
listeners a terrorist conception of history. 
"9 
This last phrase, in which Vincent Descombes summarises the Kojevean enterprise, 
cannot be simplistically grafted onto Girard's understanding of hominization, nor to his 
emphasis on the conflictual possibilities of mimetic relations. However, there does seem to be 
a convergence between the two projects. In Deceit, Desire, and the Novel Girard makes 
13 A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading Of Hegel, 7. 
14 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology ?f Spirit trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: OUP, 1977), 109-110. 
1) A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading Of Hegel, 6. 
16 Ibid., 7. My italics. 
17 V. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy , 
13. 
s Kojeve was widely used, and understandably so, by Francis Fukuyama in his The End of History and 
the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). 
19 V Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, 14 
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explicit use of the Master - Slave dialectic to elucidate the dynamics of desire in Stendhal's 
The Red and the Black. 2° Just as Kojeve suggests that `Human Desire must be directed 
toward another Desire'21, Girard outlines the mechanism of desire described by Stendhal in 
terms which fulfil Kojeve's imperative. 22 Furthermore, the desire for recognition which forms 
the basis of Kojeve's dialectic is echoed in Girard's contention that the mechanism of object- 
desire is fuelled not by the value of the object itself but by the (perceived) self-sufficiency and 
ontological fullness of the model who becomes a rival. As Girard explains, `Since the model 
obstinately bars access to it, the possession of this object must make all the difference between 
the self-sufficiency of the model and the imitator's lack of sufficiency, the model's fullness of 
being and the imitator's nothingness. ' 23 This radical desire for ontological fullness is 
described by Girard as `metaphysical desire'. Rather than desiring an object for some intrinsic 
value, firstly desire is the desire of an other's desire and, secondly, desire itself originates as a 
desire for the being of the other, the model. 24 The key is that the imitator suffers from an 
essential indeterminacy or lack. Thus, the desire for the object becomes incidental and the 
pivotal experience is that of the rivalrous relationship between the imitator and the model-rival 
who, according to Girard, become doubles. `5 This scenario is comparable to the Master - 
Slave dialectic endorsed by Kojeve in which the fight to the death is in order to be 
`recognised' and, thus, to be identified as human. 
It would seem obvious then that, according to Girard, self and other are ineluctably 
ensnared in a violent framework in which recognition necessitates annihilation. However, if 
one pays close attention to the complexities of desire in Girard's work then such a simplistic 
assertion would seem to be undermined. For example, the novelistic truth which Girard 
20 R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 109-112. 
2ý 
A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading Of Hegel, 5. 
Cf R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 109. 
23 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World in collaboration with J-M Oughourlian 
and G. Letort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 296. 
24 Cf. R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, tend the Novel, 533. 
2i R. Girard, Things Hidden, 284-287. 
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discerns in certain nineteenth-century novels undermines a dialectic in which violence is the 
foremost vehicle towards selfhood and recognition. `Violence', Girard believes, `far from 
serving the interests of whoever exerts it, reveals the intensity of desire; thus it is a sign of 
slavery. '26 Rather than freeing one from bondage, the Kojevean celebration of `bloody strife' 
only increases one's subjection. to the dynamics of desire. Moreover, Girard's notion of 
mimetic desire is essentially triangular. While, as we have seen in the last chapter, the object 
becomes of secondary importance once the imitator and model-rival assume the status of 
doubles, Girard's insistence on the role of the object cannot be ignored. This is due to 
Girard's observation that desire is often characterised as acquisitive in nature. Thus he allows 
for a richness and complexity in human interaction that is lacking in a rigidly dialectic 
approach. As Robert Hamerton-Kelly suggests, `Direct recognition is a limit; actual 
recognition is always mediated through an object. Desire is acquisitive, and acts through the 
representations of desire. '27 
It is the foundational character of the mimesis which is unveiled in Girard's attention 
to the contours of human subjectivity - augmented by his study of literary, anthropological and 
philosophical texts. It is worth emphasising that Girard has developed a method which is 
enlivened by his literary analysis and his contention that mimesis has, since the time of Plato, 
been limited to role of representation and it has ignored `kinds of behaviour involved in 
appropriation. '28 It is the acquisitive nature of mimetic desire which is, one the one hand, 
shared by Kojeve, but on the other, is configured in a way - triangular - that does not accord 
with Kojeve's Hegelian analysis. Girard shares with Kojeve a suspicion of an Enlightenment 
paradigm which exhorts the purity of knowledge, of unqualified speculation. The former's 
investigation, and theoretical positing of, the centrality of mimetic desire and the victimage 
mechanism questions the innocence of human interaction - indeed, rationality itself as a 
26 R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 112. 
27 R. Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). 202. 
28 R. Girard, Things Hidden, 8. 
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standard-bearer for human progress. However, unlike Kojevve, Girard is also suspicious of a 
theory of human interaction which posits a binary archetype. A theory of triangular desire 
undermines a tradition of philosophical and theological anthropology which propounds a self- 
sufficient subject who chooses an object for its inherent value. 29 The stress on mimesis also 
suggests a link with a tradition of French psychology that highlighted the importance of, in 
Gabriel Tarde's terms, `imitation' and, what Hippolyte Bernheim and Gustave Le Bon 
designated as, 'suggestion'. 30 Indeed, the importance of mimesis in Girard's work is 
demonstrated by his epigrammatic use of Aristotle's assertion that `Man differs from the other 
animals in his greater aptitude for imitation. '31 
Such an understanding of subjectivity, precarious at the best of times, diverges from 
the notion of violent subjectivity in Kojeve's project. There the self is not engendered with 
and by the other but is self-generated. Within the ongoing composition of this human drama, 
the recourse to a notion of desire that transcends a master-slave dialectic, and not simply a 
violent supersession characteristic of the Kojevean conqueror, facilitates a more complex and 
ambiguous understanding of identity than the wholly immanentist view of contestation allows. 
For it is evident that the configuration of desire and the accompanying interaction between 
subjects - if one can still call the Girardian `actor' a subject - is most definitely dissimilar from 
the unequivocal negation of alterity in Hegel for whom 
self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that 
presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness 
is Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that 
this nothingness is f it it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent; 
object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty... . 
29 Cf. R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 15. The belief that one's desire arises from one's own 
resources, `that it is the emanation of a serene subjectivity' or, alternatively, that desire is constituted by 
the object's inherent value, `it is written into the nature of things', is seen by Girard to be the illusion of 
the romantic i'a! Nteux. 
30 Cf E. Webb, the Self Between, 38. 
'I Aristotle, 1'OL'tic". S, 4. Cited in R. Girard, Thinks Hidden, 1. 
. 32 G. W F. Hegel, Phellomenologv (? f Spirit, 109. 
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Consequently, due to its status as the uncertain subject - utterly dissimilar from the assured 
subject of Hegel - the subject of mimetic desire outlined by Girard cannot simply be bracketed 
with the reactive constitution of the Hegelian self through some violent overcoming. 
The sense of the annihilation of the other which informs Kojeve's philosophical 
anthropology is, furthermore, closely related to the proposition that the subject is `God' -a 
theme closely associated in French Hegelianism to that of limit experiences and taken up in 
particular by Bataille. 33 This is evident in Kojeve's ultimate reliance on the development of a 
Feuerbachian framework in which it is anthropology that acts as the substructure from which 
to consider all theoretical endeavour that demands abstraction. Along these lines, Kojeve 
makes two assertions that are pertinent. Firstly, he contends that `In fact, theology was always 
an unconscious anthropology; man projected into the beyond, without realising it, the idea he 
had of himself. '34 Secondly, and concomitantly, Kojeve suggests that `The only, the single 
reality of the Christian notion of God is, for this philosophy [i. e. Kojeve's Hegelianism], 
Mankind taken in the totality of its historical evolution within nature. '35 Kojeve's left 
Hegelianism and Marxist gloss of theology is the outcome of a significant aspiration to 
overcome what he perceives as a mistaken idealism in both Hegel and theological discourse 
more generally. In place of what he perceives to be an intellectually dishonest mystification, 
Kojeve's project is one in which he tries to ascertain the fundamental nature and elucidate the 
`reality' (a much used term of Kojeve's as it is of French existentialism) of existence. 
3; Cf. Georges Bataille, Irisier Experience trans. L. A. Bolt (New York: SUNY Press, 1988), esp. 108- 
111. Bataille suggests that '7he Phennomer? ology of Spirit comprises two essential moments completing 
a circle: it is the completion by degrees of the consciousness of self (of human ipse) and the becoming 
everything (the becoming God) of this ipse completing knowledge (and by this means destroying the 
particularity within it, thus completing the negation of oneself, becoming absolute knowledge. ' (108- 
109). 
34 A. Kojeve, `Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme', 345, En fait, la theologie etait toujours une 
anthropologie inconsciente, l'homme projetait dans l'au-dell, sans s'en renre compte, I'idee qu'il se 
faisait de lui-meme. ' 
1' Ibid., 340, `Car la seule et unique realize de la notion chretienne de Dieu est, pour cette philosophie. 
('Homme prix dans la totalite de son evolution historique effectuee au sein de la nature. ' 
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However, as I shall demonstrate in more detail, in Girard's exploration of the configuration of 
desire the divine - not in this case the indefinable `sacred' of so much recent theoretical 
endeavour, but the `full-blooded' Other of the Christian tradition - is the necessa 1 point of 
reference for the formation of a non-violent, non-acquisitive, redeemed subjectivity. Desire, 
as understood by Girard, is equivocal. It encompasses the transcendent, peaceful dimension of 
human interaction as well as those relations that occur within a more immanent, immediate 
context. It is, to borrow a Platonic-cum-Derridean term, a pharmakon. 36 
It is nevertheless the case that despite a significant divergence between Girard's 
project and that of Kojeve, the dynamic characteristics of mimetic desire present the likelihood 
of conflict between the mimetic protagonists - to suggest otherwise would be disingenuous. 
The reciprocity of the desire of subject and model breeds violence. Brutality, as we have seen, 
is an all too common result of human interaction, the contours of which are traced in Girard's 
hypothesis of violence and cultural formation. 
37 Conflict is not, however, determined, nor is 
the configuration of desire homogenous. There are two possible patterns within the Girardian 
hypothesis through which desire is mediated and, argues Girard, the possibility of conflict is 
dependent on which type of mediation is operative. These alternatives are, in the words of 
Eugene Webb, 
(1) that which leads almost inevitably to conflict, because the self and its 
model are competitors within the same field of action, and (2) that which does 
not, because the self and its model cannot be competitors since their fields of 
action do not overlap. 38 
36 Cf Jacques Derrida, `Plato's Pharmacy' Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone, 
1981), 61-172. Cf R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 296-297 for the Girard's discussion of the 
Pharmakon and for his analysis of the link between pharmakon and pharmakos, the scapegoat. 
37 Cf especially, R. Girard, Oolence and the Sacred (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1977) 
for a full account of the violence which arises from the heightened rivalry caused by the unrestrained 
rogress of acquisitive mimesis. 
RF Webb, The Self Betwvcii. 93. 
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The first of these possibilities Girard refers to as `internal mediation' and the second `external 
mediation' - as a pharmakon desire is a poison or a remedy, internal or external. Girard 
illustrates this distinction with reference to Don Quixote39. Cervante's novel presents a fine 
example of external mediation. While the Don imitates the chivalrous adventures of the 
knight errant, Amadis of Gaul, there is no possibility of rivalry because the subject (the Don) 
and the mediator (Amadis) inhabit quite separate regions of activity. It is only when mimetic 
desire is operative in the relation of `immanent neighbours' that internal mediation is 
established and that conflict, with what seems to be almost a structural necessity, ensues. 40 
This mediatory distinction is an extremely important ingredient in the Girardian hypothesis. It 
points to the ambiguity of desire and displays that Girard's thought cannot be simplistically 
characterised as pointing towards wholly violent conclusions. In the last two chapters I 
considered the constituent elements of these forms of mediation, now it is worth pursuing 
these elements more explicitly under the rubric of this `internal-external' distinction. 
5.1.1: The Rivalry of Violence 
The pattern of internal mediation is such that object rivalry is the inevitable outcome 
of the force and influence of desire when the imitator and model are involved in the same field 
of action. This configuration is exacerbated by the confusion which arises from what Girard, 
after Gregory Bateson, terms the `double bind'. If a subject imitates the behaviour of a model 
then the model naturally enjoys the role of exemplar and thus proclaims `Imitate me'. 
However, as Girard explains, `if the imitation is too perfect, and the imitator threatens to 
surpass the model, the master will completely change his attitude and begin to display 
jealousy, mistrust and hostility. '41 Parallel to the imperative to imitate me is the contrary 
declaration `Do not imitate me! ' Thus, a 'double bind'. Girard's concern is that in modern 
society all barriers have been removed to the `freedom of desire' and the possibilities for 
39 R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 1-4. 
40 Cf. R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, 21 
41 R. Girard, I hings Hiddden, 290. 
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situations of internal mediation are infinite. 42 Consequently individuals are susceptible to the 
perplexing force of the mimetic double bind. 
The double bind and the rivalrous dynamics of internal mediation suggest that 
competition is the destined outcome. As with the double bind, in the scope of internal 
mediation the relationship of the subject or imitator to the model is. at least initially, marked 
by a distinctive ambivalence. That is, the model is adored because the model acts as the 
source of desire but, as the subject attempts to acquire the object of desire, the model vý, ill 
assume the role of obstacle to appropriation. Convergence of desire onto a common object 
leads to rivalry for that object. The attention, however, shifts from the object of desire and the 
energy of mimetic desire fuels a rivalry in which the obstacle-rival is the figure of attention. 
Thus, `an imitative aspiration for the object becomes a direct rivalry between the imitators' . 
41 
This rivalry is a reciprocal mediation in which the model becomes drawn into the play of 
mimesis, imitating in the other the desire the other first found in him'. 
44 The imitator and the 
model become the focus of each other's mimetic rivalry. They become like each other in their 
obsession to acquire the being of the other. They are now, in every way, doubles. 
45 There is 
no ontological difference between them since the basis of their reciprocal desire is `a process 
of mimesis involving undifferentiation'46 The structural inevitability of violence is 
schematised by Girard with reference to the intensity of internal mediation. 
In terms of how it might inform a theological anthropology, this exposition of the 
internal configuration of desire by Girard offers the possibility of maintaining the social 
location of the self without neglecting the harsh realities evident in the violence of the social 
42 Ibid., 291. 
43 R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, 20. 
44 E Webb, The Self Between, 95. 
4S R. Girard, Things Hidden, 242. 
46 Ibid., 287. 
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space and the pathology of mimesis. On the other hand, Girard's hypothesis is not as 
thoroughly pessimistic as it might seem nor as wholly predicated on violence as critics such as 
Milbank suggest. Girard proposes that the violent predicament can be o,. ercome. If there is 
one area where Girard's contribution is original (and controversial) it is in his assertion that it 
is only in relation to Christ that the rivalrous lure of internal mediation can be superseded. As 
Hamerton-Kelly characterises it, `The divine is the proper transcendental pole of mimesis by 
relation to whom mimesis is preserved from rivalry and violence'. 47 
5.1.2: The Antidote to Violence: External Mediation 
External mediation, as we have seen, is distinguished by the fact that the subject and 
the model are acting in separate fields of action. Although it is quite obvious that God is as 
external to the field of rivalrous desire as any being can be, there is more to the external 
mediation of the transcendent than the encouragement of the ultimate hero-worship. Girard 
has, suggests Webb, 
come to believe that to understand what human being is, one must also 
consider questions about the nature of the relation between the human and the 
divine, because only in that relation does human being enter into its fullness. 48 
Full human being is a question not of the elusive plenitude gained in fusion with, or 
consumption of, the Other. How, then, can fullness be gained? In his conversation with 
Girard in Things Hidden, Oughourlian outlines Girard's consideration of the topic: 
If we follow your reasoning, the real human subject can only come out of the 
rule of the Kingdom; apart from this rule, there is never anything but 
mimetism and the `interdividual'. Until this happens, the only subject is the 
mimetic structure. 
49 
47 R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Fiolence, 46. 
48 
49 
E. Webb, Me Self Betweeiz, 174 
R. Girard, 7hingc Hidden, 199. 
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Girard's contention is that the Gospels reveal, for the first time, the violence of mimetism. 
The authority of this revelation is inherent in its unveiling of the 'victimage mechanism'. 50 
The victimage mechanism, as we have seen, is the outcome of the endemic nature of mimetic 
violence, which, through the operation of mimesis itself. is the conversion of reciprocal 
violence which threatens to destroy the community into a unanimous violence where a victim 
acts as the focus for conflictual mimesis. This common allegiance at the conclusion of the 
mimetic crisis becomes the resolution of conflict. 51 The victim, in turn, acquires an 
ambiguous status. Held responsible for the communal disorder, the victim is `believed to have 
brought about his own death'52 and yet, as also responsible for the renewal of peace, the 
victim is regarded as sacred. This ambivalent reading of the murder of the victim passes into 
communal myths and, thus, the innocence of the victim is concealed. Girard concludes that 
the victimage mechanism is the basis for all human institutions which, because of the quasi- 
transcendent principle attributed to the victim, he terms `sacrificial'. 51 Nevertheless, this 
transcendent factor is constituted by violence and, hence, can only be characterised as false. 
The prevalence of false transcendence is definitively revealed in the person, life and 
work of Jesus and, therefore, it does not, indeed cannot, retain its potency. Revelation is so 
efficacious because the continued influence of the victimage mechanism, the sacrificial order 
and false transcendence, is reliant on the omnipresence of mystification. `Violence'. declares 
Girard, `in every cultural order, is always the true subject of every ritual or institutional 
structure'. 54 Only the revelation of Jesus can save human beings from false and violent 
subjectivity and promote the true subjectivity which is apparent in what Girard calls the `sur- 
transcendence of love'. " 
50 Cf. Chapter 3 of this study.. 
51 C. R. Girard, Thinks Hidden, 95. 
5` Ibid. 
,; Ibid., 19-22. 
54 Ibid., 210. 
Ibid., 233. Cf. E. Webb, The Self Between, 176 for a discussion of true versus false subjectivity 
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The possibility of new ways of living - true subjectivity - is actualised in the person of 
Jesus. He is the `incarnation of non-violent love'56 and is the only model of imitation who can 
redress the imbalance created by the violence of mimetic desire and false subjectivity. Jesus 
is, then, the `external mediator' par excellence because, 
The saving revelation that breaks Satan's power and opens up the possibility 
of true life in the Kingdom of God - that is, life governed not by mimetic 
desire and violence but by love - is not just taught by Jesus as the bearer of a 
message but is embodied in him as the beginning of the new life itself 57 
Through `Christ's perfect love' 58 true subjectivity can be actualised and a life in which 
revenge and victimisation are ubiquitous is overcome. Furthermore, the human tendency 
toward idolatry, exacerbated by the mimetic mechanism, could be identified in Girardian 
terms as a form of internal mediation and false transcendence. Idolatry helps human 
individuals and groups to remain within the security of a mimetic and sacrificial framework 
rather than encounter the possibility of alternative forms of living. Thus idolatry has, contra 
Jean-Luc Marion, the kinds of repercussions that are infinitely more serious than a problem of 
the veracity of one's metaphysics. 
59 
This distinction between internal and external desire, and the accompanying potential 
for violence and non-violence, suggests that Guard's project is not so easily characterised as 
one in which the recourse to conflict is determined or essentialised. Whereas in Girard's 
project the ubiquitous recourse to violence is subject to an analysis that at once reveals its 
'(' E. Webb, l'he Self Net s ee, r, 178. 
'7 Ibid. Satan, in Girardian terms, is the Christian symbol of false transcendence and the victimage 
mechanism. Cf R. Girard, things Hidden, 162. 
ix R. Girard, Things Hidden, 277. 
59 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being. hors texte trans. T. A. Carlson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), esp. Ch. 1,7-24. For a criticism of Marion along Girardian lines cf my 'Writing 
of(f) Victims: hors texte' New Rlackfriar., Vol. 78, No. 916 (1997), 267-278. 
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actuality and outlines its disastrous consequences, it is easily distinguished from theoretical 
perspectives in which violence is an essential element or one in which ruthless conflict is 
celebrated. It is interesting to note, in this context, that in Kojeve's political theology even the 
most bloody violence, defined in relation to the human being as both temporality and 
negation, can be wholly positive if understood in terms of the consummation of subjectivity. 60 
Furthermore, in Girard's terms, human potentiality for non-violent living is intrinsically 
related to the fact that the uncertain subject, produced and reproduced, as it were, by the desire 
of the other, is compelled to renegotiate the drama of (mis)recognition that constitutes 
intersubjectivity in relation to transcendence. How this might be actualised is a question that I 
shall consider in due course. 
This examination of the violent or non-violent constitution of subjectivity and, it 
should be said, culture, 61 does not, however, answer the charge that Girard's hypothesis 
identifies and depicts human beings as fundamentally violent, unredeemed creatures whose 
proclivity is for violence rather than peace. Or, in the more theological language of one critic, 
the problem is that Girard `considers only blood and murder, not love and the divine plan. '62 
Two points are in order here. First, as Girard himself suggests, there is a distinction between 
the biblical creation and what his own work is at pains to stress in its delineation of the 
recourse to violence by human groups and individuals - the founding murder and the creation 
of culture. '63 The latter is indicative of fallen humanity. Secondly, the role of Christ in 
Girard's theoretical framework removes any illusions that Girard conceives subjectivity as 
essentially predicated on violence. Girard's understanding of the (anti-) sacrifice of Christ, 
because of its emphasis on a fundamentally non-violent God whose creation is constituted as 
and for love, exposes the antithetical relationship between this untypical life and death and 
60 A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading Of Hegel, 160. 
61 Cf. R. Girard, ihi»gs Hiddeni, 178. 
62 R. ke Gall, `La conception negative de ('imitation et du sacrifice chez Rene Girard' Nova et vetera 56 
(1981), 48. 
t'? Rebecca Adams, 'Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: A Conversation with Rene Girard' Religion & 
Literature 25: 2 (1991), 20. 
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classical concepts of sacrifice. The significance of this distinction is suininansed by Julia 
Kristeva in her Girard-informed reflection on the love of God: 
Not only is the sacrifice temporary (the body of Christ will be resurrected in 
its integrity) but in addition, and beginning with the immersion of the faithful 
in Christ, what the faithful allows to die is only a lustful body, the erotic 
body, in order to recover, through resurrection, the body in its integrity but 
completely invested in the ideal. 
64 
Kristeva's point is that sinful humanity, because of the radically different economy 
inaugurated by the resurrection, is transformed. After Girard, she suggests that the desiring 
economy initiated by Jesus changes the significance, and ultimately restores, the sacrificed 
body. Unlike Manicheanism, moreover, this transformation is effected within a bodily - if 
transient and mortal - existence and reconfigures human beings in line with the gift of creation. 
The full integrity of that which is human - and here `body', it seems to me is a synecdoche that 
plays a similar role to anima or `soul' - is revealed, indeed actualised, in the resurrection. 
While in no way revolutionary, Kristeva's reading of the sacrificial economy (after Girard) is 
profoundly important. For the passion and death of Christ, that bloody episode that so 
animates Girard and his religious thought, can be understood as the instantiation of `passionate 
love': 
passionate love is a gift that assumes total suffering and loss, not in order to 
make of it a metaphorical assumption towards the Other but to allow a 
Meaning, always already there, anterior and coming from above, to manifest 
itself to the members of the community that share it. 
65 
It is this `gift' that characterises the `subject' of the Girardian hypothesis but it is a gift that is 
lived in terns of the economy of desire and `concrete' situations rather than simply possessed. 
64 Julia Kristeva, Tales of Love trans L. S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 142. 
6s Ibid., 141 
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5.2: Interdividuality and Agency 
There is little doubt that Girard's emphasis on the `concrete' engagement of subjects 
of desire owes much to an Hegelianism shaped by the particularity of Kojeve's concerns. Even 
though much of the substance of Kojeve's anthropology must be and is rejected in Girard's 
hypothesis, it is obvious that Girard's project is wholly at odds with the intrinsicist materialism 
of Kojeve in which violence constitutes the major ingredient in the constitution of the self. 
Nevertheless there is one positive inheritance that must be taken into account before I further 
evaluate Girard's work. Although I shall explore this theme in more detail in the next chapter, 
I want for a moment to examine the dynamic character of the Girardian subject that takes 
many of its characteristics from Kojeve's Hegelian self. 
If it is true that Girard, along with the most significant French thinkers of his 
generation, has inherited much from French Hegelianism then one question urgently requires 
an response. Why have I been at pains to disassociate Girard's work from that of Kojeve? 
The answer is that it is the emphasis on the ineluctability of the violent constitution of 
subjectivity in the latter's project which distinguishes it from Girard's notion of the genesis 
and constitution of the self. However, I want to suggest that subjectivity, in its Girardian 
pattern, bears the hallmark of twentieth-century Hegelianism - especially with regard to one 
central feature of the ubiquitous master-slave dialectic. Kojeve's reading of the 
Phenomenology was peculiar in that its emphasis was wholly on the struggle for recognition. 
Hence, his work has been particularly denounced for its divergence from the purity of the 
Hegelian system. However, the consequence of reading Hegel from the standpoint of the 
master-slave dialectic is not simply - depending, of course, on one's critical perspective - 
either the bastardization or renewal of the Hegelian corpus. 66 KojeveIs reading of Hegel 
66 The former view - that Kojeve's interpretation of Hegel is thoroughly flawed - is extremely common 
Cf T. Pinkard, Hegel 's Phenomenologv: The Socialite of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 436-437, n. 1 10; P. Redding, Hegels Hermeneutic. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 119-122 Cf also, Andrew Shanks' view that Kojeve's influence has been 'almost entirely 
regrettable'. A. Shanks, Hegel'. Political Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
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effectively regenerated philosophical anthropology and installed desire as a central component 
of politically-sensitive reflective endeavour. The exploration of desire and its character is not 
excluded from the canon of modem philosophy, nor in fact was Hegel the first to consider its 
place in a study of subjectivity. 67 Nevertheless, as Judith Butler points out, 
Desire has been deemed philosophically dangerous precisely because of its 
propensity to blur clear vision and foster philosophical myopia, encouraging 
one to see only what one wants, and not what is. Desire is too narrow, 
focused, interested, and engaged. But when philosophy interrogates its own 
possibilities as engaged or practical knowledge, it tends to ask after the 
philosophical potential of desire. 68 
It is the emphasis on engagement that Girard has inherited, along with much twentieth-century 
French philosophy. Even those who ultimately rejected the all-encompassing pretensions of 
Kojeve's Hegelian project embraced this aspect of his (in)famous seminars of the nineteen- 
thirties. The subject could no longer be understood exclusively in tenns of a self-conscious 
monad that was safe within its bounds. Accordingly, Kojeve contrasts the `contemplative', 
quiescent self - `the "knowing subject"' who "`loses" himself in the object that is known'69 - 
with the subject of desire for whom `Desire dis-quiets him and moves him to action. '70 It is, 
therefore, action that becomes the proper site for a thorough topography and comprehension 
of subjectivity and not contemplation nor the conceptual alone. Consequently, to borrow from 
Michel de Certeau, one could, after this particular reading of Hegel, outline a cultural and 
anthropological hypothesis `allowing the logic of unselfconscious thought to be taken 
seriously. '7' - or, in Girard's case, the logic (or folly) of desire. The Girardian self is one who 
210, n. 21. The latter view - which takes into account the originality of Kojeve's project as well as its 
status as commentary - is volunteered by Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in 
7Hwentieth-('entury France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 61-79. 
67 Cf. Judith Butler, Suhject. s of Desire, 3, Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1955), Part 3, prop. 9, p. 137 & Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical 
Reason trans. L. White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), § 3, Theorem II, Remark 1, p. 21-22 
68 Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire, 3. Butler's emphasis. 
69 A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reacting Of Hegel, 3. 
70 Ibid., 4. 
71 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of IE, 'º'eiydaty Life, trans. S. Rendall (Berkeley California Universit\ 
Press, 1984), xv. 
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can only be considered in the midst of various engagements with, indeed `as', the other. Yet. 
whereas for Kojeve desire is `the project of self-realization through the mediation of the 
other's recognition', 72 in Girard's terms the problem of recognition is not necessarily an 
ineluctable element of the fulfilment of one's `project'. Because desire is socially generated 
and sustained it inevitably shapes subjectivity and generates personal agency and the various 
engagements that give rise to and animate identity. 
The subject of desire as delineated by Girard is both dynamic and uncertain and is the 
result of an Hegelian residue, of a particular kind, of course. This inheritance is particularly 
evident in the anthropological theory propounded in Things Hidden and Deceit, Desire and 
the Novel. In the next chapter I will show how such an understanding of the subject provides a 
significant resource for the revisioning of theological anthropology. At this point it is 
sufficient to suggest that the tensions and difficulties involved in living and acting as a `self- 
between' are obvious - not least due to the problems of conflict, of autonomy and of identity. 
Nevertheless, it is not as though these difficulties, gleaned in part from Kojeve's Hegelianism, 
wholly negate the possibility of identity, even if that term is understood in an extremely `soft' 
sense. One could even suggest that they serve to highlight the necessary negotiations of which 
life is constituted. As John Caputo remarks, 
the importance of Hegel and Genpan philosophy generally is the discovery of 
opposition, which is the true test of affirmation, the ordeal through which life 
must pass, the test of whether it is an angel or a demon that whispers in our 
ears and tells us that life goes on and on, without remission. 
73 
72 M. C. Dillon, `Desire: Language and Body' Postmodernism and Continental Philosophy (eds) Hugh 
J. Silverman & Donn Welton (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), 36. 
73 John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: ('olltribution. S to a Poetics of Obligation with ('onstant Reference 
to Decoirstrnctioil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 5 1. It is possible that Nietzsche can 
also provide a lesson here in that his anti-metaphysical stance is represented by Zarathustra who 
de. 'cendv from the mountain into wisdom. The point would seem to be that `truth' does not reside in the 
ether but in the messiness of the human condition. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
trans. R. J Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961). 
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Yet while Girard provides a thoroughgoing exposition of the vicissitudes of subjectivity. 
including an analysis of much neglected trials and tribulations and the undetermined nature of 
the self, this same theoretical investigation necessarily raises the question of the status - or 
even the very possibility - of agency. Can the uncertain subject be considered in am sense as 
an agent or is he or she simply an actor whose roles are determined by the ebb and flo« of 
social forces and demands? 
5.2.1: Agent or. ] cior? 
The problem of agency reaches to the heart of Girard's anthropology and has been 
highlighted by two commentators in particular. 74 The question posed concerns the role and 
nature of desire. Is it that Girard outlines a notion of self (constituted by mimetic desire) that 
is so `thin' that it borders on a nihilist rejection of any `content'? I want to suggest that this is 
not so and in order to demonstrate why such an accusation is misleading I will consider, with 
the help of Judith Butler's more recent work, the anthropological implications of the loss of a 
strong foundational subjectivity. 75 
In her recent work, Excitable Speech, 
76 Butler proposes, through an analysis of J. L. 
Austin's philosophy of language and Louis Althusser's theory of interpellation, that 
subjectivity can only be intelligible when understood as a discursive process and, moreover, 
74 Cf. Paisley Livingston, `Demystification and History in Girard and Durkheim' Violence and Truth: 
(fin the Work of Rene Girard (ed. ) Paul Dumouchel (London: Athlone, 1988), esp. 130. Robert Greer 
Cohn `Desire: Direct and Imitative' Philosophy Today Winter (1989), 318-329.1 am also grateful to 
Gerard Loughlin whose own observations communicated in conversation and correspondence have 
assisted my reflection on this issue. 
7' The most famous being that of Kant for whom the subject is the 'ground of thought'. Immanuel 
Kant, The ('ritigl e of Mire Reason trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933), B 421), p. 
382 
70 Judith Butler, Lxcitahlc Speech: A Politics of the Perfornnatire (London: Routledge, 1997). 
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that `linguistic agency' emerges from an `enabling vulnerability'. 77 The fields of linguistic 
possibility enable and sustain subjectivity but also always exceed any static identity: 
To be addressed is not merely to be recognized for what one already is. but to 
have the very term conferred by which the recognition of existence becomes 
possible. One comes to "exist" by virtue of this fundamental dependency on 
the address of the Other. One "exists" not only by virtue of being recognized, 
but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable. 78 
It is the linguistic act that constitutes the possibility of subjectivity, of "existence". 
Broadening the terms of Butler's discussion, one could suggest that the activity or agency of 
the subject is only possible or evident in a cultural, historical (as well as linguistic) context. 
Indeed, Butler remarks that `an "act" is not a momentary happening, but a certain nexus of 
temporal horizons, the condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment it occasions. '79 
Thus it is not the sovereign subject who is responsible for the act but it is the act or the 
utterance that constitutes a subject of response and responsibility. 
Untethering the speech act from the sovereign subject founds an alternative 
notion of agency and, ultimately, of responsibility, one that more fully 
acknowledges the way in which the subject is constituted in language, how 
what it creates is also what it derives from elsewhere. Whereas some critics 
mistake the critique of sovereignty for the demolition of agency, I propose 
that agency begins where sovereignty wanes. The one who acts (who is not 
the sane as the sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is 
constituted as an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of 
enabling constraints from the outset. 
0 
There are two telling points in this passage. In the first place, agency is in no way lost simply 
because the subject is stripped of his or her sovereignty. Indeed, according to Butler, a more 
vulnerable subject can be understood as inherently responsible in that the derivative nature of 
existence" indicates a subjectivity constituted by reception and response. Second, agency is 
77 Ibid., 2. 
78 Ibid., 5. 
79 Ibid., 14 
80 Ibid., 15-16. 
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that which occurs because of - not despite - the constitution of the self (as actor) in a 'field of 
enabling constraints'. It is these constraints that seem to worry critics of mimetic desirest. } et 
it seems almost too obvious to suggest that all that we are (and do) is in some way conditioned 
and enabled by convention and context, for which the `Other' is often a cipher. Andrew 
McKenna, in line with Butler's analysis, but this time in the idiom of mimetic desire, suggests 
that because `desire originates not in the self but in another desire it is prey to mimetic 
behaviour in which the sovereign will has no role. '82 Furthermore, one is by no means simply 
a pawn in the midst of a sea of determinacy. The point here, as Butler suggests, is that 
"`agency" is not the same as "mastery". ' 83 There are constraints as to what and who the agent 
can be when that being or becoming is regulated by social possibilities and rituals. That is 
why subjects act in different ways - play different roles? - in distinct places, positions and 
relationships. But there is one more point that Butler makes that I simply want to mention 
here in preparation for the more thorough theological reflection in the next chapter. That is, 
subjectivity is made possible because of a linguistic and socio-cultural "excess ". s4 Indeed, if 
one were to compile all the desires that one had ever desired `would they not present a 
quandary for identity? '85 It is the undecideability of identity and subjectivity that highlights 
not only its dependent nature but that there is always a surplus to meaning and responsibility 
that itself demands recognition and interrogation. The consequence of such a surplus, in 
contradistinction to a `homeopathic' conception of life and existence in which the content and 
parameters of the latter are endlessly diluted, 
86 is that the agent or actor is confronted by the 
ambiguities and incompleteness of life, a state in which the mastery of desire is unrealisable 
no matter what a consumer society and its production and reproduction of desire suggests - 
that we believe in the illusion of our sovereignty over desire. 
91 Cf Paisley Livingston, `Demystification and History in Girard and Durkheim, 131. 
1 82 Andrew McKenna, Violence and Difference, 150. 
83 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech, 26. 
8`' Ibid., 28. 
x' Ibid., 30. Butler remarks 'what if one were to compile all the names that one has ever been called' 
but I think that her point is easily transposed into an analysis of desire and subjectivity. 
86 This strategy is evident in Simon Critchley's I "eº v Little ... 
AImo. w Nothing (London: Routledge, 
1997), 26, where the ultimate meaning of human_f nitude is that uc cannot find meanie il fu/f Iment 
for the finite' The emphasis is Critchley's. 
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The importance of Butler's reflections on subjectivity and agency, apart from 
augmenting my discussion of the Girardian concept of the interdividual self, is that it 
questions the very point from which an analysis of subjectivity most profitably commences. 
While the fear that the decentering of the subject, so evident in Girard's work, may result in an 
extreme nominalism, a renewed `metaphysical thinning out of the world' must certainly be 
attended to, 87 it is also apparent that the claim that self has been so decentred that it constitutes 
a complete fiction and does not in any intelligible way exist at all is somewhat overstated. As 
Malcolm Bowie suggests, in relation to Lacan, the self `does not `disappear' ... as a 
fashionable phrase would have it, but has its manifold trajectories plotted and re-plotted by 
him. '88 What Girard has done is to plot the trajectories of the self taking as his co-ordinates a 
desire that is dependent on alterity and the mimetic context in which the responses to the 
desiring other occur. The theory of subjectivity that Girard has developed will, I hope, 
provide the resources for an interrogation of what constitutes human being from a theological 
perspective. 
5.3: Revelation as Resolution 
Before moving to the task of delineating a theological anthropology after Girard, there 
is one other important problem evident in the Girardian hypothesis that requires critical 
attention. As I suggested in Chapter Three, the most controversial aspect of Girard's work is 
his insistence that it is only with the aid of Gospel revelation that humankind can rise from the 
mire of conflict and violence. The question that arises from this assertion is quite simple. 
How is this liberation effected? Again, John Milbank is heavily critical of this aspect of 
Girard's work and he suggests that what is missing from the latter's consideration of the 
87 Cf Frank B. Farrell, Suhjectirity, Realism and Postmodernism: The Recorerty of the World in Recent 
Philosoph' (Cambridge: Cambridge [i niversity Press, 1994), esp, 151 ff. 
Kx M. Bowie, 'Jaques Lacan' Siruciuralism acid Since (ed) J. Sturrock (Oxford: OUP, 1979). 131. 
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significance of Christ is any hint of the form of peaceable conduct, or more accurately. any 
context in which such conduct can be set: `Do we not need to know the idiom of peaceable 
behaviour if we are able to distinguish it from the coercive? '. 89 This is an important point and 
one which certainly carries weight. However, in Girard's defence it must be said that he is no 
theologian and that his work, rather than in any way presenting a systematic or polished 
theology, offers a number of what Lucien Scubla has called `theological inferences'. 90 Yet the 
very lack of any attempt to outline the way in which one can live a life characterised by the 
`sur-transcendence of love' 91 is a major deficiency in Girard's affirmation of Christianity. The 
difficulty is that if Christianity is the only religion `to point to the remedy - the only one to lift 
men out of the sacrificial order by uniting them directly around the God of love instead of 
reconciling them belatedly over the grave of the surrogate victim', 92 who or what is the means 
by which the remedy executed? The answer to this question has important theological as well 
as anthropological repercussions. From a theological perspective the controversial element in 
Girard's championing of Christianity is not the suggestion that unless human beings, as Scubla 
aptly remarks, `benefit from some divine grace, they will inevitably descend anew into 
violence', 93 but that such a reflection upon grace is wholly missing from Girard's analysis. It 
is for this reason that Pierre Manent accuses Girard of presenting a Pelagian understanding of 
nature and grace - Pelagian in the sense that once the truth of human violence is revealed 
`everything takes place between men. '94 
89 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 398. However, Fergus Kerr provides an important 
rejoinder to Milbank when he asks, in Girard's defence, `How would it be possible to flesh out' what 
Milbank calls 'the absolute vision of ontological peace? ' This latter vision is Milbank's alternative to 
Girards lack of a programme of transformation. Cf F. Kerr, `Rescuing Girard's Argument? ', Modern 
l heoloy 8: 4 (1992), 396 
90 Lucien Scubla, The Christianity of Rene Girard and the Nature of Religion' I 7olence and Truth, 160. 
91 R. Girard, Things Hidden, 233. 
92 Lucien Scubla, 'The Christianity of Rene Girard and the Nature of Religion', 160. 
93 Ibid., 172. 
94 P. Manent, `Rene Girard, la violence et le sacre', ('ontrepo :t 14 (1974), 169. Quoted in Lucien 
Scubla, `The Christianity of Rene Girard and the Nature of Religion', 172 
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The characterisation of Girards theology - if that is what one can call it - as rigorously 
Pelagian is, I think, somewhat overstating the deficiencies in his work. As I mentioned earlier. 
Girard only provides `theological inferences' and has not worked out, in print at least. the 
implications of his exploration of the Gospels. Yet the fact remains that there are two major 
weaknesses apparent in the conclusions that Girard draws from these explorations. 
First, it is apparent that Girard presents a framework in which the efficacy of the 
Gospels can be understood in terms of `revelation and recognition' or, as William E. Connolly 
puts it, `definitive recognition and resolution. '95 What this amounts to is that the Gospels 
reveal the truth of human violence and the recourse to %ictimage mechanisms through the 
`unadulterated' disclosure of the reasons for and method of Christ's death. Thus, there is no 
displacement of responsibility for violence, nothing concealed, and the possibility of non- 
violent living is the subsequent challenge of the texts. There is little equivocation in Girard's 
belief that the significance of the passion and death of Christ can be summarised thus: `it [the 
passion] is quite capable of undermining and overturning the whole cultural order and 
supplying the secret motive force of all subsequent history. '96 This suggests, however, that it 
is simply by knowing that human beings are caught in a cycle of violence that such a cycle 
can, as if from nowhere, be arrested and vanquished. The emphasis is upon a certitude being 
learned and known, not on the fact that the incarnation, death and resurrection have in some 
way transformed nature itself by the grace of God and that the latter demands continued 
activity, a way of life, as it were, that accords with faith as well as the knowledge gleaned 
from the gospel texts. 
Os William E. Connolly, The Augusti»ian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Aioralitty (London 
Sage, 199 1), 31 n. 5. 
96 R Girard, 7hing Nieder,, 209. 
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This takes us to the second weakness which relates to the paucity of references in the 
Girardian corpus to such practices through which the non-violent alternative announced by 
Christ's life and work can be lived. This failing is summarised by Scubla who remarks that in 
Des Choses cachees Girard seems to outline a Christianity stripped of all sacredness and 
ritual. '97 There is no doubt that this is a mystifying omission. For while Girard has described 
the constitution of subjectivity in terms of its altogether `existential' and institutional 
composition, with regard to his insistence on the efficacy of revelation - its impact and 
consequences - such a `thick' description of the theological subject is almost wholly absent. 
There is no discussion in Girard of the church and its role as a site of the production and 
reproduction of desire nor as the location for the practice of love. All Girard concerns himself 
with is Jesus, as if the gospels themselves are divorced from the communities within which 
they were written and from which they emerged as central texts for the wider church. Girard 
himself provides a good example of the difficulty that I have highlighted when he suggests 
that 
Jesus invites all men to devote themselves to the project of getting rid of 
violence, a project conceived with reference to the true nature of violence, 
taking into account the illusions it fosters, the methods by which it gains 
ground, and all the laws that we have verified over the course of these 
discussions. 98 
Girard is undoubtedly right that the `project' announced by the gospels is new and 
revolutionary. However, what is missing from Girard's understanding of Jesus's invitation is 
the difficult and complex demands that follow. The gospels demand a way of life that is the 
result of the hard work of discipleship. It is worth reminding oneself of John Donahue's 
exploration of the theology of discipleship in Mark's gospel. There Donahue suggests that 
Mark's Gospel is a manual for discipleship, a text in which the vicissitudes of the imitation of 
Christ are explored and outlined in `a narrative expansion of the journey of commitment and 
97 Lucien Scubla, The Christianity of Rene Girard and the Nature of Religion', 170. 
98 R. Girard, Things Hidden, 197. 
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recommitment that is to characterize Christian life. '99 It is not as though Girard is blind to the 
need for action. `The Gospels tell us', claims Girard, `that to escape violence it is necessary to 
love one's brother completely - to abandon the violent mimesis involved in the relationship of 
doubles. ' 100 While it is obvious that Girard could not establish beyond doubt the shape and 
character of a Christian life, his hypothesis is nevertheless devoid of any attempt to point to 
frameworks within which different kinds of activities that are central to the practice of a 
Christian life, a life of loving `one's brother completely', might be rehearsed and conducted. 
What is the point, for instance, of liturgical ritual if it is revelation alone that provides the 
necessary ingredients for a thoroughly Christian life? Or does ritual simply act as a reminder 
as to the content of revelation? 101 Just as pressing is the question of the place and purpose of 
the church in the midst of an often violent world. The church is traditionally, and for good 
reason, characterised as a sacrament of Christ, not simply as an ontological fact but as a living 
presence of the Spirit of Christ. Indeed, the documents of the Second Vatican Council echo, 
according to Walter Kasper, `the splendid idea of Irenaeus of Lyons' that `through the 
communion of the church God wishes to renew everything in Christ. ' 
102 This ongoing task is 
a much more multidimensional affair than Girard's conception of the resolution of the world's 
violence which, in contradistinction, seems utterly unidimensional. Because of the very 
conflicts, difficulties and roles that are intrinsically part of being the church in various 
contexts, the move towards non-violence is a difficult journey. As Rowan Williams observes, 
`We are always already in history, shaped by privation, living at the expense of each other: 
important moral choices entail the loss of certain specific goods for certain specific persons, 
because moral determination, like any 'cultural' determination, recognizes that not all goods 
99 John R. Donahue, The Theology and Setting of Discipleship in the Gospel of Mark (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1983), 52. 
1(10 R. Girard, Things Hidden, 215. 
101 Mary Barbara Agnew argues that if, as Girard argues, Christ's death must serve as a summons to 
reject violence, then the liturgy `must be the place where that rejection is nourished, deepened, 
witnessed and celebrated. ' She begins the process of developing possible liturgical strategies from 
Girard's hypothesis. Cf her "A Transformation of Sacrifice: An Application of Rene Girard's Theory 
of Culture and Religion' Uorship 61 (1987), 493-509. The quote is found on p. 508. 
102 Walter Kasper, Theology and Church trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 1989), 164. Cf Lumen 
Geillinm 2. 
187 
for all persons are contingently compatible. ' 
103 We are unfinished creatures who easily 
misread and misunderstand the thrust of revelation, particularly in the confusing milieu of 
incompatibility and incommensurability that constitutes our contingent existence. Linked to 
this point is the fact that there is almost the rejection of an eschatological dimension in 
Girard's description of `revelation and recognition'. If only we understood the message of the 
gospels then transformation would be effected. Surely the Christian tradition has always 
highlighted what is to come and in a sense embodied this hope in fulfilment of its practice. 
`The church is the sacrament of the world", claims Edward Schillebeeckx, `precisely as the 
sacrament of salvation which is offered to all men - she is hope not only for all who belong to 
her; she is also, quite simply, spec mundi, hope for the whole world. ' 
104 Yet this hope is 
precisely hope because it presents itself in the midst of the messiness and sinfulness of the 
human condition, a point emphasised by Williams who suggests that 
the union of divine and human interest must be affirmed and understood at 
just that point where the sheer historical vulnerability of the human is most 
starkly shown, where unfinishedness, tension, the rejection of meaning and 
community are displayed in the figure of a man simultaneously denied voice tos 
or identity by the religious and political rationalities of his day. 
This `unfinishedness' seems to be accepted by Girard as part and parcel of the ebb and flow of 
day-to-day human existence but in his analysis of Christian existence the tension is 
removed. 106 That is why Girard's work is relatively silent on the question of tradition. It is 
almost as though tradition is of no significance in the light of a perspective from which truth 
can be straightforwardly garnered, unhindered by the accretions of manifold historical 
readings and rereadings. The latter seems to be relegated to the status of a phenomenon of 
103 Rowan Williams, `Saving Time: Thoughts on Practice, Patience and Vision' New Black friars Vol. 
73 No. 861 (1992), 322. 
104 Edward Schillebeeckx, The Mi. csiorn of the ('horch (London: Sheed & Ward, 1973), 48. 
1"' R. Williams, `Hegel and the Gods of Postmodernity' Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion 
¶eds. ) Philippa Berry & Andrew Wernick (London: Routledge, 1992), 78. 
06 This tendency to provide a `thick' description of the violence of rivalrous desire and a `thin' 
description of its peaceable counterpart is also present in a recent Girardian reading of contemporary 
cultural concerns. Cf. Gil Bailie, Violence (Imvciled: Humanih' at the Crossroads (New York: 
Crossroad, 1995). 
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confusion that characterises the church's bungled attempts to come to terms with and practice 
the gospel. '°7 From the Letter to the Hebrews onwards, Girard sees tradition as little more 
than the reinstatement of a sacrificial ideology that once again conceals the truth of 
revelation. 108 This may well be due to the fact that the emphasis on the purity of the gospel 
revelation bypasses the problem of a certain conflict and confusion within the Christian 
community itself. Girard sees the scriptures as uncovering one message in one way, while 
tradition may also be seen as presenting that message (if there is but one) in a myriad of ways 
and contexts. However, even if Girard's reading demands significant attention, the fact 
remains that tradition can be understood as the exploration of the significance of Jesus in the 
midst of the conflicting desires and narratives that Girard himself has done so much to 
uncover. The consequence of Girard's position is that his notion of grace, contra Milbank, 
109 
seems peculiarly intrinsicist. While this may seem on the face of it more preferable to an 
immoderate extrinsicism, the work of Maurice Blondel and Michel de Certeau suggest that the 
problem with both conceptions of the divine/human relationship is that they share the same 
basic error. 
Certeau and Blondel represent a strain of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Catholic 
Christian thought that responds, first, to an intrinsicism in which it is revelation rather than 
grace that provides a sufficient basis for transformation or in which there occurs the 
objectification of dogma in modem historicism and, second, to a context in which one sees the 
securing of the supernatural in terms of its extrinsic status over and against nature. The latter 
position, so claims Blondel, mirrors the defects of the former - both positions are disengaged 
from life. 110 As a counterpoint to these tendencies, Certeau and Blondel conceive tradition in 
107 Cf. R. Girard, Thing., Hidden, 224-262. Here Girard criticises `historical Christianity' for its flawed 
readings of the gospels. 
108 Ibid., 227ff. 
109 J. Milbank, t heologv and . S'ocial I heorr, 396-397. 110 Maurice Blondel, the Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, trans. Alexander Dru &I lltyd 
Trethowan (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 228. 
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a disconcertingly radical manner. l I1 If tradition comes from tradere, to hand down, then it is 
something that can be characterised (radically) as gift. Thus, the handing on is an entrusting 
rather than a replication, a creative offering rather than a command to secure a `revelation' 
unsullied. As Certeau suggests, Christianity 
has had a series of intellectual and historical social forms which have had two 
apparently contradictory characteristics: the will to be faithful to the inaugural 
event: the necessity of being different from these beginnings. 112 
The elaborations of the Christ event, which is irreducibly `other', `are historically 
specified in being permitted by this beginning; but none is identical with it. ' 11 3 Thus dogma, 
the text(s) of tradition, is, or at least ought to be, constituted in a context where the `mediation 
of collective life and the slow progressive labour of the Christian tradition, are essential. '' 14 
Articles of faith are not the `property' of one being or entity nor are they beholden to one 
vehicle of revelation - Scripture, Pope, Bishop or Council - but they belong to the whole 
church 115 and, importantly, only in dialogue and confrontation with the world. 116 This 
diversity, inherent in the `mediation of collective life', presupposes two reference points. 
First, the fact that although the divine authorisation of difference in tradition means that the 
`plural is the manifestation of the Christian meaning', 117 this plurality assumes (rather than 
conswnes) the event to which it always proceeds. 118 Second, the (re)reading and (re)writing 
of tradition - dogma, doctrine and articles of faith - demands action. 
111 By "radical" I do not understand "foundational" but rather "racinated", rooted in a dense and 
inextricable system of roots, of factical pregiveness, which antedates me and my attempts to disentangle 
it. ' John D. Caputo, Against Ethics, 254, n. 14. Cf also Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology trans. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Boston: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 101-102. 
112 Michel de Certeau, 'How is Christianity Thinkable Today? ', The Postmodern God: A Theological 
Reader (ed. ) Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 142. 
13 Ibid., 144. 
114 Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, 269. 
Cf Gerard Loughlin, 'The Basis and Authority of Doctrine' The Cambridge Companion lo 
Christian Doctrine (ed. ) Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 41-64. 
116 Frederick Christian Bauerschmitt points out that Certeau `speaks of a "double confrontation" of the 
Church with its contemporaries and its tradition. ' 'The Abrahamic Voyage: Michel de Certeau and 
Theology' AýMoxdern 77ýeologty 12: 1 (1996), 24. 
117 Michel de Certeau, `How is Christianity Thinkable Today? ', 144. 
18 Christianity 'is not permitted to reduce everything to one element. ' Ibid., 149 
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`The Christian movement is always a recognizing of a particular situation and 
the necessity of a new step forward. There is always a necessary risk in being 
different. It requires simultaneously a place and a "further", a "now" and an 
"afterwards", a "here" and an "elsewhere". ' 119 
Consequently, the restlessness that characterises the practice of tradition, of being different, 
embodies a cultural iconoclasm. It is this practice, which, as Blondel contends, is confided to 
the practical obedience of love', 120 that responds - inexhaustibly - to the Christ event and 
confronts (with an `unfinishedness') that violence and destruction characteristic of much of 
human existence and which Girard so adequately portrays. The hope that constitutes the 
Christian tradition is one that must be alive to the enactment of the intrinsic relation to its 
raison d 'etre with the creation and recreation of practices that `confront' or disrupt both 
violence and the "soft" totalitarianism of the contemporary world. 
121 But this action that 
constitutes tradition is not a one-way street. As Certeau realised, `praxis always brings about, 
in relation to what is present and pointed out, gradual or abrupt displacements which will 
make possible other laws or other theologies. ' 
122 It is this difficult expedition, rather than a 
revelation that is certain to bring about an assured resolution, that is the disposition of a 
tradition made up of the stuttering history of a multiform community. Indeed, the history of 
Christianity shows that its nature cannot be univocally apprehended and that the status and 
standing of institutional forms has always suggested that `what has been is no longer what has 
to be. ' 123 The reading and writing of the Christian story, exegesis upon exegesis, highlights 
not only the fact that this story is the `antitype of all types' 
124 but that 'Christianity is not a 
119 Ibid., 151. 
1 20 Maurice Blonde], The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, 274. 
` The term "soft" totalitarianism is that of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, `The 
`Retreat' of the Political', Retreating the Political, 128. They are responding to Lyotard's discussion of 
the 'terror' of the `social system' in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington & Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 63-64. 
122 Michel de Certeau, `How is Christianity Thinkable Today? ', 152. One could point to the impact of, 
for example, feminist and liberationist movements on the ongoing (re)constitution of Christian tradition 
What this notion of tradition implies, however, is that the Church learns to converse rather than always 
to `speak'. I am indebted to Paul Murray for making this point. 
t`- Gerard Loughlin, Telling God. Story: Bible, Church and . VarraIiv Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 217. 
124 Ibid., 97. 
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body of doctrine that can be specified in advance, but a way of life and all that this 
implies. '125 That is why the stage upon which ecclesial life is enacted can never be disengaged 
from the gospels but neither is this context, as one might say is evident Fa ith Girard's notion of 
revelation, a fixed and static entity. 
The point of this discussion of tradition and its place and role in attending to the 
demands of the gospels was intended to highlight something of a weakness in Girard's 
understanding of revelation. Girard provides, on the one hand, a theory of subjectivity that is 
wholly intelligible in the context of day-to-day life, its hopes, difficulties and struggles. Yet, 
on the other hand, his emphasis on revelation alone as the route to the peaceable kingdom 
seems both myopic and superficial, if not barren. Of course there is much within tradition - 
dogmatism rather than attentiveness, selfish rather than faithful readings - that requires 
criticism and discrediting. Nevertheless, it is my contention that the Christian tradition, due to 
its vitality, cannot simply be dismissed nor ignored, particularly in relation to anthropology 
where it is particularly rich. Girard's hypothesis requires at this point to be brought into 
conversation with examples of that tradition in which the human/divine relationship is 
celebrated and interrogated. This I will attempt in due course. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to critically evaluate those elements of the Girardian 
hypothesis that have a direct impact on issues surrounding theological anthropology. I have 
shown how the charge that Girard's notion of the self is intrinsically linked to violence, 
particularly of an Hegelian character, is ultimately false. While it is obvious that there is a 
family resemblance between Kojeve's desiring self and the interdividual self of the Girardian 
125 Andrew Louth, Discerning, the . 11ýsteý_i :. (ýr F, ssav on the Nature of iheolok, (Oxford: 
Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 86. 
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hypothesis, there are also radical and fundamental differences between the two conceptions of 
subjectivity. This is due in the main to a lack of attention on the part of critics to the triangular 
configuration of desire, the equivocal status of desire in his thought and a blindness to the fact 
that subjectivity is only `true' in relation to transcendence. I have also demonstrated that 
Girard delineates a subject who is essentially engaged, dependent and uncertain but that the 
exigencies of such a paradigm of existence do not result in the loss of agency. Rather I 
suggested, with reference to Judith Butler, that it is only in the context of a decentred self that 
agency makes any real sense. It is the very excessiveness of the subject that engenders 
subjectivity and, in Girard's terms, this exceeding is fuelled by desire. Third, and on a more 
critical note, I registered a sense of dissatisfaction with Girard's emphasis on the efficacy of 
revelation, divorced it seems to me from the kinds of concrete situations that are only too 
evident in his anthropological reflections. Finally, I suggested that Girard's religious thought 
is silent on the important issue of tradition and its place and role in living the ongoing 
demands of the gospels. 
It is clear that while Girard's notion of the interdividual subject is far from perfect for 
the demands of a theological anthropology, it offers resources for the latter that the two 
strategies we encountered in Part One of this study do not. Neither the resituation or 
reconstitution of the subject provide sufficient means for the ethical, political and existential 
needs of subjects within socio-political contexts where fragmentation is omnipresent. The 
attention to interdividuality, the self as active, the primacy of mimetic desire and the 
existential conditions of a late-capitalist society suggest that, for all its faults, the Girardian 
hypothesis may enrich theological anthropology and vice-versa.. This rapprochement is the 
task of any next chapter. 
193 
Part Three 
Chapter Six: 
Towards a Theological Anthropology 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I critically assessed those parts of Girard's hypothesis that are 
central to an exploration of theological anthropology. There I made, broadly speaking, two 
conclusions. In his work Girard opens up significant possibilities for a renewed understanding 
of the (uncertain) human subject; the self is constituted and sustained in a social, historical and 
linguistic context of desire-led interaction. However, I also concluded that while his 
anthropology may well be illuminating and challenging, much of Girard's `theological' 
undertaking is simplistic and consequently insubstantial for the demands of a theological 
exploration. Girard's hypothesis requires theoretical enrichment. This, I suggested, could 
only happen satisfactorily if the Girardian hypothesis is brought into conversation with the 
theological tradition. The reason, and my approach in attempting this task, is very simple. In 
Girard's terms the gospels provide an unparalleled disclosure of the reality and form of human 
violence. Yet this notion of revelation is static: it is as if the way to the peaceable kingdom is 
characterised by an experience of sudden discovery rather than a journey characterised by 
uncertainty and temporality. In contradistinction to the austerity of Girard's method, in this 
chapter I wish to explore theological anthropology in a manner that is constantly attentive to 
the exigencies of desire - even with regard to divine desire. Rowan Williams provides a fine 
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summary of this approach when he suggests that Christian language can be understood as one 
that 
in working through concepts like penitence, conversion and hope, in its 
commitment to the freedom of God and God's grace to draw historical 
realities into a future as yet undetermined, ... resists the notion that the 
understanding of faith can be only a moment of interpretative perception with 
its own synchronic integrity and completeness, as opposed to a process with 
strong elements of risk and provisionality. I 
I will take up the challenge of delineating a theological anthropology that embraces the `risk 
and provisionality' of which Williams speaks in relation to Christian language and I will argue 
that this is also an inescapable dimension of Christian `existence' more generally. The 
appropriate terms under which this exploration will occur are `engagement' and 
`performance'. I choose these terms because Girard's anthropology reminds us of the situated 
and viceral components of subjectivity. Furthermore, both terms concur with a variety of 
`dramatic' readings of the gospels in which `we are invited to identify ourselves in the story 
being contemplated, to reappropriate who we are now, and who we shall or can be, in terms of 
the story. '2 Williams could well be describing a process of imaginative reading distinctively 
Ignatian in character - part of what constitutes a spirituality as a way of life, a process, I will 
argue, that is particularly pertinent to this interrogation of theological anthropology after 
Girard. Prior to an engagement with the Ignatian exercises, however, I want to explore the 
particularity of the Christian formation of the uncertain subject and his or her performance of 
the Christian `drama' in relation to the question that informs any theological anthropology- 
what does it mean to be a human being in relation to God? I will respond to this question via 
three narrations of the uncertainty of subjectivity : first, that of the early Martin Heidegger; 
second, the highly distinctive work of Emmanuel Levinas; and, finally, Maurice Blondel's 
phenomenological exploration of action. This will inform and engender a theological 
reflection on the hwnan/divine relationship that will establish the vitality of the Christian 
I Rowan Williams, The Literal Sense of Scripture' Modern Theology 7: 2 (1991), 125. 
2 Ibid. 
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tradition before I return to Girard and the possibility of constructing a theological 
anthropology stimulated by these three narrations of subjectivity. 
As a means to the application of an entirely Christian theological perspective to the 
analysis of subjectivity considered thus far, I will first interrogate a particularly apposite study 
of the performative self carried out by Martin Heidegger in 1920-21. Heidegger's early 
lecture course on Augustine and Neoplatonism will assist in the fulfilling aims of this chapter, 
to move towards a constructive theological anthropology, because his reflections prompt and 
inform the delineation of a particularly Christian understanding of the frame in which an 
anthropology can be situated and sketched. 
6.1: Heidegger, Augustine and Neoplatonism 
The early Heidegger's interest in Christian theology is well documented, 3 as is his 
claim (made in 1921) that he identified himself as a Christian theologian. 4 Heidegger's 
engagement with the Christian tradition was substantial and provided a way, a path as he saw 
it, to his magnum opus Being and Time which was first published in 1927. Indeed, many of 
the central themes and ideas presented in that work emerged during Heidegger's lectures and 
seminars of the 1920's in which he attempted a retrieval of what he termed `primordial 
Christianity'. 5 Here, I want to examine one instance of Heidegger's attempted recovery of 
authentic Christian experience that he outlined in his 1921 lecture course on Augustine and 
3 Cf. John D. Caputo, `Heidegger and Theology', The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (ed. ) 
Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 270-288. 
4 Heidegger's claim was made to Karl Löwith. See the latter's `The Political Implications of 
Heidegger's Existentialism' New German Critique 45 (1988), 121-122. Löwith actually remembers 
Heidegger as counting `himself among the ranks of the "theological Christians'"(121). 
Cf. John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden hiurg (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 157-202, Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger 's Being and lime 
(Berkeley: University of California Press. 1993), 149-219. 
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Neoplatonism. 6 In this course, as throughout this stage of Heidegger's development, the work 
of recovery was attempted through a study of `factical life experience'. This experience can 
be defined, according to Thomas Sheehan, as 
a pre-theoretical, pre-rational lived experience of "self-exceeding", of being 
drawn out beyond one's ordinary self-understanding.? 
It was Heidegger's contention that primordial Christianity provided a model for factical life 
experience and that his task, which led him in particular to an investigation of the Pauline 
letters, was one of `explication. '8 However, this task had been complicated by the fact that the 
Christian tradition had lost much of the purity of this primordial life experience in its 
appropriation of metaphysical conceptualisation. A specific example of this problem, 
considered by Heidegger in his 1921 course, was Augustine's use of Neoplatonic thought. In 
his exploration of Book X of the Confessions, Heidegger had, he believed, to do more than 
mere explication: the task of recovering factical life experience demanded a `destruction' of 
the impurity of a Christianity overlaid with Neoplatonism in order that the experience of 
authentic Christian life itself might be grasped. 
The thrust of Heidegger's recovery of this authentic Christianity was adequately 
summarised in his 1922 essay on Aristotle when he remarked that `Christian theology, the 
philosophical "speculation" standing under its influence, and the anthropology that always also 
develops in such contexts all speak in borrowed categories that are foreign to their own field 
6 Martin Heidegger, Augrustinnus und der Neoplatonismus, (Gesamtausgabe II. Band 60, 
Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (Frankfurt, a. M.: Klostermann, 1995), 157-299. 
7 Thomas Sheehan, 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the Phenomenology", 1920-21' The Personalist 60 
(1979), 315. 
K Cf. Otto Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger 's Path of Thinking trans. Daniel Magurshak & Sigmund Barber 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1987), 26. For Heidegger's investigation of Galatians and 
Thessalonians, cf. Martin Heidegger, Einleitung in die Phcnromeno/ogie tier Religion, Gesamtausgabe 
11, Band 60, Phänomenologie de., ý religiösen Lebens (Frankfurt, a. M.: Klostermann, 1995), 67-125. 
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of heing. '9 What Heidegger attempted during this period, hou ever, was to uncover not only 
the correct categories (factical life experience, concern [Bekümmerung], etc. ) but the 
comportment appropriate to authentic Christian existence. These two aims can be perceived 
as major elements in Heidegger's engagement with Augustine's Confessions. 
Heidegger's explication and destruction of Augustine's thought in Book N of the 
Confessions is rather complicated and at times rambling. Therefore, I will simply outline the 
main points of this lecture course in a straight-forward manner that risks over-schematization. 
I will do this by first presenting Heidegger's explication, that is, what he considers to be 
adequate in Augustine's exposition of the Christian life and, second, by turning to his 
criticisms, his destruction, of Augustine's Neoplatonic borrowings. 
The course, Augustine and Neoplatonism, began by describing and rejecting three turn 
of the century studies that examined 'Augustine's relation to history and the philosophy of 
history'; 10 these works being those of Troeltsch, Harnack and Dilthey. In place of these 
attempts to apply historical science to a particular object, "Augustine's life and his works", 
Heidegger's intention was to apply a `phenomenological interpretation of Augustine' that 
sought to `understand him and not to classify him historically. ' II 
In his application of this method to Book X of the Confessions, Heidegger showed 
that Augustine's point of departure was factical life experience. In response to the questions, 
`What does it mean to seek God? ' and On what basis do I decide, when I have found God, 
9 Martin Heidegger, `Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle (Indication of the 
Hermeneutical Situation)', trans. Michael Baur Man and World 25 (1992), 386. 
10 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger '. s Being and line, 192, cf. Martin Heidegger, Augustinus 
rund der Neoplatonismus, 160-166. 
11 Ibid., 195, cf. Martin Heidegger. .4 ugusiinus und 
der Neoplalonismiv 
, 
175ff. 
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that He is truly what I have sought? ', Augustine's answer is unequivocal: When I look for 
you, who are my God, I am looking for a life of blessed happiness. I shall look for you, so 
that my soul may live. ' "2 In attending to this happy life, Heidegger suggests, Augustine 
understands it in terms of hon,, one can come to it rather than what its content might be. 
Consequently, as Theodore Kisiel suggests, 
If the happy life is thus a how of experiencing, then it can never be found 
even if I were to scour the whole world. It is not an object (Objekt) and 
cannot be appropriated from others. The having of a happy life, its 
actualization, is formally always an "own", so that the individual who 
experiences it is always actively involved in it. 13 
The happy life is, in Augustine's terms, understood as performance rather than content. It can 
only be known, grasped, in terms of, or rather in the actualization of, factical life experience. 14 
The radically performative nature of this happy life exposed by Heidegger is deemed 
by him to be an authoritative delineation of the authentic factical life experience of primordial 
Christianity. However, Augustine's manner of conceptualisation is not always oriented to this 
mode of life experience. Heidegger points to the appropriation of a Neoplatonic form of 
speculation by Augustine in which `being good and being beautiful belong to Being' and in 
which the good and the beautiful can be 'enjoyed'. 15 In the fruitio Dei, `God is enjoyed as the 
summum honum [highest good] and he alone may be enjoyed. ' 16 Here a Neoplatonic 
distinction is at play between that which is to be `used' (uti) and that which is to be `enjoyed' 
(frui). Theodore Kisiel, following a transcript of Heidegger's lecture course, summarises this 
important distinction in the phenomenological analysis of Augustine's philosophical theology: 
12 Saint Augustine, ('onfe. ssions trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), Book X. ch. 
20,226. 
13 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesi., (? f Heidegger,,; Being and lime, 199; cf. Martin Heidegger, a1 ugustinus 
raid tier Neoplatonismus, 192-193. 
14 Cf. Otto Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger 's Path (? f Thinking, 26. 
15 Cf Ibid., 27 
16 Ibid. 
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The object ofJrui is always enjoyed for its own sake, without reference to 
anything else, whereas the object of uti is sought for the sake of something 
else, as a means to some other end. The eternal unchangeable things are to be 
enjoyed, the temporal changeable things are to be used as a means to that end. 
It is a perversion to enjoy money and to make use of God. One should not 
worship God for the sake of money, which is the height of hypocrisy, but 
should spend money for the sake of God, the highest and unchangeable good, 
"Beauty of old, yet ever so new". 17 
This application of fruitio Dei by Augustine is perceived by Heidegger to be in direct contrast 
to, indeed, incommensurable with, the earlier emphasis upon Christian existence as factical 
life experience. Heidegger indicates that the frui, in its proper correlation with Beauty. 
`incorporates a basic aesthetic moment in its sense of summum bonum'. 18 The beautiful, in 
the context of Neoplatonic metaphysics, belongs to the essence of Being. The fact that the 
contemplation of the beautiful, of the summum bonuni, takes one outside of the `troubles', 
concern and cares (curare) of life to the rarefied heights of ontological security reveals that 
this reposeful quietude, Neoplatonic in its character, stands at odds with the factical life 
experience of the Christian life. It is also, interestingly, at odds with the very confessional 
technique utilised by Augustine: `This confessional character of the search for God is in fact 
the key to the focus on actualizing the experience of God rather than observing Him 
aesthetically in terms of objective content. ' 19 The serene comportment typical of aesthetic 
contemplation is considered invalid in relation to Christian factical life experience. The 
reason for this judgement is all too apparent to Heidegger. As John van Buren remarks: 
17 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heideggers Being and Time, 201. The quotation is from chapter 
27 of Book X of the ('o, ifessions. For Augustine's analysis of the distinction between uti and frei, `use' 
and `enjoyment', cf. Saint Augustine On Christian Teaching (De Doctrina Christiana) trans. R. P. H. 
Green (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1997), Book I, chs. 22-35,16-27. The Gesamtausgabe 
version of Heidegger's lectures differs in structure from the student transcripts that Kisiel used in his 
work. Heidegger's exploration of uti and firui can be found in Martin Heidegger, Auugustinus gd der 
Neop/atonismns, 271-27 3 while his fullest discussion of Christian factical life is. 4ugustinu. s und der 
Neop/alonismus, 205-210. 
18 Theodore Kisiel, J'he Genesis of Heideggers Being and Time, 202. 
19 Ibid., 207. 
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Intoxicated, asleep and darkened by these contemplative and speculative 
visions, the self falls away from itself into the world and closes off the 
historical situation of its relation with God. 20 
Consequently the Neoplatonic tradition that manifests itself in Augustine's work - as a 
metaphysical `overlay' that is responsible for the alienation of the subject of factical life from 
God - is uncovered by Heidegger and subjected to a conceptual destruction that he pursues 
with considerable energy. 
6.1.1: Heidegger and Religious Life 
The destruction of Augustine's employment of Neoplatonic conceptual i sati on brings 
to the fore not only the demand to reassess the relationship between Athens and Jerusalem but, 
more importantly, significant questions concerning what constitutes an authentic Christian 
existence. Heidegger's entry into the phenomenology of religion and his subsequent 
reflections on human existence which culminated in Being and Time were greeted with 
tremendous excitement, particularly by theologians. Nevertheless, some seventy-five years 
on, we have to ask what it is in Heidegger's project that provides theological reflection with 
the resources for a renewed understanding of a Christian life. There are three points at which 
Heidegger encourages the radical delimitation of a theological anthropology, a process that not 
only circumscribes the appropriate structures of human experience but also generates the 
additional effect of intensifying the quest for appropriate `grounds', if that remains an 
appropriate term, upon which subjectivity in a wider context can be made intelligible. 21 
2(' John van Buren, 'Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther' Reading Heidegger from the Start: F,. s. say. s in Hi. s 
Earliest Thought (eds) Theodore Kisiel & John van Buren (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 165 
21 As will become clear, I am indebted in this section to Fergus Kerr's essay, 'Getting the Subject back 
into the World: Heidegger's Version' Human Beings (ed. ) D. Cockburn Royal Institute of Philosophº- 
Supplements: 29 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 173-190. 
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First, Heidegger insists that the proper site for understanding the hu nan/div-ine 
relationship in its authentic, primal, indeed biblical, form is in the midst of the world, rather 
than through the attainment of contemplative or epistemological certainty. As Fergus Kerr 
remarks, with reference to Heidegger's seminal work, Being and Time, 
To insist on affectivity, involvement and finitude - on human beings as in (or 
out of) tune with their situation, inescapably concerned (even if seeking to 
take flight), and living under the shadow of death - is to shake off the myth of 
the self as a purely rational, disengaged and timeless entity. The notion of the 
`transcendental ego' collapses under pressure from the New Testament. 22 
There is nothing static or secure about a subject of concern, fear, resolve and `facticity'. 
Heidegger's revisioning of theological anthropology is one in which the exigencies of 
everyday life constitute the territory of authentic existence - neither a withdrawal from the 
ordinary nor a simplistic transcendence of it are considered commendable or possible. 
Second, Heidegger's insistence in Augustine and Neoplatonism on the historical and 
cosmic form of human `existence', particularly in relation to the Incarnation, Crucifixion and 
Resurrection, should make it apparent that the concept of human being arises within, and as a 
response to, the `inescapable limits''3 of existence that one is required to negotiate. Yet this 
`inheritance' of finitude may, as Kerr suggests, `free us, as well as restrict our possibilities. ' 24 
Agency, as with Girard and Butler, is not mastery of or over limitation, but the very bequest of 
the human condition, as a gift that engenders action. 
Third, there is the term `factical life', an appellation whose determination is amply 
demonstrated in Heidegger's emphasis on the performance and engagement of the human in 
22 Ibid., 181. 
23 Ibid., 188. 
24 Ibid. 
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relation to the divine. Even sin is understood in Heidegger's anale sis of Book X of the 
Confessions as thoroughly performative: `He who flees from God loses Him. '-'S The 
influence of Luther's inversion of Aristotle - Luther praised the practical writings of Aristotle 
and condemned the Metaphysics - and of Kierkegaard's passionate reappraisal of Christian 
existence are both apparent in Heidegger's analysis of Christian facticity. 26 Yet it is the return 
to the New Testament that is most fully imprinted on the early work of this Christian 
Heidegger in his contention that the Christian life, characterised by finitude as much as the 
quest for infinity, is `terrifying as well as fascinating. '"7 
However, there are two characteristics of Heidegger's portrait of authentic existence 
that, after Girard, require challenging. The first difficulty with Heidegger's project is that it 
consisted in a search for 'a universal ontological framework that was neither Greek nor 
Christian. '28 The consequence of Heidegger's unapologetic universalism is that he actually 
forgets (or ignores) the distinctive nature of biblical demands. On the one hand, as John 
Caputo points out, `the young philosopher was very much taken with Kierkegaard's sense that 
Christianity has not been brought into the world to comfort us in our old age and allow us to 
sleep at night. '29 Yet this same Heidegger believed, on the other hand, that his `destruction' of 
Christianity's metaphysical heritage was homologous with his `destruction' of Aristotle which, 
after Luther, inverted the superiority of the Metaphysics over the Ethics. Caputo suggests that 
the conflation of the Christian and Aristotelian modes of factical life is fatally flawed: 
[Heidegger] seemed not to notice, or not to consider relevant, that in 
comparison to the Aristotelian ethics in particular, the biblical narratives are 
not at all oriented to the phronimos, the prudent man (sic), the well-educated, 
25 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger'. s Being and Time, 207. 
2(' Cf John van Buren, 'Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther', 166-172. 
27 Theodore Kisiel, 'Heidegger (1920-21) on Becoming a Christian: A Conceptual Picture Show' 
Keading Heidegger from the Start, 185. Cf. Heidegger's comments on 1 Thess. 1: 6, Martin Heidegger, 
Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion, 94. 
2"' John D. Caputo, 'Sorge and Kardia: The Hermeneutics of Factical Life and the Categories of the 
Heart', Reading Heidegger_from the Start, 329. 
2') Ibid.. 328. 
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moderate man of judgement, the aristocratic gentleman whom the younger 
aristocratic set should learn to emulate. Indeed, it was of just these well-to- 
do, respectable gentlemen that the biblical experience of life was most 
suspicious. Instead of this mainstream prudent man, the biblical attention is 
directed to everyone who has been marginalized by the mainstream, to 
everyone who is out of power, out of money, out of luck, uneducated and 
despised. Instead of the uprightness of the man of good judgement, the 
biblical narratives turn to those who are bent and laid low. 30 
After Girard one can suggest that Heidegger has forgotten the character whose life is staged in 
the midst of the biblical narratives - the victim. 31 The Christian conception of factical life - of 
existence with God - holds a particularly special place for the outcast and that is one way in 
which the biblical narratives undermine pretensions to a form of truth that is divorced from 
finitude and immersion in facticity. In his Girard-informed consideration of the place of the 
victim, Andrew McKenna proposes that 
Truth is not before us, in the future, lying yet to be measured or mastered; it is 
not above us, in the empyrean, awaiting revelation, illumination or 
postsurvival representation; it is not behind us, either, in our past, awaiting 
Platonic recollection. Truth is not transcendental; if anything, it is 
transdescendental, for it lies beneath us, underfoot, in the victim. 32 
Christian factical life experience is rendered distinctive because of the place of the victim, the 
outcast with whom Jesus consorted. `The biblical stories' as Caputo reminds us, `proceed 
from a different conception of factical life, one that was enamoured neither with rules, as in 
modernity, because they favoured a kind of radical mercifulness over rule-keeping, nor with 
excellence (arete), because their heart was with the outcast, with the worst not the best. '33 
One could suggest, however, that the biblical narratives do not destroy `rules' but establish a 
new rule - not to simply look beneath us but to descend to the very place that `truth' resides all 
too painfully. 
? °' Ibid., 329. 
31 Indeed, Caputo himself uses this very term. Ibid., 330. 
32 Andrew McKenna, `Postmodernism: Its Future Perfect' Postmodernism anal ('ontineftial Philo. sophly 
(eds) Hugh J. Silverman & Donn Welton (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), 238. 
33 John D. Caputo, '. borge and Kardia', 33 1-3 32. 
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The second challenge to Heidegger's analysis of Christian factical life is just as 
serious. Intoxicated by the heady waters of Luther's Heidelberg Disputation-` and the 
achievements of the Rhineland mystics, Heidegger presented throughout this period of his 
work a subject of factical life experience whose relationship to the divine is radically `owned' 
rather than shared. 35 Of course, Heidegger was himself reacting against a sovereign subject of 
Husserlian phenomenology for whom consciousness was everything and the cares and troubles 
of existence were but petty distractions. Heidegger therefore presents a more grounded self 
than his predecessors: 
The subject [Heidegger's subject]is neither free nor absolute, he is no longer 
entirely responsible for himself He is dominated and overwhelmed by 
history, by his origins over which he has no power since he is thrown into the 
world and his thrown-ness [dereliction] marks all his projects and all his 
powers. 36 
These appreciative words are those of Emmanuel Levinas, one of Heidegger's most prominent 
expositors and critics. Although, as this quotation makes clear, he acknowledges the advances 
made by Heidegger, Levinas is also deeply suspicious of the subject of factical life experience 
who is, by the time of Being and Time, to have become Dasein. Heidegger's weakness, 
according to Levinas, lies in the fact that the subject, whose existence we saw being mapped 
out in Augustine and Neoplatonism, is always solitary and has no need of, nor desire for, the 
possibilities that come with the encounter with another. Indeed, that which comes from 
outside this subject is always experienced as the property of that subject. As Levinas puts it, 
'What comes from the outside - illuminated - is comprehended, that is, comes from ourselves. 
34 Cf Martin Heidegger, Augustunis und der Neoplatonismus, 282, Martin Luther, Heidelberg 
Dispu/atioti, 1518 trans. Harold J. Grimm Luther's Works: Volume 31 Career of the Reformer: I (ed. ) 
H. J. Grimm (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1957), 39-70. 
35 Cf Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heideggers Being and Time, 199. This `experience' is 'formally 
always an "own". ' 
36 E. Levinas, 1L; ii decouiranl l 'existence arec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: 'rin, 1974), 49. 
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Light makes objects into a world, that is, makes them belong to us. '37 The ultimate failure of 
Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of existence, according to Levinas, is its inability 
to envisage an encounter with the Other which does not entail a return to the Same, the self. 
Authentic existence in its Heideggerian guise does not include - at least as a central and 
necessary component - the encounter with otherness. Authenticity is, then, determined by its 
solitary nature and alterity (das Man) inhibits efforts to establish an ethical or receptive mode 
of existence. 38 As a counterpoint to the `owned', somewhat isolated character of Christian 
existence, the exploration of the Girardian hypothesis undertaken earlier in this study suggests 
that it is only in relation to, indeed because of, an otherness that mediates desire and identity 
that peace (or violence) is actualised. 
In summary then, this analysis of Heidegger's understanding of Christian existence 
indicates two important issues that need to be acknowledged if the pursuit of a reappraisal of 
theological anthropology is to be realised. The first point reminds us that the performance - 
the actualisation - of Christian existence is a difficult process, enacted as it is within a worldly, 
historical environment. Neither the scriptures nor the Christian tradition provide a perfect 
model, script or blueprint which ensures that every gesture and movement is exactly befitting 
of the context. Rather a Christian's life is full of negotiation informed, to be sure, by both 
scripture and tradition but there is inherent in both, as my interrogation of tradition in the last 
chapter exhibited, a sense of plurality and undecideability both in terms of delimiting 
appropriate forms of engagement and developing the genres in which the Christian life is 
made intelligible. This is due, not least, to the fact that, as R. R. Reno remarks, the `Christian 
ideal of transcendence resists the purity (and finality) of the solution. '39 It is within the 
framework of the very perplexing and arduous nature of this life, in stepping into its midst 
37 E. Levinas, / iristence and Existents trans. A. Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 
48. 
38 Cf. Brian Schroeder, Altared (. round: LE'º'inas, History, and Violence (London: Routledge, 1996), 
98. 
39 R. R. Reno, The ordinary Transformed: Karl Rahirer and the ('IIrisliaJ1 I l. ti oti of Tral1. vc-endence 
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1995), 69. 
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rather than responding in quietude or withdrawal, that grace is experienced. That is the great 
theological challenge: subjectivity is made to shudder - indeed, is de-centred - in a landscape 
where ultimate destiny is validated within finitude. 40 
The second issue that requires affirmation is that alterity is intrinsic to any 
performance of the Christian life. This point can be made even more forcibly when the 
requirements of Girard's hypothesis are borne in mind. As my criticisms of Heidegger 
exhibit, it is the other who is outcast and victim who constitutes the privileged site of alterity 
for the realisation of biblical demands. Consequently, the relationality envisaged as intimately 
part of an analysis of subjectivity is, one might say, full of dramatic licence rather than 
characterised by an uncluttered (ideal) speech situation where the trouble and concerns of 
human existence are transcended (rather than struggled with) in a disengaged exemplary 
situation. 41 
In order to construct an alternative vision of subjectivity, one that not only takes into 
account but commences from the premise that alterity is prior to any individual form of 
security - ontological, epistemological or otherwise - Levinas's work requires at least to be 
visited in passing. It is possible that the distinctive emphasis in Levinas on the primacy of the 
other, born in part from his engagement and subsequent dissatisfaction with Heidegger, may 
provide a key to a theological anthropology in which alterity serves as the point of departure. 
40 This does not mean, of course, that this ultimate destiny is limited to finitude. For an insightful 
exploration of the `shuddering' of subjectivity, cf. Walter Benjamin, `The Metaphysics of Youth' 
Selected 4ritingc: Volume 1: 1913-1926 (eds) M. Bullock & M. W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA Belknap 
Press, 1996), 13-24. 
41 As I think is exemplified by Alasdair I. McFadyen among others. Cf The Call to Personhootl:. 4 
('hristian Theory of the Individual in Social Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
Cf Chapter T\,, o above. 
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6.2: Levinas and,. 1lreritl 
On encountering the work of Emmanuel Levinas one realises that his is a `great 
prophetic voice'. `- His undermining of the sovereign autonomous self 'clears a space for a 
rethinking of ethical selfhood'. 43 In attempting to show that the ethical relation to the other is 
ultimately prior to the ontological relation to oneself, Levinas exposes the violence of the 
obsession with transcendental reflection and of a subject that, in its 'for-itself. marginalises 
and expels otherness. Replying to this violence, `Levinas's account of the face-to-face 
involves the notion of the self as disjunction of identity rather than the constitution of a 
unity. '`' The contrast between the self of ontological certainty and the subject of the ethical 
relation is heightened when one considers the manifold use of metaphors of touch in Levinas's 
delineation of the face-to-face relation. 45 It is this corporeal enactment of the ethical relation 
that is beautifully captured in Edmond Jabes' `dialogue' with Levinas's work: 
A face asleep, a face waking, some trace of dark or light. 
To step on a trace means stepping on a face. 
We should on these paths, walk on our mouths, advance on our lips to kiss the 
trace. Love rules the road. 46 
In the context of the prophetic demands of the Levinasian text, I would like to 
consider the place of desire in relation to the other, a desire marked not by the mastery of the 
42 The characterisation of Levinas as a prophet is John Caputo's. See his Against Ethic.,. ('ontrihution. s 
to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconsiniction (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1993), 80. 
43 S. Critchley, 1 he Elirics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 148. 
Cf. also E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1981), 128. 
44 Noreen O'Connor, `The Personal is Political: Discursive Practice of the Face-to-Face' The 
Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other (eds) R. Bernasconi & D. Wood (London: Routledge. 
1988), 64. 
4' Cf especially, E. Leývvinas, Totalirr and Infinity: , -fn Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 197-201. 
46 Edmond Jabes, The Book of Aiargins trans. R. Waldrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), 161. 
-, U9 
ego but desire in the face of the other. In his 1963 paper, `The Trace of the Other'. 47 Le\ inas 
contrasts the self of the western ontological tradition with a very different 'subject of desire': 
to a subject that is thus defined by concern for himself and who in happiness 
fulfils his `for himself - we oppose the desire for the other which proceeds 
from a being already replenished to overflowing and independent, and ýN ho 
does not desire for himself. Desire is the need of him who has no more 
needs. We can recognize it in the desire for an other who is another [aulrui], 
neither my enemy ... nor my complement .... 
The desire for another is born in 
a being that lacks nothing, or, more exactly, it comes to birth on the other side 
48 of all that can be lacking him or can satisfy him. 
Compelling rather than comforting, Levinas's portrayal of desire takes one beyond the 
confines of need and satisfaction to a space dedicated wholly to the other. No return to the 
same here, but an unqualified offering in the midst of desire. But who is this 'subject of 
desire'? Edith Wyschogrod's gloss of this text may help our investigation, for she states that 
The relation with the other does not make us happy; it puts the self into 
question, empties the self of itself. It calls upon all the resources of the self 
which we have no right to withhold from others. The desideratum does not 
fulfil an appetite but calls forth our generosity. 49 
It is now that we can pinpoint our desiring subject for he gives himself even to the point of 
extinction. 50 Indeed, so committed is he to the other that he risks both his motivation being 
misunderstood and his very physical existence. His desire is so great, so insatiable (and his 
need so paltry) that if destruction is the outcome of his absolute commitment to the other then 
47 E. Levinas, `The Trace of the Other' trans. A. Lingis Deconstruction in (, ontext: Literature and 
Philosophy (ed) Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 345-359. In 
conversation, Robert Eaglestone has suggested to me that this essay can be understood as an essential 
link between 1 otalitly and Infinity, and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Cf Robert 
Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism: Reading After Levinas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997). 
tx E. Levinas, 'The Trace of the Other', 350. 
4" E. Wyschogrod, Emmairuel LL'vinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1974), 933 
% That Levinas's 'subject of desire' is thoroughly male is well argued by Pamela Sue Anderson in her 
unpublished paper, 'Tracing Sexual Difference: Beyond the Aporia of the Other'. I am grateful to Dr 
Anderson for a copy of this paper. 
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so be it. His name? - T800 or John Kruger. Yet these are just two of his many pseudonyms. 
He is more commonly known as Arnold Schwarzeneggar but even this is simply a cipher for a 
humanity that is inhuman in terms of the extent to which it will go in ensuring the priorit\ and 
protection of the other. 51 
This is, of course, a caricature and it is obvious that the `technological ly-ass isted 
efficacy in conflict and killing' - `the mechanical terror'52 - associated with Schwarzeneggar is 
wholly otherwise than the `subject of desire' delineated by Levinas. Nevertheless, the super- 
heroic dedication of these characters of Schwarzeneggar's is the outcome of an insatiable 
desire for the (always downtrodden and vulnerable) other. Moreover, this desire is, to borrow 
Wyschogrod's description of Levinasian desire, `experienced by a completely independent 
being who is already fulfilled. '53 Nothing, and nobody, can change Schwarzeneggar's course 
in his service of the other, for his responsibility to the other is infinite and he, in his desire, is a 
hostage in the face of their otherness. 54 
The reason for this caricature is quite simple. Levinas, as I have already pointed out, 
is a prophet and, as John Caputo suggests, `one is always in-adequate to the sayings of the 
prophet. '55 Indeed, how can one respond to Levinas's `absolutely impossible Abrahamic 
demands'? 56 For to present, outline or practice an ethics in the face of the ethical relation, of 
51 For these remarks on Schwarzeneggar I am indebted to Greta Gleeson. T800 is the name of 
Schwarzeneggar's character in Terminator 2: Judment Day, he is John Kruger in Eraser. For a very 
useful guide to the messianic overtones in the Terminator films, cf. Sean French, The Terminator 
(London: British Film Institute, 1996), 49ff. 
'2 These terms were used by Richard Roberts in his unpublished paper, 'Like Glist'ring Phaethon: Male 
Self-Identity in an Era of Diminishing Expectations' presented to The Centre of the History of the 
Human Sciences, University of Durham, 5 February, 1996. 
5; E. Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Lerl, ras: The Problem of Ethical Aletaphy. sics, 93. 
_54 John Hoberman vividly sketches both sides of the Schwarzenegger portrait. On the one hand 
Schwarzenegger `evokes that third prophet of modernity, Friedrich Nietzsche'. yet, on the other hand, 
`this half-domesticated killer cyborg is the perfect dad. ' Cf J. Hoberman, 'Nietzsche's boy' Sight and 
Sound 15 (NS) (1991), 24 - 25, 
5-ý John D. Caputo, Against Ethics, 80. 
51 Ibid., 79. 
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the event that constitutes being-for-the-other, is a failing. '? It is this radical singularity of 
Levinas's project that both inspires and exasperates. To illustrate this predicament let us 
return to Edmond Jabes. It is not simply very difficult to `walk on our mouths, advance on our 
lips to kiss the trace, '58 it is impossible - and if it is possible then it has to be learned and 
practised. The point, however, is not to dismiss the ethical relation but, in Robert 
Bernasconi's words, to maintain it `by insisting on its impossibility', 59 
Insisting on the impossibility of the ethical relation as delineated by Levinas is not the 
result of a disposition for rejecting the sayings of the prophets. Rather, this insistence is due to 
the fact that the inversion of the subject-other configuration does not necessarily provide a 
route beyond its status as completely dichotomous. As Caputo suggests 
For all his resistance to totalization, and all his talk of decentering the same, 
the fact is that things are radically recentered for him around the Other, which 
is an infinite and absolute ec-center, a kind of transcendental eccentricity. 60 
Levinas reinserts the radical difference in the self-other relation in a manner that suggests not 
only the priority of the other, but the absolute priority of the other. Consequently, he modifies 
rather than transforms the logic of the same and, in doing so, fails to address adequately the 
manner in which self and other engage in a context that, after Girard, one could characterise as 
undecideable and uncertain. More seriously, however, Levinas presents us with an ethical 
relation that occurs prior to consciousness and problematizes an encounter between self and 
other that takes place in a historical, linguistic and cultural context. As with Hegel. 
consciousness represents the fall. 61 In such frameworks of identity and, in the case of Levinas, 
57 Cf. Robert Bernasconi, 'Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics' Deconstruction and 
Philosophy: The iexls ofJacques Derrida (ed) John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), 135. 
ýx Edmond Jabes, The Book of Marlins, 16 1. 
59 Robert Bernasconi, 'Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics', 1 35. 
60 John D. Caputo, . -1gains1 
Ethics, 84. 
61 Cf G. WF Hegel, lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume 111: I )ciermnzolc Religion (ed. ) 
P. C. Hodgson, trans R. F Brown (Berkely University of California Press, 1987), 527ff. Cf also 438n. 
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alterity, the `hustle and bustle of life'62 constitutes a terrain of radical impurity and, one might 
suggest, too sinful to yield a context for transformation. What hope is there then of 
actualizing change and of fulfilling a desire for transformation in the midst of this broken 
world? 
To summarise: in the philosophical anthropologies outlined by Heidegger and Levinas 
there are serious deficiencies particularly with regard to the role of the actual other within the 
structures and parameters of human experience. There is a virtue made of the authentic 
solitary self that is Dasein in the early Heidegger, a universal subject who can slip in and out 
of Greek and Christian frameworks. In Levinas's work, there is a frightening, even sinister, 
self-abnegation that supplements the resplendent vision of the priority of alterity. 63 Both 
undoubtedly provide us with rich seams of intellectual resources that require excavation, with 
Heidegger finitude is perceived as a gift, an inheritance, and Levinas questions the 
presuppositions that saturate modern reflections on subjectivity. These thinkers remind us, 
moreover, that any analysis of subjectivity must account for its performative condition and its 
inherent effect on those with whom we engage. Heidegger, in particular, attends to the 
distinctive and radical character of gospel demands. However, neither attends sufficiently, I 
believe, to the characteristics of subjectivity in the midst of practices and the negotiations of 
every-day living. Indeed, an alternative framework for a theological anthropology must take 
account of the imperfections that are an intrinsic part of being human and the provisionality of 
understanding selves and others. 
This provisionality, along with the thoroughly engaged nature of subjectivity, is 
central to one delineation of the human condition. If as Gillian Rose contends, `No human 
62 Cf Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger 's Being auf Time, 201. 
63 As I will show later, I am not suggesting that there is no place for a proper selflessness (or even a 
place for self-mortification) in a Christian anthropology. This can and must, however, be distinguished 
from a form of basic self -abnegation and tendency toward destruction. 
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being possesses sureness of self, '64 then this statement could stand as a summary of the work 
of Maurice Blondel. Yet, within the context of such insecurity, Blonde] discloses the state and 
status of human being in relation to the infinite. He achieves this through a refusal to 
safeguard the religious through a continued dichotomy of thought and existence and nature 
and grace. 65 As Jean Lacroix argues, 
by discovering in our acts an incompleteness which is not only de facto but de 
jure, that is to say a natural and incurable inachievability, Blondel brings to 
light in us a "prepared place", an "open fissure". 66 
The virtue of Blondel's work is that he perceived this `place' and `fissure' to be present within 
ordinary existence. Consequently, his thesis may well enhance the bid to develop a 
theological anthropology after Girard. 
6.3: Action and the Supernatural 
According to Lacroix, Maurice Blondel `was attempting to discover the need of the 
supernatural in man's very heart. '67. The method that drives Blondel's investigation is not, 
however, epistemological but phenomenological. It is in terms of an exploration of the 
concrete situation of action that Blondel suggests that the supernatural is mediated. But why 
action? 
Action is not only a fact; it is a necessity. It is often presented to me as an 
obligation and it imposes unwilling sacrifices on me. I cannot advance with 
all the clarity I desire nor always accomplish what I set out to do. And, once 
performed, my actions weigh on my whole life; I am their prisoner. I can 
4 Gillian Rose, Love '. Work (london: Chatto & Windus), 1995,125. 
65 Interestingly, the dichotomy between nature and grace is also apparent in nineteenth-century neo- 
scolasticism (both Catholic and Lutheran) and Blondel's work is a reaction to both this theoretical 
phenomenon and rise of historicism. Cf R. R. Reno, The Ordinary Transformed, 86-94. 
66 Jean Lacroix, Maurice Blonde!: An Introduction to the Matt ruin His Philosophy trans. J. C. Guinness 
(New York: Sheed & Ward, 1968), 34. 
67 Ibid.. 22 
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neither abstain, nor be self-sufficient, nor find satisfaction, nor be liberated. It 
is this weight of necessity and heteronomy that must be justified. It must be 
shown that this necessity is in conformity with man's deepest aspirations, that 
heteronomy is the condition for authentic autonomy. All this the science of 
action must establish. 68 
Because action disrupts the self-sufficiency of thought yet also submits to more than an 
immanent explanation, Blondel saw in its `necessity and heteronomy' a means to ensure that 
the dialectic of reflection and practice, thought and existence, were brought into their proper 
relation - an interplay that superseded both. This method is not, however, that of Hegelian 
sublation: action always contains heterogeneous elements that cannot be subsumed under an 
ideal. In Blondel's words, action 
is performed to be seen. The end knowingly pursued does not shut desire off. 
What we do, we still do for something other than what we think. There is a 
hidden surplus in the intention; and it is this enfolded tendency that is found 
once again in the very result of the operation. 69 
The character of action cannot be exclusively seized in either thought (intention) or deed 
(effect). There is always a surplus, an undecideability. 70 It is this `surplus' that insinuates the 
supernatural. For Blondel the philosophy of action obtains `certitude concerning a need, a 
certain need for an indeterminable Something, which is a principle of inquietude and 
insatiability. 171 This need or requirement that a philosophy of action gives rise to can only be 
answered in relation to the divine. We are compelled, as Blondel argues, to pursue the 
undecideability of action to its resolution in God: it is because in acting that we find an 
infinite disproportion in ourselves that we are constrained to look to infinity for the equation 
68 Henri Bouillard, Blonde/ and (, hristianitt, trans. J. M. Somerville (Washington, D. C.: Corpus Books, 
1969), 6. 
69 Maurice Blondel, Action (1893), 218. 
7° There is also a sense in which we cannot fulfil our most honest desires and this disrupts the notion of 
a unified, sovereign self as St. Paul knew only too well. As Andrew McKenna suggests, `A fuller 
exegesis of Paul's discourse (Rom. 7: 15-20) on not doing "the good I want, but the evil I do not want 
is what I do" would show that it provides a critique of autonomous agency that is as radical as anything 
we find in a Derridean deconstruction or a Lacanian decentering of the subject. ' Andrew McKenna, 
`Biblical Structuralism: Testing the Victimarv Hypothesis' Hello. '. 17: 1 (1990), 73 
71 Maurice Blondel, l. ca 1'entsee 11: Les re. sppoirsahi/itc s de /a pensee et la po. v ibilite Je son acht'vement 
(Paris: PUF. 1954), 318. 
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of our action. '72 Yet there is another side to the finite-to-infinite dialectic: On the other hand, 
it is because in affirming absolute perfection we do not ever arrive at equalling our own 
affirmation, that we are constrained to look for its complement and its commentary in 
action. 173 
Action, in its `enabling constraints', implies a view of freedom that is more intricate 
than a simplistic notion of autonomy. Freedom for Blondel is not coextensive with a form of 
securing the ends of one's own will or desire. That is to succumb to death. Rather a person is 
only free `by opening himself up to another action than his own. '74 There are echoes here of 
what in a Girardian idiom would be a realisation that belief in self-sufficiency is a 
consequence of romantic lying [mensonge romantique]. 75 Indeed, Blonde] suggests that `we 
would will to be self-sufficient; we cannot be. '76 Action exhibits our dependence on that 
which is other to our will and intention. There is a `deterioration', a loss of self, in action but 
only in the midst of the risk of action can we progress towards our fulfilment - no wonder, 
then, that Blondel was calling (in 1893! ) for the decentering of the self: 77 
the action performed brings back to the being who conceived and willed it a 
new richness that was not yet either in his conception or in his resolution. Not 
all that was simply ideal in the intention eludes action; at least a part is 
realized in it; and this real is heterogeneous with regard to this ideal. That is 
why, after having acted, we are other, we know otherwise, we will in another 
way than before. ' 78 
72 Maurice Blondel, Actio» (1893), 324. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 329. 
7ý This is the myth, as Girard see it, of spontaneous desire. Cf. Rene Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the 
Novel: Self and 0/her in Literary Structure trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1965), 16-17. 
76 Maurice Blondel, Action (1893), 302. 
77 Ibid., 442. 
79 Ibid., 425. 
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It is action that demonstrates not only our dependence on and constitution by the other but the 
necessity of attending to the infinite. In the acknowledgement that we are in some sense other. 
a confession that comes in the midst of action, occurs the realisation that it is God that 'does 
everything' : `Not to appropriate to oneself is the only method of acquiring the infinite. It is 
wherever we are no longer our own. '79 Yet this `loss' of self, or at least the petty 
preoccupations that circumscribe the horizon of possibility, arises in a context not of 
annihilation but of a freedom to accept God as God is, not as we would want him to be. KO It is 
God who creates the possibility of the response - in action - to the infinite as `the supernatural 
movement cannot proceed from ourselves. '8' It is only possible to respond, to act in faith, 
because of the prior gift of grace, but this active response is imperative: `the act of faith should 
inspire faith in acts. 's2 It is neither contemplation nor experience alone that are the privileged 
site for the relationship with the supernatural. It is action that provides the latter because, as 
Blondel remarks, `in the simplicity of the most common practices, there is more infinite than 
in the haughtiest speculations or in the most exquisite feelings. '83 
There is something extremely ironic about Blondel's reflection on the decentering of 
the self: with the loss of the invulnerable autonomous subject comes a simultaneous openness 
to the infinite within the ordinary. In another context, Jean-Luc Nancy rehearses a notion of 
the exraordinarily mundane nature of this experience when he suggests that he is `trying to 
indicate, at its limit, an experience - not, perhaps an experience that we have, but an 
experience that makes us be. '84 This is exactly where Girard's thesis requires extension. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, Girard's analysis of the interdividual self indicates that coming 
to subjectivity in desire-led relationships results in an `extreme openness'. 85 We become who 
79 Ibid., 356. 
80' Ibid., 366. 
81 Ibid., 367. 
82 Ibid., 375. 
83 Ibid., 376. 
`ý4 Jean-Luc Nancy, the Inoperative (. 'ommunity, 26. 
" Rebecca Adams, `Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: A Conversation with Rene Girard' Religion and 
Literature 25: 2 (1993), 24. 
-' 
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we are in our moving out beyond ourselves. Yet, while Girard has exhaustively outlined the 
method and repurcussions of the ecstatic nature of mimetic desire in the context of culture and 
conflict, he is remarkably silent about the practices that enable and facilitate such an openness 
in relation to the distinctive setting of the Christian Church. 
In order to bring Blondel's faith in acts to bear on a Girardian analysis of the 
interdividual nature of subjectivity, I want to argue that the notion of deification is central 
here. For Blondel, deification is the basic promise of Christianity: 
Vos dü eritis: this saying from Genesis can serve as the inscription for either 
of the two cities. That is the divine promise. That is the satanic temptations(' 
The most remarkable feature of Blondel's analysis of action is his suggestion that deification 
is actualised through our practices. Neither rational nor irrational, deification is realised in the 
midst of action because activity is initiated and voiced by the divine to which the human then 
struggles in desire and response. `Each act inspired by a thought of faith begins the generation 
of a new man because it engenders God in man. '87 Thus we become like him: `Adopted by 
the Father, regenerated by the Son, anointed by the Holy Spirit, man is by grace what God is 
by nature. '88 But this `becoming like God' is not a participation in the divine that is actualised 
because of the perfect contemplation or enjoyment of God. It is the coming together of grace 
and nature due to the benevolence of God. 
It is through action that the divine takes hold in man, hides its presence there, 
insinuates into him a new thought and a new life. It is through action that the 
lowest and the most obscure parts which express the needs of the organism 
and the reverberations of the universe rise to faith and cooperate in the human 
, '('Maurice Blondel, Fxigc'! Ices philosophiques du christianisme (Paris: PUF, 1950), 134 J 'as 'as du 
erilis' is translated as `You will be gods'. Cf. Maurice Blondel, Ae ion (1893), 328: 'Man aspires to be 
a god: to be god without God and against God, through God and with God, that is the dilemma. ' 
87 Maurice Blondel, Ar/iuir (1893), 379. 
88 Ibid., 375, n. 1. 
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and divine work that comes to completion in us. Without it the synthesis is 
not brought to perfection. 89 
Added to Blondel's thesis concerning the invitation to infinity that occurs in action is 
the contention that there are certain `prescribed' practices that best reflect the mediation of 
grace in a world of sin. These mediatory practices, and the revelation that is intrinsically tied 
to them, take their distinctive character from their ecclesial setting and the church's tradition. 
Tradition is not, as we saw in the last chapter, a inert deposit of truth but a living, multiply- 
constituted ratification of practice and belief. Furthermore, it cannot `be used and developed 
unless it is confided to the practical obedience of love. '90 Again practice breeds practice, that 
of the tradition engenders practice of love, for `without this active love of the members of 
humanity for one another, there is no God for man; he who does not love his brother does not 
have life within him. '91 It is not simply the case, however, that scripture and tradition simply 
give rise to action, they both demand action and act as a guide92, a legend or key to the 
mapping and performance of loving practice: 
a tradition and a discipline represent a constant interpretation of thought 
through acts, offering each individual, in the sanctified experience, something 
like an anticipated control, an authorized commentary, an impersonal 
verification of the truth it is for each one to resurrect in himself ' 
Even in the celebration of the contingency and undecideability of practice there remains a 
necessity for guidance so that the divine life might come to perfection in human beings. It is 
from the standpoint of the integral relation between faith and action that guidance, 
sy Ibid., 380. 
90' Maurice Blonde], The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, trans. Alexander Dru & Illtyd 
Trethowan (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 274. 
91 Maurice Blondel, Action (1893), 407-408. This assertion of Blondel is a response to Leibniz's 
dictum: to love all men, to love God, is the same thing. ' (407). 
92 This point is reinforced by Nietzsche's observations in Me Anil-(hrisl. He suggests that 'it is not a 
`belief which distinguishes the Christian: the Christian acts, he is distinguished by a different mode of 
acting. ' Friedrich Nietzsche, iwighlight of the Idols and The Anti-('hri. w trans R. J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 145. 
9 Maurice Blondel, Action (1893), 380. 
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commentary and discipline take on their dynamic character: no faith without practice. no 
practice naturally equal to faith; no revealed truth without also prescribed acts. '94 
It is this conjunction between deification and practices that is absent in Girard's 
consideration of Christianity. Nevertheless, both Blondel and Girard take the human person 
and his or her place in the cosmos seriously and suggest that in order to know of and 
experience God, human beings have to start where they are, with the gift, its content and its 
nature. In other words, there is a `humanist' perspective in their work. By `humanist'. I do 
not mean that either thinker constructs a priveleged site of epistemological or experiential 
certainty. On the contrary, Girard and Blondel attend to and address the specificity of being 
human in relation to the divine in all its provisionality and uncertainty with regard to truth.. 
They conceive of subjectivity as engendered within the loss of self, when the self is given over 
to others and the world. They also suggest that it is within the midst of human existence that 
the transcendent is given. This suggests that there is an element of labour - the hard labour of 
love - in the religious life that mirrors the incessant labour of tradition. Consequently, their 
'humanism' is directed against that which dehumanizes rather than the construction of discrete 
identities. I want to argue that this element is largely absent from the attempts to resituate and 
reconstitute the subject that I outlined in Chapters One and Two. In the case of deconstruction 
and Marion's via negativa, any reflection on the place and status of the self is considered 
redundant; with a philosophy or theology of communicative sociality, there is a lack of 
recognition of the constraints within and between subjects that require negotiation. In other 
words, there is insufficient attention given to the constitution and instillation of forms of life 
that respond to contemporary fragmented existence. 
94 Ibid., 382. 
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To summarise: in the thought of Maurice Bondel the relation of the subject to the 
infinite is delineated. Blonde] demonstrates that with the constant loss of our will and our self 
to others and the world resides the openness to the divine. The ecstatic nature of the subject 
who always is beyond him or herself marks the meeting of nature and grace. This is where 
Girard can learn from Blondel's analysis. Girard provides an excellent and extensive sketch 
of the visceral, brutal and painful experience of being-in-the-world - of nature, as it were - but 
when it comes to grace the enthusiasm tails off. Blondel's work, on the other hand, can 
benefit from the more concrete, even painful, assessment of the human condition that is 
provided by Girard. In order to provide a perspective from which an understanding of the gift 
of grace - the vertical pole of the human/divine axis - can be more fully integrated with 
Girard's rich examination of the theatre of human interaction - the horizontal pole -I want to 
bring Girard's desiring subject into a theological context where the relationship between desire 
and the motion of grace can be discerned - the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola. 
I wish to propose that the Ignatian Exercises offer a profound insight into how we 
might consider the self theologically in a postmodern context. In the first place, within the 
rubric of the Exercises we are invited to do the very thing that Rowan Williams proposed as a 
proper to a Christian engagement with Scripture: to `identify ourselves in the story being 
contemplated, to reappropriate who we are now, and who we shall or can be, in terms of the 
story. '95 Second, and more significant in this context, the Ignatian Exercises were written by a 
man of the late Middle Ages who was, nonetheless, standing at a `turning point at which the 
interest begins to be directed towards the subjective, towards the question of salvation as it 
bears upon the subjective life of the individual, of the sense in which God is a `gracious God' 
precisely to me. '96 The exercises were written in the midst of an unprecedented fracture that 
was political, theological and anthropological in character. As Wenders illustrates in Der 
95 Rowan Williams, `The Literal Sense of Scripture', 125. 
' Karl Rahner, 'Being Open to God as Ever Greater' Theological Investigation Vol. VII trans. D. 
. Bourke (London: DLT, 1971), 
11 
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Himmel über Berlin, contemporary subjects within advanced capitalist societies are 
experiencing a fracture of equal proportions. Ignatius, then, may provide important signposts 
that take us across such fractured terrain, even if there is no evident solution. 
6.4: Spiritual Exercises and the Christian Drama 
The Ignatian Exercises is simply a manual of desires and their composition. In an 
almost Girardian manner. Ignatius recognizes that our desire is composed in relation to God, 
the world and our activity. It was Friedrich Schlegel who suggested that 'Whoever desires the 
infinite doesn't know what he desires. But one can't turn this sentence around. '97 The manual 
that Ignatius designed responds to such ignorance by grounding desire for the infinite in a 
`horizontal theatre' of `combat and action. '98 The Exercises represent an attempt to situate 
human nature as the copula mundi, `the link between uncreated and created being. '99 The 
human person, their body and imagination are located within the world and this world is the 
stage upon which the exercitant participates in `God's self-expression in history. '"" This 
paricipation is realized through composing the self in relation to the scriptures. 10 t 
However, the Exercises, while practiced by individuals have an ecclesial setting and 
can in no way be thought of as a private, disengaged affair. As Michael Buckley suggests: 
in making the Exercises, the exercitant is to become configured to the Church 
in its fundamental service and intimate experience of Christ, even more, that 
one comes to participate in that service and experience. In the exercitant, the 
97 Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), § 47, p. 6. 
98 Louis Dupre, Ignatian Humanism and its Mystical Origins' ('ommunio 18 (1991), 169. 
99 Ibid., 168. 
100 Philip Endean, `The Ignatian Prayer of the Senses' Heyihrop Journal 31 (1990), 408. 
101 Ignatius of Loyola, Ignalius (? f Loyola: Spiriiual Exercises and Selected forks (ed. ) G. E. Gans 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 136. The term `composition' is used thirteen times in the I; xercise. s. 
ýýý 
Church is again to realize its mission in the struggle for human salvation and 
its radical nature as beloved of Christ. 102 
The role of the Exercises is to configure the exercitant to the gift of grace and to enable him or 
her to respond to that which dehumanizes. For Ignatius, The satanic, the diabolic, is the 
antihuman, the humanly destructive, and this sense of the relentless, cosmic struggle retrieves 
in the Exercises the gospel understanding of the conflict that lies at the heart of human 
history. ' 1"3 Thus the desire of the Church ought to be both for Christ and for the world. 
There is no escape from the materiality of nature in the exercises. Knowing and experiencing 
the divine is a matter of repeated response and participation, of continuing a pattern 
disclosed. ' 104 This pattern is the gift of the giver and our action in response is a re-enactment 
of this pattern. Indeed, Ignatius sees apostolic action itself 
as participating in the "outgoing" movement of God's trinitarian life. 
Humans are called not to rest in divine quiet but to descend with the Son into 
the created world for the purpose of sanctifying it. 105 
It is in this sense that anthropology is given a theocentric perspective. Nonetheless, 
the Exercises are hard work.. Intrinsic to them is the notion of paideia, that one is nurtured and 
taught in the skill of discernment through the prayer of the senses. This prayer is not, itself, 
directly an application of the "spiritual senses", but rather a pedagogy towards acquiring 
them. ' 106 Discernment does not imply a resolution that is established once and for all, nor a 
pragmatic choice forced by the demands of circumstance. Rather it suggests a decision that 
requires the hard and continuous work of responding to `the end for which I am created. ' 
107 
The response is formulated in relation to the directed, contextual and imaginative reading of 
102 Michael Buckley, S. J., `Ecclesial Mysticism in the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius' Theological 
Studies 56 (1995), 443. 
103 Ibid., 445 
104 Philip Endean, `The Ignatian Prayer of the Senses', 408. 
105 Louis Dupre, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 226. 
I()(Philip Endean, `The Ignatian Prayer of the Senses'. 412. 
107 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, 130. 
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scripture so that the exercitant develops `the ability to distinguish effective from ineffective 
strategies' 108 through which responsibility to the divine Word is enacted. And this 
responsibility carries with it significant implications for the Church: `for the Church itself is a 
principal agent in [the] struggle against the antihuman. This religious sensibility may be 
almost unintelligible to a bourgeois, domesticated Christianity that possesses no sense of the 
Church in conflict and looks to religious experience for the secure and the soothing. ' 109 If 
Giorgio Agamben is to be believed, then theology has done little to challenge such desires for 
the comfortable. In a discussion of the place and status of the sacred in classical nineteenth- 
century sociology, Agamben suggests that 
What is at work here is the psychologization of religious experience (the 
"disgust" and "horror" by which the cultured European Bourgeoisie betrays 
its own unease before the religious fact), which will find its final form in 
Rudolph Otto's work on the sacred. Here, in a concept of the sacred that 
coincides with the concept of the obscure and the inpenetrable, a theology that 
had lost all experience of the revealed word celebrated its union with a 
philosophy that had abandoned all sobriety in the face of feeling. That the 
religious belongs entirely to the sphere of psychological emotion, that it 
essentially has to do with shivers and goose bumps - this is the triviality that 
the neologism "numinous" had to dress up as science. 110 
In contrast to this domestication of the religious, Ignatius portrays `a Renaissance scene of 
combat and action. ' 111 And is it not the case that Girard portrays a (post)modern scene of 
combat and action? It is the demands of such scenes that inspire the Ignatian commitment to 
the difficult labour of discernment. 
Discernment is the negation of an activity - cerning - and one of the two meanings of 
this word is well worth exploration. The root of this activity can be found in the now 
108 Louis Dupre, Passage to Mrxlernin% 224. 
1009 Michael Buckley, S. J., `Ecclesial Mysticism in the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius', 446. 
1 IO Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 1998), 78. 
Louis Dupre, Ignatian Humanism and its Mystical Origins', 169. 
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redundant English verb `to cerne'. 112 This verb means `to encircle' or `to enclose' and here it 
might indicate the way in which selves become trapped within their petty preoccupations and 
ultimately become shut off from that which exceeds them. Contrary to the desire to become 
self-sufficient, discernment is a pedagogical strategy that engenders openness in relation to our 
desires. The fact that Ignatian discernment is rooted in relation, scripture and tradition 
suggests that desire for the divine is not to be understood in isolation but directed, fleshed out, 
as it were, in prayerful and bodily practices. Our performance and engagement, in the context 
of paideia are a response to the divine desire for creation. 
We might say that the Christian project of discipleship, conceived as a 
lifelong schooling in the purification of desire, is a matter of discovering that, 
whatever we desire, our desiring of it is only the desire of God in the measure 
that it is conformed to and transformed by God's previous desire of us. Our 
yearning, purified, shares in that yearning from which our world is made. 113 
Divine desire is prior to human desire and it allows, creates the possibility of, the desire of 
divine desire. 
Nevertheless, the transformation of desire, what Lash calls its purification, can only 
occur within the parameters of an ecclesial and social life characterised by a process of 
negotiation and risk. Such a risk is evident in Abraham's encounter with three angels, 
recounted at the beginning of chapter 18 of the book of Genesis. Emmanuel Levinas, reading 
the text through the rabbinical commentaries, suggests that the visitation can be construed as 
representing the relationship between the `singular signification of God' and the `responsibility 
for the other man'. ' 14 To illustrate this correlation, Levinas suggests, in a manner reminiscent 
112 In the following discussion I am indebted to Paul Smith's discussion of discernment. C. his 
Discerning the Subject (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), esp. xxx. 
113 Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and the End qqf Religion' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 37. 
114 Emmanuel Levinas, `Beyond Intentionality', Philosophy in France ]Way, (ed. ) Alan Montefiore 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 114-15. 
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of his Talmudic studies, 115 that verse three of chapter 18 should follo« verse one. and verse 
two become verse three. The passage now reads: 
`The Lord revealed Himself to Abraham in the plains of Mature, while he was 
seated at the entrance to his tent during the heat of the day. And he said, 
Lord, if I find grace in your eyes do not pass this way before your servant. As 
he raised his eyes and looked, he saw three persons standing before him; he 
ran to them from the doorway of his tent and prostrated himself on the 
ground. 116 
The outcome of changing the order of the verses is that the passing of the three persons is the 
result of an Abrahamic prayer, Adonai, Lord, `do not pass this way before your servant'. The 
visitation of the Other might now be understood as a `revelation of God'. Let us, however, 
read the passage as it usually proceeds: 
The Lord revealed Himself to Abraham in the plains of Mamre, while he was 
seated at the entrance to his tent during the heat of the day. As he raised his 
eyes and looked, he saw three persons standing before him; he ran to them 
from the doorway of his tent and prostrated himself on the ground'. And he 
said, Lord, if I find grace in your eyes do not pass this way before your 
servant. 
The passage now has the title Adonai addressed to one of the visitors and not to God. Rather 
than revealing a direct, almost tangible, connection between the presence of God and the 
presence of others, the passage demands and celebrates a drama of risk in which those who we 
encounter may be angels, demons, or plain old human beings. The point is that our 
recognition, our comprehension, especially of God is `always provisional and preliminary'. ' 17 
Yet this is the only context in which we can attempt the practice of excessive openness - to 
both the other and God - and, if you like, perform the Abrahamic drama. For there is no 
absolute purity or finality in the encounter with another, human or divine. There is, in 
I15 Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1990). 
116 1 have followed Levinas's version of the text. Emmanuel Levinas, `Beyond Intentionality, 114 
117 Gillian Rose, The comedy of Hegel and the Trauerspiel of modern philosophy', Mourning Beccome. s 
the Lau : Philosophy wid Repre. seiuaticut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 72. 
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contrast, the difficulty of engagement. As Cornelius Ernst so aptly puts it. 'Grace is not 
faceless. '118 This is where the discernment is thoroughly appropriate - it is not a matter of 
uncovering truth and certainty but of embracing risk in a manner that celebrates, and is 
purified by, divine desire. The process of discernment suggests, conto Levinas, that action is 
not the simple effect of a revelatory cause. On the contrary, thought and action are understood 
by Ignatius to be integrated in response to a grace that constitutes the conditions, or engenders 
the possibility, of authentic freedom: `What have I done for Christ? What am I doing for 
Christ? What ought Ito do for Christ? ' 119 The theological subject is called to respond in the 
theatre of nature on the basis not of epistemolgical or revelatory certainty but in the midst of a 
risk that self-realisation occurs in responding to grace. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined some possible theological resources which, when 
brought into conversation with the Girardian treatment of subjectivity, might provide the basis 
for a reconsideration of the theological subject. As a means to this end, I outlined Martin 
Heidegger's attempted recovery of authentic Christian existence in Augustine's Confessions. 
Although this Heidegger may well be described as a theological counterpoint to Jean-Luc 
Marion - Heidegger is obsessed with that which is given, the experience of primordial 
Christianity, while Marion can look no further than securing the integrity of the giver - he 
forcibly reminds us of the performative nature of Christian existence. Unlike Girard, 
however, Heidegger is not concerned with the intersubjective character of the Christian 
experience and this was highlighted by the criticisms of Emmanuel Levinas. 
118 Cornelius Ernst, 'Mary: Sign of Contradiction or Source of Unity? ' Muultiple Echo: Exploration., ' in 
1 heologt" (eds) Fergus Kerr & Timothy Radcliffe (London: DLT, 1979), 124 
119 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, 138. 
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Levinas's work, prophetic though it undoubtedly is, was shown to be terrifying in its 
drive for the purity of the face-to-face encounter. The absolute priority of the other is 
established beyond the context of the hustle and bustle of life and, consequently, seems 
somewhat flaccid in the face of the difficulties and challenges of a fragmented postmodern 
context. 
In his more explicitly theological idiom, Maurice Blondel, I argued, offers a profound 
and insightful analysis into the relationship between nature and grace and theological 
anthropology. In his examination of action he regenerates the significance of subjectivity in a 
theological context - not least because of his delineation of the relationship between the faith 
inherent in action and deification. I also conclude that Blondel offers much that will enliven a 
Girardian anthropology because of this emphasis on the integral relationship between God and 
the world. Engagement with grace is not the result of understanding a revealed truth but is 
related to the (given) human condition itself. Just as Girard can learn from Blondel, the 
reverse is also true. Girard's expansive and richly detailed examination of the configuration 
and exigencies of desire could only illuminate Blondel's understanding of nature - even if it 
seems rather dismal to insist on the inclusion of the bloody and sinister within human 
experience, it is unfortunately only too necessary. To do otherwise would be irresponsible. 
Finally, because the weakness of the Girardian hypothesis, in theological terms at 
least, is its insufficient attention to the order of grace, I argued that bringing the Ignatian 
Lzercises to bear on the Girardian subject may open up a stimulating route to the revisioning 
of theological anthropology. This arrangement not only augments Girard's anthropological 
studies but also highlights the performative and engaged manner in which active co-operation 
with God must be actualized. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Theological Anthropology After Girard 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, particularly through the work of Maurice Blondel and Ignatius 
of Loyola, I explored avenues through which the Girardian hypothesis might be translated into 
a more thoroughgoing theological idiom. The purpose of bringing Girard into conversation 
with Blondel and Ignatius was to examine the ways in which desiring selves who are 
constituted in relation to the desire of others might come into a more fitting engagement with 
scripture and tradition: to `identify ourselves in the story being contemplated, to reappropriate 
who we are now, and who we shall or can be, in terms of the story. ' 1 This sense of responding 
to the divine gift through scripture-informed practices is something that I wish to elucidate and 
begin to enact, as it were, in an albeit modest way in this chapter. I will pursue this task using 
three texts that open up rich possibilities for rethinking the ways in which Christian existence 
might be performed and the reference points for such existence. I am in no way claiming to 
provide an exhaustive treatment here but, rather, a series of snapshots that offer an insight into 
the hard labour of love that characterises a response to grace. Before I move to these short 
Rowan Williams, The Literal Sense of Scripture' ModernTheology72 (1991), 125. 
performances or spiritual exercises, however, I want to rehearse the backdrop to their staging 
through providing an overview of this study's progression and purpose. 
7.1: Summarising the Thesis 
The point of this thesis is basically twofold: to consider the status and fate of the 
subject in a postmodern context and to provide a theological response that is both theoretically 
responsible and informed by the existential exigencies of contemporary existence in western 
societies. In order to meet this aim, I used, in my introduction, the ambiguous reading of 
subjectivity in Wim Wenders' Der Himmel über Berlin as a point of departure. Wenders' 
reading of contemporary fragmentation and his attempted resolution of brokenness loosely 
correspond to two major theoretical (and antithetical) approaches to anthropological discourse 
- the resituating of the self and its reconstitution. 
In Part One I examined both of these theoretical strategies. In Chapter One I outlined 
two major considerations of the dissolution and resituation of the self that align a negative 
anthropology with a negative theology. Jacques Derrida was seen to refuse any place for the 
theological or religious unless they are inscribed with the terms of their own negation. Only in 
relation to a sacrificial and responsible economy can religion be maintained in that alterity and 
love constitute the logic of the gift of death. Positive religion, in contrast, is violent in its 
quest for institutionalisation and the composition of dogma. Jean-Luc Marion, meanwhile, 
was seen to take a very different approach in bringing together a negative anthropology with a 
negative theology. Marion's project starts from an attempt to save God from metaphysics 
through an alliance with classical apophaticism. Charity replaces Being as the foremost name 
of God in his attempt to save the deity from the clutches of onto-theo-logy. A concurrent 
theme in Marion's work, a motif that is pursued under the rubric of la distance, is the chasm 
that he fashions between God and God's gift - the world. Accordingly, Marion claims that 
-', 0 
only prayerful discourse concerning the divine or - even better - only that which is sanctioned 
by the bishop can be termed theology. Any notion of subjectivity in the context of the 
ecclesia is seriously condensed if not wholly negated. 
I then proceeded to assess both these wide ranging projects. In the case of Derrida. I 
suggested that his evacuation of the theological results in a refusal of site and situation. 
Consequently, using Walter Benjamin as a guide, I argued that this deconstructive approach is 
in danger of providing a vacuum that will be filled - only to quickly - by capitalism. This 
religion of a cult (without mercy) and little else is, I suggested, perfectly configured to the 
shape and form of a `religion without religion'. Consequently, I asked for a more nuanced 
understanding of the task and status of articles of faith as a means to mapping the theological 
subject. In the case of Marion, I questioned his project on two fronts. First, in relation to his 
doctrine of God, I challenged both the success of his attempt to spurn any name of God bar 
charity and his disregard for the gift in his need to save the giver from any stain of 
metaphysics. In relation to the former, I suggested that, in the words of Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Marion ends up `saying nothing about the god that cannot immediately be said about "event". 
about "love", about "poetry". '2 As far as the latter point is concerned, I suggested that 
Marion's philosophical theology ignores the importance of the relationship between God and 
the world that is established in the doctrine of creation. God is to be saved and their is no 
need to consider the gift for it is irrelevant. Second, I contested Marion's ecclesiology on the 
basis of its exclusionary logic and its retrieval of Denys's De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia. A 
meta-subject is constructed in the space vacated by the subject of modernity and I suggested, 
with reference to Henri de Lubac, that this is an escape from the difficulties of contemporary 
existence rather than a solution to the fragmentation of subjectivity. 
2 Jean-Luc Nancy, 'Of Divine Places', The Inoperative Communrihv (ed. ) P. Connor (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 113. 
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In Chapter Two I examined a major response to the dissolution of the subject that 
conforms to Wenders' attempted resurrection of the self: namely, the reconstitution of the 
subject. Under this term I considered the contribution of Jürgen Habermas and of those 
theologians, particularly Alistair McFadyen, who align themselves with Habermas's theory of 
communicative action. Habermas offers a highly distinctive response to the crisis of 
anthropological discourse in that he is critical of both the project of modernity and its 
postmodern opponents. However, as I demonstrated, Habermas wants to bring modernity to 
its completion as its failure is due, in large part, to an over emphasis on one type of rationality 
- the instrumental and calculative reason that destroys subjectivity. This category of reason 
has its place, but in an intersubjective context Habermas posits the centrality of another, 
forgotten reason founded on communication. On the basis of communicative reason, 
Habermas delineates the structures and frameworks within which selves can co-exist in non- 
coercive relationships within the public realm. I then illustrated how Alistair McFadyen takes 
up the Habermasean project in his construction of a theological anthropology. McFadyen 
pursues his project on three fronts. First, and following Habermas, he posits a self who 
`becomes' in the context of dialogue. I also demonstrated, second, that McFadyen augments 
this self with a secure, individual site of `personal being' that holds the self fast in the ebb and 
flow of communicative interaction. McFadyen's final move is to bring a theological element 
into his anthropology with a discussion of the intersubjectivity of the trinity. This trinitarian 
God is the model for human relationality. In relation to the claim that a divine 
intersubjectivity provides an important reference point for the portrayal of an authentic 
subjectivity, I then considered attempts by Anthony Thiselton, Cohn Gunton and Jürgen 
Moltmann to constitute models of sociality and intersubjectivity in conjunction with a 
particular model of the trinity. 
In response to these philosophical and theological efforts to reconstruct the parameters 
of selfliood. I presented what I believed were fundamental deficiencies in the unifying aim of 
the communicative model - the reconstitution of the subject. First, after Nietzsche and 
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William Connelly, I suggested that the selves who were being reconstituted were disembodied 
subjects. There is a whole visceral mode of being that is neglected in the communicative 
framework, a mode that must both be invoked and embraced if the crisis of fragmentation is to 
be addressed. I then moved to the question of the status of desire in a communicative model 
of human relationality and concluded that, as with the visceral, desire is only acceptable if it 
can be tamed. If not, then desire remains a dangerous outsider in anthropological discourse of 
this kind. These critical remarks were, I argued, relevant to McFadyen's project as well as its 
philosophical progenitor. However, in McFadyen's theological anthropology there were other 
features that required critical attention - not least his retention of a privatised, non-negotiable 
site of identity that he calls a `personal centre'. I insisted that McFadyen was constructing a 
solipsistic notion of the self that was at odds with his prior - post-Habermasean - claim that 
the subject is formed within intersubjective relations. Finally, with regard to the centrality of 
the social model of the trinity, I questioned the idealist assumptions of its proponents and their 
disregard for the heterogeneous nature of relationality. In consequence I claimed that it is 
imperative that greater attention be given to both the status of analogical discourse and the 
concrete form of human interaction. 
As a way beyond the deficiencies of both these attempts to consider the fragmentation 
of the self sketched in Wenders' cinematic exploration I turned, in Part Two, to the very 
different enterprise of Rene Girard. Girard's distinctive reconfiguration of the subject is part 
of a wider theory of cultural origins and development. Consequently, in Chapter Three I 
considered two major elements of his hypothesis: the investigation of the genesis and 
subsistence of cultural and religious institutions and the significance he attaches to texts in 
which conflict is concealed or, in the case of the biblical tradition, revealed. There I showed 
the importance of mimesis in the Girardian hypothesis and how Girard perceives a violent 
moment as constitutive of every cultural and religious framework. Indeed, he even claims, in 
relation to the conception of cultural and sacrificial institutions through a violence that is 
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engendered by mimetic rivalry, that `Violence and the sacred are inseparable. '3 . As an antidote 
to violence the victim is commemorated as both the cause of internecine strife and the agent of 
its overcoming.. This ambivalent account of the status of the victim of the founding murder - 
an account that pleads the innocence of the guilty - is designated as mythological by Girard. I 
then showed how Girard contends that certain texts are effective in progressively revealing the 
innocence of the victim (texts of persecution) to the point that a full revelation occurs 
definitively in the Christian gospels. Girard believes that this revelation of the true status of 
the mythological and the sacrificial makes Christianity the only cultural framework which 
provides the resources for the overcoming of violence. In Chapter Four I then provided an 
overview of Girard's more thorough-going analysis of subjectivity. There I examined the 
central role of desire and its intimate alliance with mimesis in the Girardian hypothesis. 
Desire does not arise as a motion between subject and object but is engendered by the desire 
of the other. Thus the subject is dependent upon the other for his or her identity - the self is a 
`self between'. I then illustrated that Girard returns to the gospels as texts which offer the only 
ground upon which authentic subjectivity can flourish. This is possible, he contends because 
of the non-violent, non-rivalrous nature of desire of the divine and the imitation of Christ. 
In response to the Girardian hypothesis I strove to evaluate, in Chapter Five, its 
relevance for revisioning theological anthropology. In this chapter I examined three areas of 
particular interest to critics of Girard's project. First, I began with an assessment of a common 
difficulty with the Girardian hypothesis: the ubiquitous presence of all things violent. There I 
attempted to answer Girard's critics. Second, I interrogated the claim that there is insufficient 
space in the interdividual configuration of subjectivity for agency. In response I demonstrated 
that such criticisms are groundless. Finally, I explored Girard's understanding of revelation 
and I suggested that his conclusion that the gospels are uniquely efficacious in bringing about 
the possibility of peaceful co-existence is predicated on a misunderstanding of tradition and 
3R Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 19. 
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the demands of Christian existence. As a rejoinder to this deficient element within the 
Girardian hypothesis I considered an alternative account of the vitality of the Christian 
tradition. Here I took Michel de Certeau and Maurice Blondel as conversation partners. This 
analysis of the role and fecundity of tradition also served to inform the more constructive 
element in this study that I began in Part Three. 
This constructive component of the thesis I began in Chapter Six. There I attended to 
the explicitly Christian project of the early Martin Heidegger. I rejected Heidegger's project 
was on two grounds. First, I questioned his attempts to construct a universal ontology rather 
than a characteristically Christian anthropology. Second, I challenged the status of the subject 
of his phenomenology of religion - the radically individual figure of factical life experience. 
Nonetheless, I argued that Heidegger gives prominence to the performative nature of 
subjectivity within a Christian framework. Then, after a brief discussion of Emmanuel 
Levinas's criticism of Heidegger and the significance of former's delineation of the 
irreducibility of alterity, I examined the work of Maurice Blondel and Ignatius of Loyola. 
Both figures, I claimed, offer significant resources for reassessing theological anthropology in 
a postmodern context without compromising the distinct relation between nature and grace. I 
suggested that Girard could learn from their portrayal of the relationship between the human 
and divine dramas and of the manner in which subjectivity can be cultivated in terms of its 
participation in God's self-expression. I also suggested that Blondel and Ignatius might be 
productively augmented with Girard's attention to the (often) conflictual and forceful nature of 
human interaction. 
With the engagement of the last chapter in mind. I would like to consider the shape 
and status of theological anthropology after Girard via three cameo performances or spiritual 
exercises. I have chosen to stage them under the title `Making Bowels Move' because it is a 
common theme of all three encounters and, in addition, this title reminds us of the visceral 
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nature of human interaction. I have claimed throughout this study that this element within 
intersubjective relations is both a neglected and fundamental ingredient in an adequate 
theological anthropology. Nevertheless, the body is a highly problematic area in 
anthropological discourse and in order to contextualise my three exercises, I will attend to a 
major issue concerning human viscerality before I commence. 
7.2: Exercising the Body 
In a reflection called `Dim Stockings' -a title that refers to a definitive movement in 
advertising that occurred in the darkness of Parisian cinemas in the nineteen-twenties - 
Giorgio Agamben uncovers the mechanism through which the body was transformed into a 
commodity. In the image that was presented to the audience, a troupe of dancing girls 
(wearing their stockings) flashed across the screen. These women were presented as 
individuals whose only connection was their presence in the image - each woman was filmed 
separately and then superimposed onto the finished celluloid product. Their conjunction and 
disjunction in the image, argues Agamben, gave rise to the epochal process of the 
emancipation of the human body from its theological foundations. ' 4 The image served to 
dislocate the body from site and situation, whether historical, social or metaphysical, and 
presented it as a feature of the commodity: `Neither generic nor individual, neither an image of 
the divinity nor an animal form, the body now became something truly 11'hatever. '5 The 
singularity of the body is captured in the image and, consequently, the bodily form is torn 
from any notion of identity bar the stockings. While Agamben wants to suggest that this 
commodification of the body - an unanchored, fluid, semblance of broken, hungry and 
struggling bodies - is not a wholly negative experience, he is concerned that today we live in 
4 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community trans. M. Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993), 48. Cf. Also Jean-Luc Nancy' reflection on the status of the body after the death of God: 
With the death of God, we have lost this glorious body, this sublime body: this real symbol of his 
sovereign majesty, this microcosm of his immense work, and finally this visibility of the invisible, this 
mimesis of the inimitable. ' Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence trans. B. Holmes et at (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 191. 
Ibid. 
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`the age of the complete domination of the commodity form over all aspects of social life. "' 
Consequently, in a move that challenges the theory of hyper-scepticism of Baudrillard, 7 
Agamben suggests that `Dim Stockings' offers important political and social lessons in 
western capitalist societies. 
What was technologized was not the body, but its image. Thus the glorious 
body of advertising has become the mask behind which the fragile, slight 
human body continues its precarious existence, and the geometrical splendour 
of the "girls" covers over the long lines of the naked, anonymous bodies led 
to their death in the Lagers (camps), or the thousands of corpses mangled in 
the daily slaughter on the highways. 8 
Agamben warns us that the glossy, deracinated body - and pornography is exemplary here - 
might deflect our attention from the difficult labour of love (politics) and the visceral nature of 
human interaction. The demand for discretion in all things bodily is vindicated by Jean 
Amery's portrayal of his experiences of torture in Belgium in 1940. What the commodified 
body does not reveal is that, in Amery's terms, `Body = Pain = Death' in the context of 
torture. 9 
This caveat is powerfully communicated by Agamben and, in the three `Spiritual' 
exercises that I will outline in the next section, I will take full account of its force. 
Consequently, the exercises will, following Ignatius, take seriously the performance of 
Christian existence by way of the integration of the senses10 (body) in prayer (spirit) through 
imagination and reflection (mind) on the status of desire. The purpose of this performance, as 
Ignatius suggests, is to (re)constitute the self in relation to the scriptures. 
" 1 hope to expose 
6 Ibid., 49. 
7 Cf. Jean Baudrillard, `The Precession of Simulacra' Art &Text11 (1983), 3-47. 
x Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, 50. 
9 Jean Amery, At The Mind'. 's Limit trans. Sidney & Stella Rosenfeld (London: Granta, 1999), 34. 
10 Cf. Philip Endean, The Ignatian Prayer of the Senses' Heythrop Journal 31 (1990), 391-418. 
'' Ignatius of Loyola, Ignatius (? f Lovo/a: Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works (ed. ) G. E. Gans 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 136. 
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the irreducible nature of this theological subjectivity and the necessity of attending to the 
variety of registers through which it is formed and performed. However, it is important to 
stress that the category of the body, which I believe is an essential ingredient in any 
investigation of contemporary subjectivity, is a largely neglected field of enquiry within 
theological anthropology. 12 
As with desire, the body has been understood as a dangerous outsider or a threatening 
alien presence to any serious consideration of the nature of being human, although recently 
more and more attention is being paid to the corporeal nature of religiosity. 13 This innovation 
is due, in part at least, to the important contribution of recent French theory through its 
prominent treatment of the bodily nature of subjectivity and the latter's exclusion from 
theology, philosophy and psychoanalysis. This strategic engagement with embodiment often 
occurs while stressing the subterranean and concealed manipulation of bodies in the discursive 
examination of subjects. There are two recent contributions to our understanding of the body 
that will aid our investigation. The first is recent feminist thought. Luce Irigaray is exemplary 
here in that she challenges any notion that structures of desire and exchange can be analysed 
without an understanding of which (or whose) bodies are implicated in these economies. 14 In 
addition, Julia Kristeva reminds us in Tales of Lore that a particularly significant characteristic 
of Christianity is the prominence it gives to a body which, although annihilated, changes the 
very terms through which a sacrificial economy operates: `Not only is the sacrifice temporary 
(the body of Christ will be resurrected in all its integrity)' but this resurrection serves to 
15 recover the body of the faithful in its own fullness and integrity. This thematic returns in 
12 Exemplary here is Pannenberg's prioritisation of the internal, conscious ego. The body, to be sure, is 
considered to be one's own but this fact is only mediated by one's experience of the world. Cf. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God trans. P. Clayton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1990), 53. Cf. Also Chapter Two of this study. 
1; Cf. For example, Sarah Coakley (ed. ) Religion and the Body (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) and Philip A. Mellor & Chris Shilling, Re-forming the Body: Religion, Communiti" and 
Modernity (London: Sage, 1997). 
14 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies trans. G. C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
esp. 75-88. 
15 Julia Kristeva, Tales of I, oi'e trans. L. S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 142 
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Kristeva's challenge to, and revisioning of, feminist ethics in relation to the cult of the Virgin. 
The expurgated body of motherhood is realigned with Mary in a parallel column (within the 
text) that reflects the experience of embodied motherhood and its exclusion from the text of 
the tradition. 16 These two thinkers question the evacuation of bodiliness from the examination 
of subjectivity and do not eschew the erotic and visceral nature of human interaction. 
The second strand of recent French theory that has been instrumental in retrieving the 
body is Michel Foucault's reflections on the importance of understanding the significance of 
bodily regimes in any analysis of truth and belief. There are two major terms with which 
Foucault approaches his subject, `technology' and `governmentality'. The first of these terms 
- technology - refers to the taking-place of the self. It is an active and vigorous crafting of the 
self in that a technology `seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming 
the subject, of transforming ourselves. '17 The second term - governmentality - refers to more 
direct demands on conduct. `The contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is 
tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think, government. ' 
19 The 
contact point may well be desire, space or practice but governmentality is an `art' 
19 that is 
prevalent in any social context. Crucially, this art is not that which is always imposed by a 
hegemonic power but is often pursued in order to craft alternative, resistant forms of life and 
practice. 
These recent theoretical reflections on the status of the body are a significant challenge 
to any constructive attempt to engage with the standing of the self in a theological context. 
Consequently, I want to insist that, as with desire, the full force and significance of human 
16 Ibid., 234-263. 
17 Michel Foucault, 'About the beginning of the hermeneutics of the self Religion and ('rilture b}' 
Michel Foucault (ed. ) J. Carrette (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 161 n. 4. 
is Ibid., 162. 
19 Ibid. 
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embodiment has been depreciated in modem theological anthropology as individual identity 
has been predicated on the internal constitution of the subject in self-consciousness. 
Christianity, however, has always had a complex relationship with and attitude to the body. 
While, particularly in late antiquity, the body was seen as problematic, it was nevertheless 
understood as the vehicle for a new being-in-common that was inscribed with an 
eschatological anticipation. One example of this transformed understanding of the role and 
significance of the body is supplied by Peter Brown who suggests that Oxigen `was prepared 
to look at sexuality in the human person as if it were a mere passing phase. ' 20 The body. in 
this context, was a site at which the transformation of the body politic was clearly 
demonstrated. A concomitant of a future-oriented attitude to sexuality is a transformation in 
intersubjective practice. This is not simply true of the church of late antiquity but, according 
to John Zizioulas, remains a major feature of the unique nature and constitution of the 
ecclesia. Zizioulas contends that the body affirms a `separation from other unities or 
"hypostases"' 21 in its natural state and that in the context of redemption `the constitutional 
make-up of the hypostasis should be changed' or adapted for a `new mode of existence. ' 22 
The suggestion here is that the body is transformed in its inclusion in the body of Christ. 
However, in the analysis of Zizioulas it is the ontological transformation that is emphasised. 
He is not concerned to pursue the practical, experiential, and indeed visceral elements of the 
being-in-common of the church- ecclesial intersubjectivity is engendered through ontological 
change. Here, for all the importance of an ontology of personhood, I am concerned - after 
Girard - to explore bodily, desire-led practices that characterise a theological anthropology 
within the context of late- or post-modernity. The aestheticization of the body, 
23 as Agamben 
avers, is part of a wider cultural shift that requires a theological response that is related to 
bodily and desire-led practices. While ontology is an important area of enquiry in theological 
20 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Meer, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early, Christianity 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 168. 
11 John Zizioulas, Being as ('ommunion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: DLT, 
1985), 51. 
Ibid., 53. 
23 Cf Hal Foster, The Return of the Real: The Arant-Garde at the End of the ('entufl (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1996), 219-223. 
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anthropology it tends to maintain the status of the latter as a culturally `safe' discourse. I wish 
to suggest that in the face of the aestheticization and comnmodification of the body. Christian 
practices must stage - to borrow Jon Savage's phrase -a `theatre of provocation'. 
`' My next 
task is to expose three such stagings. 
7.3: Making Bowels Move 
I attended to a bodily understanding of subjectivity in Chapter Two. There I borrowed 
William Connolly's notion of the `visceral modes of appraisal'25 or judgement through which 
intersubjectivity moves. This provides, I argued, a way of thinking self-other relations 
beyond the confines of Habermas's communicative reason. In response, through an 
examination of three biblical passage, I want to consider the shape and pattern of a theological 
anthropology that attends to the various `registers' which, as it were, constitute a subject in a 
Christian environment. Consequently. I will consider the performance of the self in relation to 
the body and desire in a manner close to the method of the Ignatian exercises that I visited in 
the last chapter. There the exercitant is `composed' through the use of the imagination: he or 
she recrafts themselves in relation to the scriptures. 
26 This composition brings together 
imaginative reflection on the datum of revelation, the cultivation of desire through the desire 
of divine desire and the living re-enactment of a response to divine self-expression. 
Furthermore, as I suggested in my engagement with the Exercises in the last chapter, a 
recurring theme of the Ignatian vision is the requirement of embodied struggle against that 
which dehiunanizes. In these three exercises, this existential struggle is a pivotal consideration 
in both reflection and action. 
24 Jon Savage, England's Dreaming: Sex Pistols and Punk Rock (London: Faber & Faber, 1991), 240 
25 William 1: Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 
27 
26 Ignatius of Loyola, I natius (? f Lotola: Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works (ed. ) G. E. Gans 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 136. 
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The biblical passages I have chosen to stage are, respectively, I Kings 3: 16-28. Song 
of Solomon 5: 2-6: 3 and Luke 15: 11-24.27 
7.3.1: 'Her Bowels Yearned upon Her Son ' 
The Judgement of Solomon is a celebrated and much-quoted narrative. The passage 
concerns two women who come to the King in order that he might arbitrate in a dispute. The 
discord between the two women centres on the identity of a child. Both women have given 
birth to sons within the space of three days. The claim of the woman who gave birth first is 
that her child has been stolen and replaced with the cadaver of the second woman's son who 
died on the night of his birth. The second woman disputes this account and claims that the 
baby is rightly hers for she bore him. An argument ensues and each party continues to plead 
her case. Solomon calls for a sword and suggests that as each woman continues to place a 
legitimate claim on possession of the baby, the case can only be decided equitably through the 
allotment of half the baby to each woman. The child's body is to be divided and distributed 
justly. However, the text tells us that the woman whose son was threatened with dissection 
acted in a singular, if not peculiar, manner. 
But the woman whose son was alive said to the king - because compassion for 
her son burned within her - `Please, my Lord, give her the living boy; 
certainly do not kill him! ' The other said, `It shall be neither mine nor yours; 
divide it. ' (v. 26, NRSV) 
The mother's plea to resolve the conflict is a form of answering that is antithetical to the 
`throat-cutting' of the distributive justice proposed by Solomon, a justice that is measured in 
its coming to decision. Central here is not a reflection on universals, freedom or voluntarism 
but the integrity of the infant other. 
27 All biblical references and versions are taken from Bible Works 4.0 by Hermeneutika. 
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This integrity, and the concomitant desire to see the child live rather than die. is not 
situated in the midst of a normative agenda but at a threshold that presents a passage through 
which justice continuously enters -a dispensation signified as `because compassion for her son 
burned within her. ' The Hebrew here, nikmeru rahamay alaw, rather than simply signifying 
the presence of strong emotion presents the desire for the child in thoroughly visceral terms: 
`her wombs (sic) grew hot on behalf of the child. ' The term nikmeru suggests that the viscera 
were burning: the word is also used to describe the heat of an oven. 28 It is, however, the 
`wombs' that are of significant interest here. The King James version renders this passage as 
`for her bowels yearned upon her son', while the Douai-Reims version suggests `for her 
bowels were moved upon her child. ' Wombs or bowels, the term nikmeru rahamay almvv 
offers a thoroughly embodied response in which the viscera (the term of the Vulgate) are 
moved beyond the mother and towards the son in an ec-static movement of love. A desire for 
the child that comes out of the womb is literally (or viscerally) advanced in a movement of the 
wombs or the bowels, a responsive and responsible action that is a liminal (yet physical) 
generosity. Justice here is a suspension (dispensation) of statutes, of the Law, and not a 
distribution (dispensation) of desserts. To be just is to become the gift bodily, a gift 
engendered by the desire for the other, a desire that is ultimately desirable because divine 
desire is understood and experienced as gift. This desiring goes beyond the confines of the 
altercation to the point of its resolution and, in its motion towards the body of the child, 
becomes a generous composure. 
Making bowels move, then, is a technology - to borrow Foucault's term - not of the 
subject, but of a taking-place of the self because of and through the other. It is a theme, or 
practice, that is echoed by Agamben. He recounts how 
2 David Clines, ed. The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, Vol. II' (Sheffield. Sheffield Academic Press, 
1998), 429.1 am grateful to John Sawyer for assistance with Hebrew and Greek translations and for 
many helpful conversations on the subject of viscera. 
Z4) 
Towards the end of his life the great Arabist Louis Massignon, who in his 
youth had daringly converted to Catholicism in the land of Islam, founded a 
community called Badaliya, a name deriving from the Arabic term for 
`substitution'. The members took a vow to live substituting them. celvves for 
someone else, that is, to be Christians in the place of others. 29 
According to Massignon, this `substitution' is not a means of compensation, an attempt to 
bring others up to the measure of the righteous, nor is it concerned with correction. On the 
contrary, it is an ecstatic repositioning of the self by `exiling oneself to the other as he or she 
is in order to offer Christ hospitality in the other's own soul, in the other's own taking- 
place. '30 Thus, the space of hospitality which exceeds one's own place is an empty space 
offered to the one irrevocable hospitality. ' 31 This exceeding is situated within an economy of 
desire for the other and of the other. 
This excessive and irrevocable hospitality is performed by the child's mother. 
However, the text of the Judgement of Solomon suggests that all Israel - because of the 
wisdom of Solomon's judgement - stood in awe and perceived the wisdom of God active in 
the work of the king. Nevertheless, it is the mother of the child who is famous in a reading of 
the text as a spiritual exercise. It is not the ruse of distributive justice that ensures the infant's 
bodily integrity, but the mother's rejection of violence that can only be understood as a 
visceral form of engagement with her son. The passage prompts an understanding of 
subjectivity that is right and proper only in that it exceeds the self and encompasses or 
embraces the taking-place of the other. The bowels or wombs enact a graceful response, a 
taking the place of the other that occurs in a motion towards and with the other that is 
engendered by a desire that encompasses both. 
29 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming ('ommlinity, 23. 
30 Ibid., 24. 
31 Ibid. 
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7.3.2: Mv Bowels Yearned for Him' 
Such a graceful response is also evident in that beautiful love poem. The Song of 
Solomon. Chapter 5: 2 -6: 3 recounts the visit of the lover to his beloved. 32 In short, the male 
lover comes to the room of the female beloved, knocks at the door and requests entry. She. 
naked and bathed, resists but, after the incident recounted in verse 4, she yields to her desire. 
The beloved woman opens the door but her lover has flown and she searches for him even 
though she forfeits her dignity in the process (v. 7). But she remains `faint with love' (v. 8) 
and tells of his beauty and magnificence: `My beloved is all radiant and ruddy. distinguished 
among ten thousand' (v. 10). 
For Bernard of Clairvaux, the status of the naked woman is one of comprehensive 
sinfulness. 33 Yet, there is, in Bernard's terms, the possibility of redemption from sin in the 
selflessness of her bearing and behaviour. 34 The `liquid myrrh' that drips from the woman's 
hands in response to her lover represents, for Bernard, the status of the Christian as one who 
bestows his or her very self upon others. The active movement of the myrrh suggests, in short, 
the 
dew of mercy, overflowing with affectionate kindness, making yourself all 
things to all men yet pricing your deeds like something discarded in order to 
be ever and everywhere ready to supply to others what they need, in a word, 
so dead to yourself that you live only for others - if this be you, then you 
obviously and happily possess the third and best of all ointments sand 
your 
hands have dripped with liquid myrrh that is utterly enchanting. 
32 Francis Landy suggests that the first verse of Chapter 5 is significant in that the male desire for the 
female lover is consummated in fulfilment. Landy further suggests that there is something deeply 
egotistic about the course of this journey of enjoying her `fruits' to the point of satisfaction. Cf. Francis 
Lands, Paradoxes of Paradise: Identity and Difference in the Song of Songs (Sheffield: The Almond 
Press, 1983), 107-109. 
33Bernard of Clairvaux, On the Song of Songs I: The Works of Bernard of C/airvarix, Vol. 2 trans. K. 
Walsh (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), Sermon 3: 3, p. 18. 
4 Ibid., Sermon 10: 6, p. 64. 
35 Ibid., Sermon 12: 1, p. 78. 
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There is a disinterestedness in her giving that Bernard sees as an exemplary form of Christian 
giving. However, it is interesting that Bernard ignores the male lover's role in this affair and 
the woman's response that is exposed with reference to the movement of her bowels. This 
part of the text is a central, visceral moment that give weight and significance to the form of 
erotic giving. Verse 4 reads 
My beloved put his hand by the hole of the door, and my bowels were moved 
for him. (KJV) 
The first part of the verse is particularly obscure. Is the passage referring to a response of the 
woman that is stimulated by the sight of the man? The answer is yes, but Silvia Schroer and 
Thomas Staubi suggest that what is seen is not simply the hand. They suggest that in ancient 
Near Eastern literature and hieroglyphics, the hand is synonymous with the erect penis and that 
the interchangeability of the hand and penis is related to the active, fecund role of both of 
these bodily parts. 36 While they speculate on exactly what the text might be referring to - is it 
masturbation? - the point is that the scene is highly erotic. One lover moves forth towards the 
other on the basis of a visceral response ('my bowels were moved') and this desire for the 
other is a pivotal feature in the composition of a loving subject who exceeds herself. 
The erotic economy that is examined here runs counter to suggestions that love in 
relation to the divine is agapeic rather than erotic. 
37 The erotic leads human beings beyond 
themselves and before others. In the sexually-obsessed contemporary west, eros is trapped 
within an understanding of instant satisfaction that is narcissistic in character. 
38 The Song of 
36 Silvia Schroer & Thomas Staubli, Die Korpersymbolik der Bible (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag. 1998), 
187-188. 
37 The most famous example being Anders Nygren's analysis. Cf. His Agape and Eros trans. P. S. 
Watson (London: SPCK, 1953), esp., 52 where Nygren suggests, after distinguishing a selfless Christian 
love (agape) with Greek eros, that `There is no way which leads over from eros to agape. ' 
38 Cf. Mark Vernon's discussion of Foucault's insistence that what we need is not to be liberated 
sexually but to be liberated from the hegemony of `sex'. Mark Vernon, "'I am not what I am" - 
Foucault, Christian Asceticism and a "way out" of Sexuality' Religion and ('crhure by Michel Foucault 
(ed. ) J. Carrette (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), esp. 199-200. 
'46 
Solomon presents a wholly different performance of the erotic that takes one out of the self- 
indulgence of, and fixation with, `sexual satisfaction' and `techniques' designed to attain the 
maximum pleasure for oneself to a bodily practice of love. In this love poem, eros leads one 
into a quest or journey of discovery in which love is the primary factor. The desire that is 
fuelled by the desire of the other entices lovers into a bodily identity - an 1' - that is 
predicated on the other and results in one `dripping with myrrh' - an identity that is given for 
and because of the other. Nevertheless, the text does not reject the bodily, and gloriously 
39 instinctual - some would say animalistic - form of eros that is an intrinsic element in the 
composition and performance of love. The relationship between the lovers is full-blooded, to 
say the least. 
Taking Ignatius as a guide, the bodily response in the verse 4 can be contrasted with 
the woman's humiliation in verse 7 where she is beaten, and wounded. As with Jean Amery's 
understanding of his experience of torture, the bodily abuse of the other results in the 
`dissolution of the world' or even, the `de-creation of the created world. ' 40 The composure of 
a self who responds erotically to the desire of the other is also the creation of a way of life that 
counters and questions dehumanizing practice in the performance of a grace-ful love. The 
body can, potentially, be absolutely separated or utterly dissolved in violence but the erotic 
comportment exposes the body of the other and desires its embrace, not its complete 
decomposition or its unqualified detachment. 
7.3.3: `All His Bowels Move' 
39 1 am alluding here to Gerard Loughlin's discussion of Balthasarian erotics. Cf his `Erotics: God's 
Sex' Radical Orihodoxy: A New Theology (eds) J. Milbank, C. Pickstock & G. Ward (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 147-148. 
4" Elaine Scarrv, The Boy in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 45. 
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The final of my three exercises is performed in dialogue with the desire of the father 
in Luke 15: 11-24. There is no need to recount the story but, for the purpose of this reading. 
the significant action is the son's return to the father after the former's self-imposed exile. The 
text suggests that the son makes his return to his Father's house in the hope that he will be 
accepted back as a hired hand (v. 17). `So he set off and went to his father. But while he «was 
still far off, his father saw him and was filled with compassion; he ran and put his arms around 
him and kissed him' (v. 20. NRSV). The father's response, csplanchnisthe, suggests a form 
of pity that is severe in its connection to the movement of the guts. 41 Again, the viscera is a 
central motif (confirmed by the Vulgate). The father is viscerally moved in response to the 
return of his son. His inner and outer movement is as if it is one as this gut-wrenching 
experience that exceeds the father is at the same time a motion towards the child: he ran and 
put his arms around him and kissed him. ' 
The theme of the embodied, visceral performance is echoed in The Scottish Psalter's 
paraphrase of the story of the Prodigal Son. The father's ecstatic corporeality is characterised 
as a being-in-common that is rendered thus: 
The father sees him from afar 
and all his bowels move. 42 
The passage places hospitality, the provision of a space that is contrived by means of a bodily 
movement, at the centre of Christian practice. And participation in a Christian He concerns 
the fort-nation or composition of certain instincts that require constant rehearsal and cultivation 
in order that they can accord with the hermeneutic of the gift that distinguishes 
intersubjectivity in this context. If `making bowels move' is a technology that is appropriate 
41 Cf. H. G. Liddel & R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon 7th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1883), 1416. 
42 Church of Scotland, The Scottish Psalter and Scripture Paraphrases (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1929), 217. 
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to the delineation of a theological anthropology then this hermeneutic is predicated on the 
father's desire to move out towards and embrace the child. A transformation of the self is 
performed in the movement that leads to the embrace with the other. 
Conclusion: The Composition of Hospitality 
Each of these three exercises in reading and performing scripture suggest that 
Christian existence requires a particular composition that is antithetical to the inherent guilt of 
capitalism that I outlined in Chapter One, in my criticisms of deconstructi on's negative 
anthropology. In contrast to a resituation of the self that is predicated on the non-experience 
of death, these exercises reconfigure the subject on the basis of a hermeneutic of gift that is 
enacted. This (re)composition of the self is an on-going process that requires both hard work 
and an openness to risk and provisionality -a point that I pursued in the last chapter with 
regard to Levinas's reading of Genesis 18. Here I want to emphasise a notion of subjectivity 
that takes place beyond one's own place in that a hospitable space is opened up by the desire 
of and for the other. Its reference point is generally called the Kingdom of God but this space 
is, to borrow Agamben's characterisation of the purpose of Badaliya, `an empty space, offered 
to the one irrevocable hospitality. ' 
43 And the other name for this space is `ease'. 
The term `ease' designates, according to its etymology, the space adjacent 
(ad-jacens, adjacentia), the empty place where each can move freely, in a 
semantic constellation where spatial proximity borders on opportune time 
(ad-aý; io, moving at ease) and convenience borders on the correct relation. 
44 
41 Giorgio Agamben, The Corning Community, 24. 
44 1hid. _ 
25. 
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This place of ease or love cannot be either delimited or formalised. There is no measure to its 
temporality or its spatiality. It can, however. be practised and the ease with which the 
protagonists of the three passages above move their whole being to and for the other provides 
one visceral technique, marked by the movement of the bowels, that is wholly appropriate to 
the immeasurable. Their desire moves them compassionately and physically beyond both 
petty preoccupations and rivalry towards the possibility of enacting a wholly different 
`interdividual' subjectivity. 
This theme of irrevocable hospitality and external desire is echoed by Girard in his 
discussion of the status of the Kingdom. He suggests that the Kingdom is a place of love that 
is characterised by the elimination of violence. Violence is a `closed kingdom' in which the 
other is a threat. 45 There is no taking the place of the other except through the dissolution of 
the other. For this reason, Girard suggests that `the real human subject can only come out of 
the rule of the Kingdom. '46 Only in relation to the enactment of the unrepresentable, of that 
which is `without price', 47 can subjectivity be realised. This space in which subjectivity is at 
`ease', however, is not a utopia but the that which gives birth to a desire which takes subjects 
beyond themselves because it constitutes their very being. And it is on the basis of this desire 
that one can begin to speak of a theological anthropology. 
45 R. Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World in collaboration with J-N1 Oughourlian 
and G. Lefort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 197. 
46 Ibid., 199. 
47 Jean-Luc Nancy, `The Insufficiency of 'Values' and the Necessity of `Sense" Cultural Values l :l 
(1997), 128 
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